‘Changes will keep happening and they’ll happen more rapidly. And Army and everyone else have to understand this. Adapt to these changes faster and faster. There’s no other way,’ says CDS Gen Anil Chauhan (Retd).
General Anil Chauhan, who served as India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) from September 2022 to May 30, 2026, spoke to The Sunday Guardian. Edited excerpts from the interview.
Q1: General, when you assumed office in September 2022, the immediate challenge was to stabilise the institution and define the structural boundaries of the CDS. Looking back at your tenure, which concluded in May 2026, how do you assess the evolution of the institutional weight of the CDS? Is the CDS still perceived as an evolving overlay, or has it become an integral part of India’s higher defence architecture?
General Anil Chauhan: First, I must say that I had no idea that I would be appointed CDS. Therefore, when I assumed office, I had to begin by learning on the job. The first is the formal authority of the appointment. When the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the creation of the CDS, it clearly defined the responsibilities attached to the office. The CDS was to serve as the Principal Military Adviser to the Raksha Mantri, promote jointness and integration among the three Services, facilitate the restructuring of military commands—including the establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands—and exercise oversight over the Tri-Service organisations. The authority to perform these functions emanated from the government sanction. But that authority existed, initially, only on paper. The second part was to translate this formal authority into institutional influence. Being designated the single-point military adviser is one thing; functioning effectively as one requires sustained effort. The CDS must establish his professional credibility with the Raksha Mantri and the National Security Adviser. He must develop a constructive working relationship with the three Service Chiefs, the Defence Secretary and the other Secretaries to the Government of India. None of this happens automatically merely because it has been written into a government order. It requires trust, consultation and continuous engagement. The third part concerns validation. How does one demonstrate that the institution is succeeding? One measure is the organisations, structures and processes that have been created. The more decisive test, however, comes during operations. Concepts of jointness and integration can be discussed, debated and exercised in peacetime, but their real value is established only when they are tested in conflict. When the structures and processes that we had been developing were put to the test during operations, they proved their relevance. That experience consolidated much of what we had been attempting to achieve. I would therefore say that the office of the CDS is now institutionalised—not merely within the Ministry of Defence or the Armed Forces, but also in the consciousness of the nation. Let me give you a small example. After my retirement, I travelled to Adi Kailash. On our return journey, we halted at Banbasa, on the banks of the Kali River, near the barrage. That evening, my wife, daughter, brother-inlaw and I went for a walk. A commando was walking some distance ahead of us, and four or five youngsters were sitting on the dyke. As we approached, I heard one of them say, “Yeh toh CDS Sahab hain.” Earlier, there was no comparable recognition of such an appointment. Today, the CDS is no longer regarded merely as an additional layer or an evolving overlay. It has acquired an identity, a purpose and an institutional permanence within India’s national-security architecture.
Q2: How important was the initial establishment of the CDS under General Bipin Rawat? At that stage, the institution was still in its infancy.
General Anil Chauhan: General Bipin Rawat had the difficult responsibility of establishing an entirely new institution. Although the powers and responsibilities had been formally distributed, the Department of Military Affairs was still taking shape. The first group of Additional Secretaries and Joint Secretaries had been appointed, but the supporting structures, procedures and delegations required to empower them fully had yet to mature. That process itself took nearly eight or nine months. Consequently, the time and institutional bandwidth available to focus on the foundational responsibilities of the CDS—promoting jointness and integration, restructuring the Armed Forces and developing capabilities for future warfare—were considerably constrained. This was not due to any lack of intent or effort; it was the consequence of the circumstances in which the institution was born. General Rawat created the institution and gave it its initial momentum. The task before me was to build upon that foundation, impart greater clarity to its processes and carry the unfinished agenda of jointness and integration forward.
Q3: You simultaneously performed three distinct roles: Chief of Defence Staff, Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs and Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. How did you reconcile these responsibilities with the operational and institutional demands of the three Service Headquarters?
General Anil Chauhan: In fact, there were three hats, not two. Apart from being the Chief of Defence Staff and Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs, the CDS is also the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Earlier, the chairmanship of this committee rotated among the three Service Chiefs, with the senior-most Chief assuming the responsibility. The role of the CDS extended beyond these departmental responsibilities. As the principal military adviser, the CDS had to engage with the wider national-security establishment. Depending upon the requirement, he could be called by, or seek an interaction with, the Prime Minister, the National Security Adviser or the External Affairs Minister. Thus, while matters concerning the Department of Military Affairs were processed through the Raksha Mantri, the broader strategic and military advisory role was performed in the capacity of the CDS. As Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the responsibility was to build consensus among the three Services and reconcile their individual requirements with the larger interests of the Armed Forces. The CDS did not replace the Service Chiefs or intrude upon their operational responsibilities. His task was to identify areas of convergence, address interService issues and provide integrated military advice at the national level. The gravitas of the CDS, therefore, had to be earned continuously through professional competence, sound judgement and the ability to provide timely, integrated and actionable advice. Institutionalising and stabilising this role within the routine functioning of government was, in my view, one of the major achievements of my tenure.
