NEW DELHI: The recently signed Saudi Arabia-Pakistan mutual defence pact represents more than another military arrangement between two long-time partners. According to Indian, Gulf and independent officials familiar with the matter, the agreement signals a strategic recalibration driven by Riyadh’s evolving security posture and Islamabad’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Beijing. Officials assessed that the pact reflects both Gulf unease over the reliability of American security guarantees and Pakistan’s attempt to diversify its external partnerships. “Riyadh is hedging against uncertainty, and Islamabad is looking for new patrons. But this is not a blank cheque—Saudi Arabia is also positioning itself to exercise greater leverage over Pakistan’s strategic behaviour,” a senior Indian security official said.
The Gulf’s declining trust in the United States has been building over several years. According to West Asia observers, the Iranian strike on Qatar earlier this year sharpened those concerns. The attack exposed the gap between Washington’s security assurances and its immediate operational response. Riyadh’s decision to sign a bilateral defence pact with Islamabad, bypassing U.S.-led frameworks, is viewed in New Delhi as part of this wider hedging strategy. “The U.S. remains central to Gulf security, but it is no longer the sole pillar,” one official noted.
While some commentators have suggested the agreement could be the foundation of a NATO-style alliance in the Gulf, officials dismissed this as unlikely. They pointed out that the region’s historical experience with the GCC’s (Gulf Cooperation Council) Peninsula Shield Force has shown the political limits of deep, treaty-based military integration. Instead, what is emerging is a more flexible, layered security architecture, built through a network of bilateral and trilateral arrangements. The Saudi-Pakistan pact, they said, fits into this trend as both signal and instrument.
Strategic comparisons are also being drawn with Ukraine and Qatar. Officials noted that both Kyiv and Doha faced moments when external security assurances provided by Washington proved less than automatic in practice. “Gulf capitals have internalised this lesson,” a senior Gulf source said. “Riyadh’s outreach to Islamabad must be understood in that light”.
For Pakistan, the pact is being projected domestically as proof of its rising military relevance. But independent officials believe the subtext is more complicated. Saudi Arabia’s extensive energy and economic ties with India give Riyadh strong incentives to avoid being pulled into any India–Pakistan confrontation. “Riyadh has now tied itself more closely to Islamabad’s behaviour,” one Western diplomat said. “If Pakistan-based actors escalate against India, Saudi Arabia will face both diplomatic and reputational costs. In effect, Riyadh becomes both patron and leash”. A line of thinking that was agreed to by two retired Indian diplomats.
The move also reflects Islamabad’s shifting external balancing. With the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) slowing, financing tightening, and Chinese asking questions, Pakistan is seeking to diversify its strategic dependencies. Officials said that by courting Riyadh and other Gulf partners, Islamabad is attempting to reduce its over-reliance on Beijing without severing ties. “It’s a tactical hedge, not a realignment,” a senior official presently with an international aid agency said. For Beijing, the concern appears less about losing influence and more about diminishing returns. Chinese engagement with Pakistan has visibly cooled, with officials noting that Beijing increasingly views Islamabad as a strategic black hole—one that absorbs resources without delivering commensurate benefits.
For the United States, the development underlines its diminishing monopoly over Gulf security. Washington is not being displaced but is now one actor among several. Indian strategic assessments view this shift as neither an immediate threat nor something to ignore. “This is not a dramatic turning point, but it is a marker,” one security official said. “Gulf states are hedging. Pakistan is manoeuvring, and big powers are adjusting to a less obedient periphery. For India, the right response is to keep its economic and diplomatic engagement with Riyadh steady and quiet”. Officials added that Saudi Arabia’s growing influence over Pakistan could work to India’s advantage by moderating Islamabad’s behaviour, provided New Delhi maintains deep economic ties and discreet diplomatic channels. “The Gulf is no longer a passive theatre,” a senior diplomat remarked. “But that also means India, as a major economic partner, has space to shape outcomes indirectly”.
