Twelve years after its launch, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was widely expected to enter a new phase marked by sustainability, transparency, fiscal prudence, and a stronger role for private sector leadership.
These expectations stemmed from the commitments made at the Third Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in 2023, where Beijing promised smaller, greener, and financially responsible projects that would depart from the earlier model of large-scale, state-driven ventures. However, the first half of 2025 reveals a different picture. From January to July 2025, Chinese economic engagement under the BRI reached an unprecedented US$124 billion in combined construction contracts and investments, already surpassing the total engagement for the entirety of 2024, which stood at US$122 billion.
This record-breaking activity has been driven by deepening cooperation in oil and gas, green energy, high-tech manufacturing, green technology supply chains, metals and mining, and digital infrastructure.
In geographical terms, the focus of Chinese investments has shifted significantly. While South Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia were the primary recipients during the first decade of the BRI, Africa and Central Asia have now emerged as priority regions in 2025. These regions offer abundant untapped energy reserves, vast mineral wealth, and a willingness to partner with Chinese firms in critical economic sectors.
By directing its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies to invest in manufacturing facilities, resource extraction projects, and industrial hubs, Beijing is embedding itself along entire supply chains, from raw material extraction and processing to final product manufacturing. Energy remains at the heart of the BRI’s engagement in 2025, with US$44 billion committed to the sector by mid-year. On paper, this year’s energy investment portfolio is the greenest in the BRI’s history, yet fossil fuels continue to dominate.
Major deals include Sinopec’s US$3.7 billion refinery in Sri Lanka and a US$20 billion gas-processing complex in Nigeria, both of which signal a return to large, state-led projects in traditional energy sectors. Renewable energy investments saw a modest rise, with US$9.7 billion committed to wind, solar, and hydropower projects amounting to a combined capacity of 11.9 GW. Coal projects also persist, attracting US$1.58 billion in mining-related contracts.
Alongside these energy ventures, China is expanding its footprint in the green energy supply chain. Investments in technology and manufacturing doubled to US$23.2 billion in the first half of 2025, with a particular focus on electric vehicles (EVs), battery production, and solar component manufacturing. Notable examples include CALB’s US$2.1 billion battery plant in Portugal and Xinyi’s US$0.7 billion solar glass facility in Egypt.
The metals and mining sector attracted US$24.9 billion, with Kazakhstan alone receiving US$19.5 billion for aluminum and copper projects, around 60 percent of which targeted raw extraction to feed upstream green technology production. In contrast, transport and connectivity projects, once the hallmark of the BRI, plateaued at US$15 billion, reflecting Beijing’s strategic shift from traditional infrastructure toward control over entire industrial and supply chains.
The developments of 2025 mark a departure from the reformist tone set in 2023 during the Third BRF, which had pledged a BRI that would be “small and beautiful,” environmentally sustainable, and fiscally sound. The Chair’s Statement promised greater debt sustainability, active private sector involvement, and closer collaboration with multilateral institutions.
In the immediate aftermath, some progress was visible. In 2023, renewable energy and transmission projects reached a record US$7.9 billion, while investments in EV and battery supply chains exceeded US$8 billion. Green energy commitments climbed to US$11.8 billion in 2024, indicating Beijing’s growing interest in clean-tech leadership. The private sector also made significant inroads, overtaking SOEs in 2023 by accounting for 52 percent of commitments and maintaining a 48 percent share in 2024.
Despite these signs of change, traditional patterns quickly reasserted themselves. Oil and gas deals rose from US$11.75 billion in 2023 to US$24.3 billion in 2024, overshadowing renewable commitments. Strategic sector megaprojects reached US$12.7 billion in 2023 and US$21.25 billion in 2024, and state-owned enterprises reclaimed dominance over the portfolio.
The apparent regression is less an abandonment of reform than a recalibration in line with Beijing’s core strategic and economic objectives. Energy security is a clear driver, with China seeking to secure steady supplies of oil, gas, and strategic minerals. Another motive lies in managing domestic industrial overcapacity, particularly in sectors such as steel, cement, and solar manufacturing, by directing surplus production capabilities toward overseas projects. The drive to secure upstream supply chains for green technologies such as rare earths, aluminum, and copper aligns with China’s ambition to dominate future-oriented industries.
In this light, the BRI remains a flexible tool of Chinese foreign policy, designed to adapt to changing domestic and global conditions while shaping an external environment favourable to China’s economic growth. The current trajectory suggests a dual-track approach may define the BRI’s next phase. On one track, Beijing continues to invest heavily in conventional energy and resource-based projects to sustain industrial needs and solidify partnerships in resource-rich regions.
However, this strategy carries reputational risks. The persistence of large-scale fossil fuel projects undercuts the narrative of the BRI as a leader in sustainable development, while the absence of meaningful debt relief measures may fuel perceptions that the initiative serves China’s strategic leverage more than its partners’ long-term stability. These contradictions may weaken the BRI’s appeal as a genuine development partnership, particularly among countries wary of debt burdens or environmental impacts.
As the BRI enters its second decade, the evidence from 2025 suggests that reform will remain selective and subordinate to Beijing’s broader strategic imperatives. The resurgence of state-led, resource-intensive projects reveals that the initiative remains as much a vehicle for managing China’s domestic economic pressures as it is for projecting geopolitical influence. Yet, the parallel expansion into green technology and high-tech manufacturing points to an ambition to dominate emerging industries even as conventional engagements persist.
Dr. Sharanpreet Kaur is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at School of Social Sciences, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar.