Q4: Did this overlapping institutional architecture ever lead to friction or conflict during your tenure?
General Anil Chauhan: No, not in any consequential sense. When I assumed office, Giridhar Aramane also took over as Defence Secretary around the same time. In that sense, both of us were beginning with a relatively clean slate. We met at the outset and agreed that we would work in unison, keeping the larger interests of the country foremost. That understanding provided a sound basis for our working relationship. I had no difficulty working with Giridhar Aramane, nor did I have any difficulty with his successor, R.K. Singh. To a considerable extent, the effectiveness of this arrangement must also be credited to the Raksha Mantri—his maturity, institutional standing and ability to assess differing viewpoints without being swayed by one side or the other. Earlier, military advice reaching the political leadership was often mediated predominantly through the civilian bureaucracy. With the institutionalisation of the CDS, the Raksha Mantri now receives the military perspective directly as well. The CDS can present integrated professional military advice, while the Defence Secretary and other officials provide their respective departmental perspectives. This has produced a more balanced and informed decision-making process.
Q5: One of your core mandates was to advance the creation of Integrated Theatre Commands. What were the most difficult structural or philosophical impediments you encountered, and what broad blueprint have you left for your successor?
General Anil Chauhan: Had I known at the outset precisely what needed to be done and how it was to be accomplished, the task would undoubtedly have been easier. My initial focus was largely on the creation of theatre commands. As our deliberations progressed, however, I realised that theatre commands could not be established as stand-alone organisational structures. They had to be preceded and supported by a much deeper process of jointness and integration. Integration itself requires jointness. The Services must first develop the habit of planning, training and operating together. This involves a wide range of issues—doctrinal, organisational, technological, procedural and, above all, cultural. These were far more complex than merely drawing lines on a map or deciding which formations would be placed under a particular theatre commander. That became the central approach during my tenure. While discussions on theatre commands continued, we simultaneously worked on integrating systems, improving information-sharing, strengthening joint organisations and developing capabilities in the emerging domains of warfare. This ensured that the Armed Forces did not remain static while awaiting the finalisation of theatreisation. The blueprint I have handed over, therefore, is not merely an organisational design for theatre commands. It is a broader framework in which four processes—jointness, integration, theatreisation and future-oriented reforms— advance together. The objective is that whenever the political decision to establish the theatre commands is taken, the enabling structures, systems and culture are already sufficiently mature. There should be no need to begin another prolonged process of integration after the commands have been created.
Q6: Did the operational situation along our borders accelerate the process of integration and theatreisation?
General Anil Chauhan: Operational challenges certainly reinforced the need for greater jointness and integration. However, the actual implementation of a major structural reorganisation requires a period of relative peace and stability. It would be imprudent to alter command-and-control arrangements while the Armed Forces are responding to an immediate operational contingency. We could possibly have progressed to the implementation stage by May 2025. However, Operation Sindoor intervened and operational priorities naturally took precedence. As a result, the process was delayed by approximately six months. Thus, operational conditions may strengthen the rationale for theatreisation, but they do not necessarily accelerate its implementation. At times, they can have precisely the opposite effect.
Q7: What is the most significant obstacle that remains in the process of theatreisation?
General Anil Chauhan: There is no fundamental structural or conceptual obstacle. A broad consensus exists that theatreisation is necessary and that Integrated Theatre Commands will be established. Some differences remain, but these concern matters of detail rather than the basic concept. When we submitted our report, it did not contain a dissent note. The concerns and objections raised during the consultation process were examined and, to the extent possible, incorporated into my recommendations. The challenge that remains is therefore not one of securing acceptance for theatreisation. It is a matter of resolving the finer details and implementing the agreed framework.
Q8: From Uri and Balakot to Doklam, Galwan and Operation Sindoor, India has adopted situation-specific arrangements at the level of higher defence decision-making. While such flexibility has served the country well during limited contingencies, could reliance on improvised arrangements become a liability in a prolonged, multidomain conflict against a peer adversary? How would permanent theatre commands provide institutional continuity without diminishing this flexibility?
