NEW DELHI: What is unfolding in Bangladesh today feels like a rupture few could have foreseen: a former Prime Minister sentenced to death, an interim government struggling for legitimacy, and a society shaken by ideological fractures, foreign influence, and resurgent extremism. A country once celebrated as a development success story now appears suspended between past traumas and future uncertainties. Yet this crisis is no longer Bangladesh’s alone. It has crossed the border and placed India at the centre of a diplomatic, ethical, and strategic storm.
Sheikh Hasina is in India, and Bangladesh wants her back. New Delhi now finds itself forced to choose between loyalty to a long-standing ally and the realities of an unpredictable regime next door. This is not merely a dispute over extradition; it is a defining moment for South Asia’s political trajectory.
Bangladesh’s political order did not collapse overnight. Tensions had been simmering for years over governance, economic pressures, and accusations of authoritarian excess. Still, the speed with which the state structure weakened surprised even those who anticipated unrest. Key ministries hesitated. Administrative orders faced pushback. Segments of the security apparatus, once firmly aligned with Hasina, began to step back. The country’s trajectory shifted not through dramatic confrontation but through this quiet erosion of institutional loyalty. The machinery that had supported the Awami League for fifteen years loosened, creating a vacuum into which opportunistic political actors quickly moved. What followed was not just a governmental transition but a dramatic rewriting of political alignments in Dhaka.
The current crisis cannot be understood without examining the broader geopolitical currents surrounding Bangladesh. Washington’s discomfort with Hasina’s growing proximity to Beijing had long been visible. But the point of rupture, many analysts argue, was her refusal to grant the United States strategic access to St. Martin’s Island—a tiny coral outpost with disproportionate importance for Indo-Pacific security. Control of the island offers oversight of India’s eastern seaboard, Myanmar’s naval theatre, and shipping lanes feeding the Malacca Strait. Hasina’s refusal to concede this ground was firm and public. The US response to the new interim government was notably swift—rapid recognition and a sudden warmth that had been absent in recent years. American officials deny any involvement in hastening Bangladesh’s power shift. But in a country deeply shaped by Cold War-era manoeuvring and regional proxy dynamics, such denials have only deepened public suspicion.
Perhaps the most alarming development has been the rapid reappearance of Islamist networks long suppressed under Hasina’s tenure. Jamaat-e-Islami—banned, dismantled, and politically sidelined—has re-emerged with remarkable coherence. Its messaging has grown assertive, its organisational structures have revived. For Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, this resurgence is deeply unsettling. With security forces distracted and political authority fragmented, reports of attacks on temples, vandalised properties, and targeted intimidation have increased. The fragile social equilibrium that held for years now appears increasingly vulnerable. Bangladesh’s political centre of gravity is shifting and not toward moderation.
The International Crimes Tribunal’s decision to sentence Hasina to death is widely seen as among the most divisive verdicts in the country’s modern history. Critics argue that the tribunal aimed not at justice but at dismantling the Awami League’s political legitimacy. The speed of the proceedings, along with charges such as the claim that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government sought to “abolish” the Pakistan Army’s Eastern Command in 1971, has struck historians as revisionist and politically loaded. Hasina has denounced the tribunal as “rigged” and the interim government as “undemocratic,” insisting she is being targeted for political reasons rather than crimes. Her call for an international process under the ICC highlights her rejection of the current government’s authority. To many observers, the verdict is less an act of accountability than a calculated political maneuver.
India now confronts one of its most consequential foreign-policy decisions in years. Under the 2013 extradition treaty, Bangladesh can demand Hasina’s return. Yet the same treaty permits India to refuse if the charges are politically motivated, if persecution is likely, or if the accused faces capital punishment. Hasina meets all of these conditions. But the choice is far from simple. Refusing extradition would allow India to invoke humanitarian and legal principles, while safeguarding a leader who cooperated closely on counter-terrorism and regional security. Yet such a decision could provoke the interim government, pushing Dhaka into the arms of China, Turkey, or Pakistan. Extraditing Hasina might ease short-term tensions with the new regime, but it would place India in open contradiction with its own stated stance against political persecution and the death penalty. It would also embolden extremist groups historically hostile to India’s presence in Bangladesh. Complicating matters further, Bangladesh’s volatile environment provides fertile ground for radical networks. Pakistan’s ISI appears to be reactivating dormant channels, accelerating the security risks along India’s eastern flank.
Bangladesh today stands at a perilous crossroads. Its institutions are fragile, its political narratives polarised, and its ideological fault lines widening in ways that threaten to reshape its national identity. Whether the country moves toward authoritarian consolidation, an Islamist-leaning order, or a fragile democratic restoration will depend not only on Dhaka’s internal dynamics but also on how regional and global powers choose to engage.
India, meanwhile, faces an equally pivotal decision. Its stance on Hasina will shape the future of bilateral relations, regional stability, and the Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape. Beyond immediate diplomacy lies a deeper strategic question: can India afford sustained instability on its longest and most porous border? Bangladesh’s trajectory will affect India’s northeastern security, migration pressures, maritime strategy, and its competition with China in the Bay of Bengal. As Bangladesh navigates its uncertain next chapter, New Delhi must decide whether to remain a cautious observer or to act as a shaping force in the destiny of its most populous neighbour. The region is watching and history may judge India’s choice as a turning point in South Asian geopolitics.
Shreya Singh Kasana is a research scholar at JNU.
