Global trade governance is undergoing its most profound transition in three decades. Technology, climate policy, and geopolitics are reshaping commerce faster than institutions can cope. The World Trade Organization (WTO)—once the anchor of predictability—is struggling to adapt, as members explore new coalitions and alternative platforms for rulemaking.
This is the backdrop against which India’s WTO strategy must be assessed. The institution is no longer the slow-moving but stable arena New Delhi once navigated. It is now a contested space—part negotiation chamber, part exit lounge—where some members still push for reform while others quietly prepare for life beyond it. In such a landscape, India’s decisions will shape not only its trade policy but its broader economic trajectory.
INDIA’S PERSISTENT DEFENSIVE POSTURE
India’s approach at the WTO is still driven by a mindset formed in the late 1990s: that saying “no” is an essential first step that protects policy autonomy, and that resisting new negotiations is the safest way to shield developmental interests. That logic made sense when India had limited global leverage, modest economic weight, and few domestic buffers.
Today, that context has changed, but the strategy hasn’t. Whether on investment facilitation, e-commerce rules, digital trade, environmental goods or emerging disciplines linked to AI, India’s instinct remains defensive. It continues to question plurilaterals inside the WTO, even as many developing countries—especially in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America—are increasingly willing to engage with them. What was once a shared developing-country posture is now becoming India’s solitary position.
India’s economic size commands global attention, but it is not large enough to halt the evolution of global norms. And in sectors that will define the next wave of growth—clean technology, data governance, advanced manufacturing, cyber standards, and AI—India needs global capital, innovation, and cross-border integration more than the world needs India’s approval in Geneva.
If rules on data flows, algorithmic transparency, supply-chain security, or carbon accounting are shaped without Indian input, India will still have to comply with them to maintain market access. The difference is that it will do so from a weaker position, with little ability to influence interpretations or carve-outs.
FTAS ARE USEFUL, BUT NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR MULTILATERAL LEVERAGE
New Delhi’s pursuit of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK), and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is strategically important. These agreements can open markets, attract investment, and modernise regulatory regimes. But even the broadest bilateral deals cannot provide what a functioning multilateral system offers: predictability across all trading partners and a coherent, universal rules-based environment.
Moreover, once India concludes these FTAs, it will voluntarily accept obligations that it resists within the WTO. This contradiction will grow more visible. FTAs can complement multilateralism; they cannot compensate for disengagement from it. If India remains sceptical of new WTO disciplines, while simultaneously agreeing to them bilaterally, it risks weakening its negotiating credibility on both fronts.
The biggest risk to India’s current stance is not that WTO negotiations will advance without it. The risk is that rulemaking may leave the WTO altogether. Countries are forging new clubs for digital trade, green goods, and supply-chain coordination. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are not symbolic experiments. They are becoming influential platforms that define standards, disciplines, and operating norms.
If India blocks plurilateral efforts inside the WTO, it does not stop the evolution of rules. It simply ensures that innovation happens in exclusive settings where India is not in the room. A post-WTO world may not be imminent, but its contours are already visible in these new coalitions. In such a scenario, India would eventually have to align with rules shaped by others, without the leverage to negotiate meaningful adjustments.
A SMARTER STRATEGY IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY
India’s caution is not unreasonable. Concerns about food security, developmental space, and regulatory autonomy are legitimate, and any responsible government must safeguard them. But blocking negotiations is not the only way to achieve these goals. Nor is it the most effective. A smarter, more confident strategy would involve three shifts:
Firstly, India should shape plurilaterals instead of rejecting them. India can participate actively, negotiate flexibilities, and influence design—especially in areas like services, digital trade, environment, and investment facilitation.
Secondly, India should use variable geometry creatively. India does not need to join every initiative. But it should lead in some, opt in selectively to others, and propose phased approaches in remaining areas—just as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU) have successfully done.
And finally, India must negotiate from a position of strength. India is no longer a marginal player. It should approach rulemaking as an opportunity to amplify its influence, not a threat to sovereignty.
THE REAL QUESTION: INFLUENCE OR ISOLATION?
The world is not waiting for the WTO to become functional again. Nor is it waiting for every member to feel ready before writing new rules. Whether on AI-enabled commerce, carbon standards, or digital services, coalitions are moving ahead—and they will continue to do so. The risk for India is not that the WTO will overwhelm it with obligations. The real danger is that global trade governance may evolve into a system where India has far less influence than its economic size warrants. A rising power cannot afford strategic invisibility.
As the WTO navigates long-pending reform at its 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), the choice before India remains stark but simple: engage, shape, and lead—or watch from the sidelines as others design the architecture of the next global economy.
Shishir Priyadarshi is President, Chintan Research Foundation.