General Anil Chauhan: The structures for higher defence decision-making—the Cabinet Committee on Security and the National Security Council, for example— have existed for a long time. These formal structures are available when required and may become particularly important during a prolonged, conventional war. Consequently, the composition of the higher decision making mechanism was adapted to the requirements of each contingency. This was not ad hoc functioning in a negative sense; it was institutional flexibility. A limited operation does not necessarily require every element of the national security establishment to be involved at every stage. The principle should be to include those whose advice or authority is relevant to the situation. Permanent theatre commands are intended to strengthen this military level of the architecture. They will provide clearly defined command relationships, integrated planning and established mechanisms for employing capabilities across the Services and operational domains. The Armed Forces will therefore not have to create a fresh operational arrangement for every contingency The two approaches are not contradictory. At the political and strategic levels, India must retain the flexibility to constitute the appropriate decision-making group for a particular crisis. At the operational level, however, permanent theatre commands will provide continuity, preparedness and integrated command and control. This combination—flexibility at the apex and institutionalised integration below it—is essential for responding both to limited contingencies and to a prolonged, multi-domain conflict against a peer adversary.
Q9: Can reform of the higher defence decision-making architecture be undertaken in tandem with theatreisation? General Anil Chauhan: No. Making recommendations on the organisation of higher defence decision-making was beyond my mandate. That is a matter for the government to decide, based on how it wishes to direct and oversee the conduct of war.
Q10: Let us turn to Operation Sindoor, launched in May 2025 following the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Unlike earlier retaliatory actions, such as the Balakot strikes, Operation Sindoor developed into a multi-domain campaign lasting approximately 88 hours. What was happening during the initial hours of planning? General Anil Chauhan: At that time, we were conducting a Tri-Service communications exercise linked to our preparations for theatre commands. On 22 April, while I was taking the debrief of the exercise, reports of the terrorist attack at Pahalgam began to come in. I immediately sensed that the incident could lead to something much larger. In retrospect, it was providential that an exercise intended to improve communication and synergy among the three Services had commenced two days earlier. The Services operate on different networks, and the exercise was specifically intended to establish connectivity among them. In that respect, the timing proved fortunate.
Q11: As CDS, were you present across these different levels, connecting political direction with military execution? General Anil Chauhan: I was present at some of these levels to obtain the necessary direction and, thereafter, to translate that direction into coordinated military action. A central part of my responsibility was to ensure that the political intent was correctly understood and implemented by the Armed Forces in an integrated manner.
Q12: What political mandate did the government give the Armed Forces for Operation Sindoor? General Anil Chauhan: The political mandate was clear. Our actions were to establish a new red line against crossborder terrorism. The perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack, as well as those who supported and enabled them, were to face severe consequences. Along with this broader mandate, certain terms of reference were laid down for the military operation. Whatever action we undertook had to produce visible and verifiable evidence of its effects. Surprise had to be maintained, and the response had to be adequate to achieve the political objective.
Q13: How did you ensure that Operation Sindoor remained calibrated and limited, without allowing escalation to develop into an uncontrolled war between the two countries? General Anil Chauhan: We anticipated that there would be escalation. When we struck terrorist targets on 7 May, we conveyed a message to Pakistan at approximately 1:30 a.m., before issuing the PIB release. We informed them that India had struck terrorist infrastructure, that the action had been precise and that collateral damage had been avoided. We also made it clear that if Pakistan retaliated, India would respond. Pakistan could not respond symmetrically because India does not host terrorist infrastructure. Therefore, we assessed that it would attempt to strike our military targets. If it did so, we would have to respond against its military targets. This could develop into competitive escalation, which would have to be controlled and terminated at an appropriate stage. These possibilities were examined in advance. During a crisis, the time available for decision-making is extremely limited. Prior war-gaming provides clarity and enables commanders to act within an established framework. The political mandate was clear, and the escalation matrix, along with the relevant contingencies, was disseminated down to the functional level. This framework extended from the National Security Adviser downwards and enabled us to manage escalation without allowing it to become uncontrolled.
