INTRODUCTION
Vappala Balachandran, a former Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, played a key but unobtrusive role in preparing for Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988. He writes how Deng held the young Prime Minister’s hand and said “there is much we can achieve together. There is nothing we can achieve by being antagonists.” Drawing on his personal experience at a founding moment in the diplomatic opening between India and China, the author offers a thoughtful history of the relations since then. His book, “India and China at Odds in the Asian Century: A Diplomatic and Strategic History” explores the complex and often fraught relationship between India and China, particularly in the context of their rising global influence.
The book delves into the historical, diplomatic, and strategic dimensions of their rivalry, highlighting areas of both cooperation and conflict. While the title suggests a focus on their competition, the book also examines internal political dynamics within India that shapes its foreign policy. The Chinese-Indian thaw, which lasted until 1998, prompted highly optimistic visions of a “China-India Century of Cooperation”, enabling both countries to compete with the US and EU. None of this happened, and instead the ChinaIndia relationship today is punctuated by border clashes between the People’s Liberation Army and the Indian Army.
The Book
Structured into three main parts, the book chronologically and thematically traces the India-China relationship: Part I, India and China, Ancient and Modern; Part II, Shaping the Idea of India; and Part III, The Contemporary Relationship, which delves into the evolving bilateral dynamics including the strategic recalibrations, military tensions, and geopolitical realignments under the Modi administration. The book traces the long history of connections and divergences between India and China, including ancient ties and early diplomatic efforts.
Balachandran revisits how Indian and Chinese philosophies, trade routes, and Buddhism intersected. Balachandran observes that “The Buddhist circuits were not merely spiritual but strategic routes for both trade and diplomacy,” highlighting how early civilisational links between India and China were underpinned by considerations beyond religious exchange. The book meticulously outlines how China’s worldview is rooted in the historical “tributary system”, which today is manifesting in strategies such as the BRI. He notes the ideological mismatch between the two nations: “Nehru’s romanticism of Asian solidarity collided fatally with Mao’s revolutionary realism,” underscoring the foundational divergence in their postcolonial trajectories.
He writes that the Panchsheel Treaty “failed to address the specific ChinaIndia border problem” and that “Nehru’s inclination to support the Asian fraternity came into direct conflict with the national prerequisites of security”. He then writes about the Jan Pasqualini spy case in 1957, who confessed to be using the “Indian Embassy as a drop box for British intelligence” and states that “ no China watcher in India has connected this with Mao’s anger towards India”. Moving to contemporary politics, Balachandran critiques India’s defence posture, remarking that “India’s reluctance to invest in border infrastructure was not strategic restraint it was institutional lethargy,” thereby pointing to bureaucratic procedures and attitude rather than deliberate policy.
Balachandran analyses the UPA government’s tightrope walk between engaging China economically and responding to its assertiveness on the border. He discusses the hawk-dove divide within the Indian establishment, laying bare internal contradictions. “The NDA Years,” brings the narrative to a moment in modern history with the assessment that “The Galwan clash marked a decisive moment. It ended an illusion, not a policy,” framing the 2020 confrontation as a wake-up call that shattered decades of diplomatic pretence.
He also cautions against muscular nationalism: “The late General Bipin Rawat…assured the nation that China would be paid ‘in the same coin’ if it attempted another ‘Galwan’ incident.” He critiques the NDA government’s alignment with the US and the Quad, especially post-2014, arguing that it has added friction to Sino-Indian ties even while attempting to bolster India’s maritime and cyber posture. He also dissects the mixed results of India’s “Act East” and Quad diplomacy, while warning of strategic overreach without matching economic or military capacity.
“New Delhi has gravitated towards the US in the hope of checkmating an assertive Beijing’s pursuit of global military and trade dominance,” he writes a key insight into India’s strategic hedging. But these lengthy and highly detailed chapters on Indian domestic politics seem removed from the Sino-Indian relationship. Balachandran also offers an insider’s view of India’s intelligence and security apparatus, often pointing out where systemic weaknesses have led to strategic surprises, particularly during border stand-offs. He also examines how India’s internal political landscape, particularly the rise of Hindu nationalism, shapes its foreign policy towards China.
He cites the US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2040, noting: “China would expect deference from neighbours on trade, resource exploitation, and territorial disputes…” Balachandran argues that India’s twin goals—strategic autonomy and counter-balancing China through multilateralism—are increasingly difficult to reconcile. He recommends clearer policy prioritisation and internal capacity-building.
China, meanwhile, continues to consolidate its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region through infrastructure investments and strategic alliances. Despite rhetorical commitments to peaceful development, Beijing has intensified its pressure on India’s periphery, from strengthening ties with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal to advancing its interests in Bhutan’s border zones. India’s response, including its growing alignment with the Quad and other IndoPacific frameworks, signals a shift towards multilateral deterrence rather than bilateral engagement. Balachandran’s emphasis on the need for strategic clarity, institutional reform, and internal capacity-building resonates against this backdrop.
Presently, India-China relations remain strained, marked by a lingering trust deficit post the 2020 clash in Eastern Ladakh. While high-level talks have prevented escalation, a comprehensive disengagement remains elusive. Balachandran’s warnings about reactive Indian diplomacy appear increasingly prescient in this context. He is concerned about India’s overt securitisation of the bilateral relationship without building sufficient economic or technological resilience to counter China’s structural advantages.
The continuity in the narrative lies in India’s quest for strategic autonomy and how China, at different junctures, has perceived and reacted to it. The book also reflects on the failure of Track-II diplomacy, bureaucratic inertia, and overdependence on Western strategic frameworks. The merging of history, political theory, strategic studies, and intelligence analysis creates a rich tapestry of India-China relations.
CONCLUSION
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of India and China’s comparative strategic capabilities, sharing many insights drawn from his experience and study. Written by a practitioner-scholar with both academic rigour and policy insight, the book’s greatest contribution lies in it being a bridge between the corridors of power and the world of scholarship in understanding the complexities of the India-China relationship.
Its structure allows for a chronological as well as analytical understanding of the IndoChinese dynamics from historical connections and philosophical divergence to contemporary foreign policy under two major political dispensations. While the book carefully charts the troubled path of China-India relations during the “Asian century” and offers astute assessments in an era of growing strategic competition between the two. The core of the book’s analysis rests on India’s fluctuating diplomatic outreach and China’s assertive transformation into a global power and debunks the optimism once attached to “Chindia” and the idea of an “Asian Century of Cooperation.”
However, much of his analysis of the relationship, is focused on the changing “idea of India” and how it bears on security. Other than the first two chapters and the book’s conclusion, the bulk of Balachandran’s observations are devoted to the “competing visions” of India by its two political parties.
The fact is that India and China, despite being old civilisations with a potential for cooperation, remain locked in an uneasy and mistrustful coexistence. This book deserves a place in the library of scholars, strategists, and decisionmakers to understand the past, present, and probable future of one of the most consequential rivalries in modern geopolitics.
Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM, retired from the Indian Army
