NEW DELHI: In his third term as Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s foreign policy has entered a phase marked by strategic consolidation, institutional maturity, and functional prioritisation. No longer focused on optics or diaspora mobilisation, India’s global engagements are now driven by trade agreements, defence supply chains, and digital partnerships that align with long-term national interests.
PM Modi’s recent visits to the United Kingdom and the Maldives in July 2025— where he signed a landmark Free Trade Agreement with Britain and led a diplomatic reset with President Muizzu—are not isolated events, but part of a calibrated shift. “We’re not the ones trying to get into the room anymore. We are hosting the room,” said a senior MEA official, encapsulating a decade-long evolution that has seen India move from the periphery to the centre of global decision-making. The long-awaited IndiaUK Free Trade Agreement has been described by British officials as the UK’s most comprehensive trade pact since Brexit. Since 2021, India has signed five Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or equivalent trade pacts to bolster economic ties with key partners.
These include the India-Mauritius Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) signed in 2021, the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2022, and the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) also in 2022. Additionally, India signed the India-EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) in 2024 with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, followed by the India-UK Free Trade Agreement in 2025.
These numbers become more significant considering that before this, India had seven full-fledged trade agreements in force. These included bilateral pacts with Sri Lanka, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and regional agreements such as the India-ASEAN FTA and SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Area).
The India-Bhutan Trade Agreement, though technically a trade and transit treaty, is often included in this list due to its broad economic provisions and long-standing implementation framework. The visit to the Maldives on 25-26 July marked a significant diplomatic reset between the two countries, coming after a period of strained ties under President Mohamed Muizzu’s “India Out” campaign. Invited as the Guest of Honour for the Maldives’ 60th Independence Day celebrations, PM Modi’s presence underscored both symbolic outreach and substantive engagement. During the visit, multiple Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and agreements were signed.
India extended a Line of Credit worth Rs 4,850 crore to Maldives and signed an amendment agreement aimed at reducing annual debt repayment obligations on Government of India-funded lines of credit. The two countries finalised the terms of reference for launching an India-Maldives Free Trade Agreement.
MoUs were also signed on cooperation in the fields of fisheries and aquaculture, meteorology and environmental sciences, and digital transformation. A network-to-network agreement between India’s NPCI International Payment Limited and the Maldives Monetary Authority will enable the use of UPIbased digital payments in the Maldives, marking a major leap in financial interoperability. Additionally, the Maldives formally recognised the Indian Pharmacopoeia, enhancing pharmaceutical collaboration. A joint commemorative stamp was issued to mark 60 years of diplomatic ties between the two nations.
These high-level engagements capped a decadelong evolution in India’s foreign policy. Since assuming office in May 2014, PM Modi has made 91 overseas visits across 78 countries, the most by any Indian Prime Minister. Officials say the nature of these engagements has transformed significantly—from diaspora-driven optics to focused partnerships built around defence, digital infrastructure, energy, and global governance. In sharp contrast to the UPA era’s more measured foreign policy, PM Modi’s first term saw an assertive campaign of global engagement. “India was reintroducing itself to the world,” a senior official with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), who is now retired, recalled. “Visibility was the objective.”
Between 2014 and 2019, PM Modi visited over 50 countries. From 2019 onward, the tempo declined, but the depth of engagement increased. “The shift has been from breadth to depth,” said an MEA official involved in strategic coordination. “Modi-2’s foreign policy was about measurable outcomes—defence deals, digital frameworks, institutional agreements— not just visibility.” In these entire three terms, the Gulf region has emerged as a cornerstone.
PM Modi made seven visits to the UAE, three to Saudi Arabia, and in 2024 inaugurated the first Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi, an act described by officials as “emblematic of deep mutual trust.” In December 2024, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister in over four decades to visit Kuwait, where he signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement and received the Order of Mubarak the Great, the country’s highest civilian honour. In October 2024, he visited Russia for the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit, where he was awarded the Order of St. Andrew and announced new Indian consulates in Kazan and Yekaterinburg. “The transformation of Gulf ties from transactional to strategic is among the most significant shifts in India’s foreign policy in the last decade,” a senior MEA source said. That trajectory was further reinforced in April 2025 during the Indian PM’s visit to Riyadh for the second meeting of the India-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council.