Q14: Was a fixed operational window prescribed—for example, 88 hours or a maximum of ten days? General Anil Chauhan: No, there was no predetermined time limit. The operation evolved according to the situation. On 10 May, Pakistan initiated contact, and we took the call to engage. Escalation management is only one part of the problem. The other essential requirement is battlefield transparency, or situational awareness. A commander at the lowest level must understand what is happening so that he can take the appropriate action. At the apex, I must simultaneously know what is happening across the land, maritime, air, cyber and space domains. This required extensive networking so that information from different systems and Services could be brought together into a common operational picture. I would not claim that we had achieved an ideal system; we were still learning. Nevertheless, our battlefield transparency was significantly better than Pakistan’s. We had a clearer understanding of what we had achieved and what the adversary had attempted. Pakistan, by contrast, appeared uncertain about the results of many of its own actions and subsequently had to seek assessments through satellite imagery. This informational advantage enabled us to control escalation and to recognise the appropriate opportunity for termination. When Pakistan contacted us at approximately 9 or 9:15 a.m. on 10 May and indicated that it wished to talk, it was evident that it was seeking an off-ramp. At that stage, we were fully ation and knew that we retained the advantage. We decided to continue the planned action until approximately 1 p.m. and indicated that talks could take place at 3 p.m. This allowed the remaining operational cycle to be completed and enabled India to enter the talks from a clear position of strength.
Q15: You have often stated that in modern conflict, “the network is the weapon.” What did Operation Sindoor reveal about the maturity of India’s network-centric capabilities and the integration of sensors, shooters and Service-specific command-and-control systems? General Anil Chauhan: At its simplest, a network connects a platform to its weapon. If an aircraft carries a missile, the aircraft and weapon remain connected until the weapon is launched. But that is only the most basic form of networking. Networks must now be regarded as weapons in themselves. There is, however, no final or ideal network. Networks must continuously evolve as technologies, threats and operational requirements change. During Operation Sindoor, we were at a particular stage in that evolution. We were working to connect the Air Force’s Integrated Air Command and Control System with the Army’s Akashteer system and the Navy’s Trigun network. Considerable progress had been made, and the process has continued. Other areas were less mature. Counter-drone systems, electronic-warfare assets, jammers and associated capabilities were not integrated into a single network to the same extent. In these areas, we compensated through established processes, procedures and human coordination. This is an important aspect of our approach to theatreisation. We did not wait for theatre commands to be formally announced before beginning integration. The networking of systems, harmonisation of procedures and creation of greater operational synergy had already commenced. Theatreisation is intended to build upon this process, not initiate it.
Q16: In pursuing Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence, how should India balance the immediate need to import critical capabilities with the longer-term objective of building indigenous technologies? General Anil Chauhan: We must accept that India began this process late. Ideally, the drive towards self-reliance in defence should have commenced with the same intensity 25 years ago. Where imports remain necessary, quantities should be kept to the operationally essential minimum, and the procurement model must change. Wherever feasible, imports should incorporate transfer of technology, joint development, domestic manufacturing or some other arrangement that contributes to long-term national capability. We cannot continue indefinitely with the earlier model of straightforward purchases without building an indigenous technological base.
Q17: Which capability gaps require the greatest immediate attention? Should India prioritise the import of hardware, software, ammunition or critical technologies? General Anil Chauhan: We have already indigenised a substantial proportion of our ammunition. In the Army, approximately 95 per cent of ammunition has been indigenised over the past five or six years. Certain technologies, particularly in areas such as cyber and space, may still remain beyond our immediate reach. Broadly, however, India possesses the intellectual and industrial capability to develop most of what it requires domestically. That is the essence of innovation. We should not assume that a task can be performed only by the system traditionally associated with it. The objective is to achieve the required operational effect, not merely to reproduce someone else’s solution.
Q18: Following Operation Sindoor, Pakistan altered its higher defence structure through the 27th Constitutional Amendment, replacing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee with a Chief of Defence Forces. How do you interpret this change, particularly when the new arrangement appears to concentrate authority in the Army Chief rather than create a genuinely Service-neutral joint institution? General Anil Chauhan: These are hard lessons that Pakistan appears to have drawn, including from Operation Sindoor. The constitutional change was evidently intended to address deficiencies in its higher defence organisation. The process of change had begun even earlier with the creation of an Army Rocket Force Command, which was separate from the provisions of the 27th Amendment. The constitutional amendment subsequently created the appointment of Chief of Defence Forces and abolished the office of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. This indicates that Pakistan itself concluded that the earlier arrangement had not functioned effectively. Whether the new system will succeed remains uncertain. It appears to draw partly upon the Indian CDS model by seeking greater integration and jointness. However, Pakistan has structured the appointment so that the Chief of Defence Forces is from the Army. That runs contrary to a fundamental principle of jointness: the joint institution must inspire confidence among all the Services. If one Service permanently controls the joint institution, mistrust is likely to persist. Pakistan’s earlier rotational arrangement did not work effectively. A similar rotational arrangement did not serve India adequately either, which is why India created a permanent CDS. But permanence alone is insufficient; the office must also remain institutionally joint and impartial.
