One Front, One Force: Theatreisation and the Future of India’s Wars

The debate over integrated theatre commands has intensified in recent months. With the government declaring 2025 as the “Year of Defence Reforms,” expectations were that India would finally move from deliberation to execution on this long-pending transformation. Instead, the proposal has run into stiff resistance, particularly from the Indian Air Force (IAF). Its leadership argues that scarce assets, the risk of doctrinal dilution, and the unsuitability of foreign models make theatreisation premature, even dangerous.

These concerns deserve to be heard. But when weighed against India’s security environment, operational needs, and decades of recommendations, theatreisation emerges not as a discretionary reform but as a national necessity.

Turf Protection vs National Interest

At the heart of the opposition lies institutional anxiety. The prospect of ceding operational control to joint theatre commanders unsettles service traditions, especially within the IAF, which has long valued independent command roles. This is not unique to India. From the United States to China to Russia, militaries have resisted such reforms before eventually embracing them. In every case, the shift to joint structures strengthened the services in the long run.

India cannot allow such anxieties, however genuine, to block the evolution of a future-ready force. Theatreisation is not about eroding identity or diminishing doctrine; it is about integrating strengths to fight as one.

Scarcity and the Fallacy of Fragmentation

The IAF’s principal objection is that with only 29–31 fighter squadrons — many of them ageing — dividing assets across theatres will blunt flexibility. But this rests on a false premise.

Theatreisation does not slice airpower into rigid regional quotas. Instead, it pools resources nationally and reallocates them dynamically depending on the operational need. Assets can be concentrated for decisive strikes or shifted swiftly between theatres. In fact, scarcity is precisely why integration is essential. Keeping resources locked in service silos wastes time and reduces responsiveness. When platforms are limited, duplication is the real enemy.

Doctrinal Concerns and Autonomy

Another worry is that theatreisation will subordinate air power to surface commanders, distorting doctrine and diminishing the IAF’s role. This is a misplaced fear. Doctrine will continue to evolve in service headquarters, training institutions, and staff colleges — none of which theatreisation seeks to abolish. What changes is the application of that doctrine in operations, where air, land, and maritime forces must function as one.

Far from eroding the relevance of air power, joint command enhances it. Aligning air, land, and maritime elements under a single commander ensures that air assets are employed at the decisive point, rather than operating in parallel. Global experience demonstrates that joint structures sharpen, not blunt, the impact of air forces.

Imported Models? No — Adaptation

Some critics describe theatreisation as a copy of American or Chinese systems. This too misreads the reform. Integration is not a foreign fad; it is a universal principle of modern war. Every major military has moved to joint commands because the changing character of warfare demands it.

India’s proposed structure — a Northern Theatre for the Chinese frontier, a Western Theatre for Pakistan, and a Maritime or Peninsular Theatre for the Indian Ocean — is uniquely tailored to our geography and challenges. This is not imitation but adaptation: learning from global practice while designing for Indian realities.

Operation Sindoor: Lessons in Multi-Domain Operations

The IAF has often pointed to Operation Sindoor as proof that centralised air planning delivers swift, decisive outcomes. The operation was indeed a success, but it must be understood for what it was: a short-duration punitive strike with limited objectives. It cannot be the yardstick for how India will fight a protracted, high-intensity war.

Sindoor, in fact, highlighted the very need for joint planning in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). Even in a limited conflict, synchronising surface fires, drones, loitering munitions, cyber support, and air strikes required careful orchestration. Seven of the nine targets were neutralised by Army weapon systems, emphasising the primacy of surface forces in shaping outcomes. The battlespace — stretching 70–80 kilometres in depth and up to 10,000 feet in altitude — was crowded with assets from multiple domains. Only joint planning allowed these capabilities to complement one another rather than interfere.

Sindoor demonstrated that jointness is indispensable even in limited operations. In a larger two-front war, the demand for joint planning across all domains will be even greater. That kind of real-time coordination cannot be delivered through centralised service-specific command; it requires empowered theatre-level authority.

Incrementalism Has Been Tried — and Failed

Another school of thought prefers incremental reforms: more coordination centres, stronger tri-service agencies, tighter joint planning. But India has walked this road for more than two decades, and the results are unconvincing.

The Kargil War of 1999 exposed delays in employing air power due to a lack of integrated planning. The Kargil Review Committee called for a Chief of Defence Staff and theatre commands. The Group of Ministers in 2001, the Naresh Chandra Task Force in 2011, and the Shekatkar Committee in 2016 all reinforced this recommendation. Yet what followed were half-steps: integrated headquarters, joint agencies, coordination bodies.

The outcome has been predictable. From Kargil to Balakot to Galwan, the same seams have been exposed. Incrementalism has been tested and found wanting. Only structural reform can deliver true jointness.

The Economic and Strategic Imperative

Theatreisation is not just operationally sound; it is economically prudent. India’s armed forces maintain 17 separate commands, each with its own logistics chain, training institutions, and administrative infrastructure. This duplication is costly and inefficient. At a time when modernisation demands every rupee, such waste is untenable.

Theatreisation rationalises support structures, reduces redundancy, and frees resources for investment in emerging domains such as drones, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and precision strike systems. The legal foundation has already been created through the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023, which empowers joint commanders with cross-service authority. The framework exists. The execution must follow.

A Paradigm Shift in Warfare

India’s existing structures reflect 20th-century, platform-centric thinking. But wars today are multi-domain by nature. Cyber, space, electronic, and information warfare now shape outcomes as much as tanks, ships, and aircraft. Adversaries like China and Pakistan are already preparing to exploit seams between services.

To persist with service-centric commands is to prepare for yesterday’s wars. To move to theatre commands is to prepare for tomorrow.

One Front, One Force

At its core, theatreisation is about the unity of effort. In each theatre of war, a single commander must be empowered to wield all instruments of combat power to achieve national objectives. Fragmented commands slow decisions, dilute combat power, and invite risk. Integrated commands accelerate tempo, simplify responsibility, and enhance deterrence.

This is not an Army model, a Navy model, or an Air Force model. It is a national model — designed to give India the ability to fight and win as one.

Theatreisation is not about eroding the autonomy of any service. It is about survival in an unforgiving security environment. Institutional concerns are understandable, but they must not outweigh the national imperative for reform.

China implemented theatreisation in under two years. India has debated it for more than two decades. Each year of hesitation weakens deterrence and emboldens adversaries.

Wars are no longer fought by services in silos. They are fought by nations as one force. Operation Sindoor proved the value of joint planning in multi-domain operations; the next conflict will demand it on an even larger scale. India must be prepared to fight the next war together — or risk losing it apart. The time to act is now.