The completion of a year is meant to bring a sense of hindsight and reflection as we look back on the bygone months, considering both our successes and shortcomings. Often, though, we rush into the imminent thrill of a new year, failing to reflect aptly on the year that’s ending. This is a classic behavioural trait of human psychology, which often manifesta in other spheres of human and public life. In this context, it is worth pondering that international relations can also be regarded as an expression of human nature, albeit upscaled. This was brilliantly argued by the famous philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his seminal work, “Leviathan”. However, fresh developments in India’s foreign policy might have prodded Hobbes to partially reassess his dictum, if he were alive today.
To contextualise it briefly, the upcoming visit of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen with other high-ranking officials from the European Union to finally and formally execute the long-pending Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with New Delhi signals an inflection point in so far as both India and EU’s diplomacy are concerned. Their mind space focusses on similar preoccupations like the need to operationalise, and not merely preach, norms and terms like “strategic autonomy” through tangible means instead of declaratory pronouncements.
A part of that operationalisation could be ingeniously appreciated in the upcoming visit of the EU Commissioner and the European Council President as chief guests at the 77th anniversary celebrations of the Indian Republic, soon after the visit of the Russian President Putin to India, where, in spite of simplistic portrayals and presumptions about EU’s doctrinal animosity with Russia, and by extension lodging protests with countries that maintain a close relationship with the latter, the EU is not letting that impinge on the evolution of the India-EU strategic partnership. This is prompted by both practical and ideational concerns. The sphere of military cooperation embeds within the functioning of both concerns, pushing defence to be a key link between ideas and action, as India and EU navigate the complexities of their FTA in the coming decade.
THE PRACTICAL AND INDUSTRIAL URGENCY OF MILITARY COOPERATION
While the imminent India-EU FTA is largely framed around markets, trade, tariffs, and digital commerce in popular media circles, it is the significant security and strategic implications that will eventually follow the ratification of the agreement. The FTA, if successfully executed, will invariably drive both the global actors into each other’s defence-industrial value complex, something a typical procedurally rigid Brussels is particular about unless and until, premised on an overarching and legal complex, as provided by the FTA.
Resultant low barriers in areas like high-end manufacturing, dual-use technologies and advanced components shall create strong incentives for European firms to shift a sizeable chunk of their production units to India. India’s large engineering base and a strong skilled and semi-skilled workforce only buttresses the industrial requirements of both the actors. And this optimism is not misplaced, rather backed by hard statistics.
The Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited (DRAL), a joint venture between France’s aviation giant Dassault and India’s Reliance Infrastructure, formed in 2017 to execute offset duties from the Rafale fighter jet deal of 2016 is now relatively integrated into the global supply chain of Dassault. Similarly, Airbus sources nearly $1.5 billion worth of services and components annually from India. Also, India is on the verge of signing a deal under Project 75I, that will amount to $7-8 billion for the construction of at least six advanced diesel-electric submarines to be jointly manufactured by Indian shipyard Mazagaon Dock Limited and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems under clear technology-transfer clause.
These military deals must not be seen in isolation as they will have considerable strategic spillovers. The upcoming decade (2025-2035) shall witness the germination of the spillovers in the form of a renewed ideational basis of bilateral ties, driven by many factors, not the least of which are the efforts to de-risk from China’s supply chain web and the episodic upheavals we are witnessing in the foreign policy and economic realities confronting USA.
THE IDEATIONAL RATIONALE FOR THE DECADE AHEAD
Beyond the immediate industrial and economic spillovers of the FTA, it is the ideational underpinnings of strategic cooperation that will shape the trajectory of this partnership over the next decade. The conventional neoliberal framing of FTAs as purely market-enhancing instruments is giving way to a more nuanced calculus in global diplomacy, where sovereignty, security and practical cooperation occupy the centre stage of policy deliberations.
In this evolving context, the India-EU FTA must be understood not merely as a trade treaty but as a structural platform through which both parties can project and protect their strategic interests.
- First, the imperative to de-risk economic and technological linkages from China’s dominance, something which has been long evident in supply chain debates, has intensified substantially over the last decade. India and the EU share concerns over the fragility of global value chains dominated by Beijing’s industrial policies and overreliance on single sources of critical inputs. This shared unease has translated into concerted efforts to diversify trade partnerships, with New Delhi accelerating negotiations for multiple FTAs, including with the EU, New Zealand, and Chile, as a hedge against tariff disputes and geopolitical volatility. These moves are explicitly aimed at insulating exporters from uncertain US tariff regimes, where import duties of up to 50 percent have been levied on key Indian sectors, prompting India to broaden its market access through alternative trade arrangements.
- Second, the shifting contours of US economic and strategic power highlight the need for Europe to assert greater agency. Despite the continuity in American presidential approaches from Obama through Trump, characterised by economic nationalism and pragmatism, it can be observed that the US no longer possesses the unilateral economic dominance it once wielded. As a result, European policymakers increasingly recognise that reliance on Washington for security and economic stability alone is insufficient; Europe must therefore strive towards building autonomous strategic partnerships with like-minded powers such as India.
- Finally, contemporary international relations reflect a renewed emphasis on territorial sovereignty and hard power as essential pillars of credible policy influence. The post-Cold War overemphasis on liberal institutionalism has encountered practical limits in an era marked by contested borders, hybrid threats, and geopolitical competition across the globe. In this milieu, the prestige and legitimacy of normative prescriptions are inseparable from the capacity to underpin them with material capability. Defence cooperation under the India-EU FTA, therefore, is not an ancillary add-on but the strategic core, through which both parties signal that ideas will be backed by action. In a global order where sovereignty is once again centrally anchored in control over territory, only actors with demonstrable power projection capabilities will shape global norms and outcomes.
CONCLUSION
It is a fair assessment that India and the EU have long underexploited the full potential of their strategic partnership, largely due to mismatched political priorities and bureaucratic inertia on both sides. The impending conclusion of the India-EU FTA, however, offers an opportunity to correct this historical lag. If leveraged judiciously, the agreement can serve as a catalyst for a normative but outcome-oriented partnership one that transcends the narrow confines of tariff reductions and market access.
Over the next decade, the FTA is likely to institutionalise defence and military cooperation as a central pillar of India-EU engagement, embedding strategic trust within industrial collaboration, technology transfer, and joint capability development. For India, this aligns with its long-term objective of strengthening indigenous defence manufacturing while diversifying strategic partnerships beyond traditional dependencies. For the EU, deeper defence cooperation with India enhances its pursuit of strategic autonomy and positions it as a consequential security actor in the Indo-Pacific.
The FTA moves beyond trade and represents more than just a commercial compact; it is a strategic instrument through which both actors can align ideas with action. In an era defined by geopolitical uncertainty and renewed great-power competition, the durability of the India-EU partnership will rest on its ability to marry economic interdependence with credible defence cooperation, which will ultimately shape not only bilateral ties, but the broader contours of global order in the decade ahead.
Dr. Manish Barma was an Assistant Professor of International Relations and Security Studies at Rashtriya Raksha University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. Shreya Sinha is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University (DCU), Dublin, Ireland.