Q19: Was the chairmanship of India’s Chiefs of Staff Committee also rotational earlier? General Anil Chauhan: It was rotational earlier, but it is not rotational now. The CDS serves as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The earlier arrangement did not provide the continuity or impartiality required, and the present system is significantly better. The CDS is in a position to take a more balanced decision because he is not simultaneously responsible for the operational management of a single Service domain. A Service Chief, by contrast, remains accountable to the government for threats and preparedness within his own domain—land, sea or air. Under the present arrangement, the three Service Chiefs remain responsible for their respective Services, while the CDS is positioned above those individual responsibilities and can consider issues from a joint perspective. That institutional separation assists the CDS in providing more objective and integrated military advice.
Q20: A striking feature of Operation Sindoor was the combination of kinetic military action with non-kinetic instruments of national power. How important is coordination between the Armed Forces, intelligence agencies, scientific organisations, the Central Armed Police Forces and civilian ministries? General Anil Chauhan: Wars are never fought by the Armed Forces alone. Every relevant instrument of national power must be brought to bear. During Operation Sindoor, important roles were performed by the intelligence agencies, the Central Armed Police Forces, ISRO, NTRO and several other organisations. These institutions had to be mobilised and coordinated towards a common national objective. The credit for galvanising and synchronising this larger national-security effort must, to a considerable extent, go to the National Security Adviser.
Q21: Your tenure also witnessed the training and operational deployment of the initial batches of Agniveers across the three Services. What, in your view, is the fundamental military rationale behind the Agnipath model? General Anil Chauhan: Fundamentally, I believe it is a good model. The central issue is the accelerating pace of technological change. Drones, counter-drone systems, spoofing and the disruption of communications have assumed enormous importance within only the past few years, particularly after the conflict in Ukraine. The character of warfare is now changing far more rapidly than before. We need soldiers who are young, technologically comfortable and capable of constantly adapting. In an era of rapidly evolving military technology, a manpower model that regularly introduces younger personnel into the force has considerable operational relevance.
Q22: But does the four-year tenure justify the time, effort and infrastructure invested in training an Agniveer? General Anil Chauhan: The same applies to young soldiers. They are entering the Services with greater familiarity with digital technologies and can absorb new systems rapidly. Training models must recognise and exploit that capacity rather than assume that technological proficiency necessarily requires many years to develop.
Q23: Will the Armed Forces also require greater lateral induction of specialists or entirely new technical branches? General Anil Chauhan: Yes. At some stage, we may have organisations such as a Drone Corps, an Artificial Intelligence Corps or a Data Corps, just as we have the Corps of Signals today. These changes will occur with increasing frequency. The Army—and the other Services—must understand this and adapt more rapidly. There is no other viable course.
Q24: Your tenure coincided with the prolonged war in Ukraine and intense multidomain conflict in West Asia. What is the principal lesson for India from these conflicts and from Operation Sindoor itself? General Anil Chauhan: People often say that we must now prepare for the kind of warfare witnessed during Operation Sindoor. My response is that Operation Sindoor already belongs to the past as a military template. Even if the operation continues in a strategic sense, its tactics and technologies cannot be treated as the model for the next conflict.
Q25: But is Operation Sindoor not still continuing? General Anil Chauhan: Yes, Operation Sindoor continues and will continue in the strategic and operational sense, just as Operation Snow Leopard continues. Similarly, can we be certain that cross-border terrorism will not recur? We cannot. Therefore, Operation Sindoor continues as a posture and a continuing commitment, even though the specific 88-hour phase of military action has concluded.
Q26: If the operatioan continues, what did you mean when you said that Operation Sindoor is already in the past? General Anil Chauhan: I meant that its specific methods cannot become a template for the next conflict. We must continuously examine new forms of warfare, new technologies and new strategies and tactics.
Q27: Kargil Vijay Diwas was observed on 26 July. Nearly 27 years after the conflict, how far has India progressed in implementing the reforms proposed by the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent Group of Ministers? General Anil Chauhan: India has changed considerably since the Kargil conflict of 1999. A large proportion of the recommendations made by the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent Group of Ministers remain valid, although the government took time to implement some of them. However, neither the CDS nor theatre commands should be regarded as the final destination of defence reform. In several countries, higher defence organisations are reviewed and modified every four or five years in response to changing threats, technologies and national requirements. The CDS and theatre commands are not the end state of reform. They may, in fact, mark the beginning of a faster and more continuous process of transformation
