NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court’s recent decision to nullify JSW Steel’s acquisition of Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd (BPSL) has reignited a critical debate in Indian insolvency law: can there be finality in commercial resolutions, or will we remain mired in judicial second-guessing? This was no ordinary commercial transaction. Valued at Rs19,700 crore (around USD 2.35 billion), the acquisition was approved under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), passed scrutiny by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), and was fully implemented. By 2021, the plant was profitable and contributing meaningfully to JSW’s steel output. The Supreme Court, however, set aside the plan in 2025, citing delays in payment, concerns about the financing structure, and alleged bad faith on the part of the resolution applicant, alongside lapses by the CoC and resolution professional. At stake is not only this transaction but a larger legal and economic principle: closure. It is in the interest of the state that there be an end to litigation (Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium). When a case, closed and implemented, is judicially reopened years later, it sends a troubling message to businesses and investors. Judicial review is essential in any system, but it must be balanced and proportionate. The Court had other options. It could have directed compliance through a judicially supervised mechanism, ensured operational creditors were paid, or called for disciplinary action against errant professionals. Instead, it invalidated a resolution that had restored a distressed company to viability. The principle that winding up should be a remedy of last resort is among the most enduring and clearly articulated doctrines in insolvency jurisprudence. The law was created to preserve economic value and save viable businesses. Yet here, the Court’s decision appears to ignore those principles, placing procedural fidelity above economic outcomes. Parliament’s intent, particularly through the 2020 amendments, was clear: to protect resolution applicants from legacy liabilities and encourage timely resolution. This judgment risks undermining that legislative clarity. The ruling also departs from the Court’s own precedent. In Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021), it upheld Section 32A of the IBC, shielding resolution applicants from prosecution related to prior management misconduct. In Tata Steel BSL Ltd v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court ruled that enforcement authorities cannot attach assets that are part of an approved resolution plan. The Bhushan verdict reintroduces uncertainty around this settled jurisprudence, particularly regarding the role of the Enforcement Directorate. India has seen such reputational setbacks before. The Vodafone tax litigation, where retrospective tax amendments reversed a Supreme Court ruling, was a stark example. It took nearly a decade and corrective legislation to restore investor confidence. The Bhushan judgment risks repeating that cycle, creating the perception that outcomes in India can be undone even after finalisation. The contrast with Salomon v. Salomon & Co. (1897) is instructive. There, the House of Lords upheld corporate personality despite public discomfort, recognising the importance of predictability in corporate law. That judgment cemented a foundational principle. By contrast, the Bhushan ruling tilts towards uncertainty in the name of procedural rectitude. The fallout was immediate. JSW’s stock dropped sharply, losing over Rs 13,700 crore (USD 1.64 billion) in market value. But the long-term consequences are more serious. Prospective resolution applicants may think twice before committing capital if judicial reversal remains a risk even after full implementation. More than 1,100 companies have been resolved through the IBC. Reopening closed matters risks turning the Code into a revolving door of litigation. That imperils not only the system’s credibility but also the economic outcomes it was meant to deliver. Recent data already signals distress. Average recoveries under the IBC have declined from over 43% to 31% since the early years. Resolution timelines now exceed 600 days—nearly double the intended limit. The Bhushan ruling compounds these issues by injecting further uncertainty. BPSL was a functioning enterprise, employing thousands and contributing significantly to industrial output. Its liquidation does not merely represent a loss of productive capacity; it marks a serious setback for a wide array of stakeholders. Employees now face uncertainty and potential unemployment, creditors are left with diminished prospects of recovery, and suppliers and ancillary businesses that relied on BPSL’s operations are equally affected- employees who face job loss, creditors whose recoveries are now in jeopardy, and suppliers and ancillary industries that relied on its operations. Liquidating such an asset despite its revival goes against both legal principles and economic logic. It also undercuts public trust in judicial stewardship of commercial policy. The broader public policy concern is this: judicial actions that undermine legislative frameworks risk corroding institutional trust. Investors, creditors, and bidders rely on consistency not only in law but in the behaviour of public institutions. If resolution plans approved by statutory bodies and implemented in good faith are later set aside, stakeholders may begin to view Indian processes as unreliable. This not only hurts the flow of capital but also shakes the public’s belief that courts, legislature, and regulatory institutions operate in harmony to uphold the rule of law. It also raises deeper constitutional questions. The doctrine of separation of powers demands that the legislature’s policy choices, when made within the bounds of the Constitution, be respected by the judiciary. The IBC was a carefully designed economic legislation passed after significant deliberation. When courts invalidate outcomes carried out under the explicit framework of such laws, they risk entering the domain of policy override. Constitutionalism demands a balance between checks and deference, especially where judicial action can affect economic stability, employment, and public interest. Going forward, Parliament must reaffirm the sanctity of approved resolution plans. The judiciary, too, must recognise that while oversight is essential, excessive intervention can erode the rule of law as much as its absence. Maintaining confidence in legal institutions requires that judgments strike a balance between correcting individual injustices and preserving systemic coherence. The Bhushan Power case should not set a precedent. It should instead serve as a moment of reflection. Legal systems thrive on both integrity and certainty. Upholding one should never mean sacrificing the other. Dr. Neeti Shikha is a Lecturer at Bristol Law School, University of the West of England. She has no affiliation, financial interest, or any other form of involvement with Bhushan Power , Bhushan Steel, or any related entities. Dr. Shikha confirms that there are no conflicts of interest influencing her academic work or public commentary.