Europe also saw deepened engagement. Modi has visited France eight times, including for the AI Action Summit in February 2025, where he co-chaired discussions on tech and climate governance. In the same week, he made his tenth visit to the United States, holding high-level meetings focused on semiconductor production and defence cooperation. “AI, chips, and logistics have replaced stadium rallies,” said an Indian diplomat who was earlier posted in Washington, pointing to the shift from diaspora-centric events to policy-focused dialogues.
In March 2025, PM Modi was Chief Guest at Mauritius’ National Day celebrations, receiving the country’s highest civilian honour and signing agreements on education, healthcare, and digital infrastructure. In June 2025, Modi embarked on bilateral visits to Cyprus and Croatia, followed by a meeting in Canada during the G7 Summit, where both countries agreed to resume full diplomatic engagement.
Officials described this as part of India’s attempt to diversify European partnerships, especially in the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The same logic of diversification extended to Africa and Latin America. In July 2025, the PM undertook his longest diplomatic tour in over a decade, visiting Ghana, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, and Namibia in eight days. In Ghana, he addressed the National Assembly and received the country’s highest civilian award. In Brazil, he attended the BRICS Summit in Rio, while in Trinidad & Tobago he received the Order of the Republic and announced an extension of OCI eligibility to sixth-generation diaspora. According to MEA officials, these visits were part of India’s strategic “Global South consolidation.”
In November 2024, PM Modi had visited Nigeria for the first time in 17 years, reviving defence and maritime ties, followed by participation in the India-CARICOM summit in Guyana. “India is repositioning itself as a leader in climate finance, energy access, and digital inclusion,” said a senior officer who helped coordinate the five-nation tour. “These visits weren’t ceremonial. They were aimed at cementing longterm voting and economic partnerships in Africa and Latin America.”
In Southeast Asia, where India’s Act East policy once promised robust engagement, travel has been limited. Barring summit meetings with Japan (seven visits) and Indonesia (three visits), PM Modi’s notable engagements include a joint trip to Thailand and Sri Lanka in April 2025 during the BIMSTEC Summit. Bilateral outreach to Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea has been minimal in recent years. “We’ve moved from region-wide activism to issue-specific alignment,” one official said, referencing India’s expanding presence in BIMSTEC and Indo-Pacific frameworks.
A brief visit to Laos for the East Asia Summit in October 2024 was one of the few standalone ASEANfocused engagements. MEA officials say global developments such as the Russia-Ukraine war, USChina rivalry, and Covid-19 disruptions have also shaped India’s travel agenda. “We had to balance ties with Russia while expanding in Europe. We had to deepen tech links with the West without falling into bloc politics,” the official explained. India’s G20 presidency in 2023 and its hosting of key multilateral events in 2024- 25 added momentum to a foreign policy that is now described as structured, goal-driven, and institutionally grounded. “We’re not the ones trying to get into the room anymore. We are hosting the room,” said an official who was a part of the larger group that handled the G20 event. This institutional maturity is visible in how foreign trips are planned today.
“Earlier, the diaspora events were headline acts. Now, the headlines are the MOUs, the strategic dialogues, the logistics agreements,” the officer quoted above said. The fact that 27 countries have conferred their highest state honours on him is, in many ways, a testament to the personal diplomacy PM Modi brings to his foreign engagements. Officials say that in PM Modi’s third term, foreign policy will be defined not by geography but by functional priorities — energy security, defence supply chains, digital regulation, and sustainable finance.
The infrastructure laid down during PM Modi’s first two terms has positioned India as a pole of influence in a fragmented global order. But officials acknowledge that much of this transformation has been driven by the Prime Minister’s personal diplomacy. “The real test,” one MEA officer said, “will be whether these partnerships outlast the leader who built them.”
