Seoul: The international order is experiencing a profound transformation. Since the launch of the Trump 2.0 administration, escalating trade wars, intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, the protracted Russia–Ukraine conflict, and widening Middle East crises have hastened the turn toward multipolarity. Within this evolving landscape, China, Russia, and North Korea have consolidated ties, signaled most visibly at the September 2025 Tianjin Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and the Victory Day Parade in Beijing.
For South Korea under President Lee Jae-myung (LJM), who has expressed a desire to advance reconciliation with Pyongyang, this trilateral convergence poses new strategic challenges. By broadening Pyongyang’s external patronage from Beijing alone to a joint bloc-based diplomacy with Moscow and Beijing, North Korea gains maneuverability and legitimacy while further restricting Seoul’s space for engagement.
The Trilateral Alignment and Its Strategic Significance
The visible consolidation of the China–Russia–North Korea alignment was symbolized on September 3, 2025, when Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un stood together at Tiananmen Square during the Victory Day Parade. This marked the first trilateral display of unity at such a high level after a very long time. The parade followed the SCO Summit in Tianjin, where both Beijing and Moscow sought to present themselves as leaders of an emerging Global South coalition intent on resisting Western unilateralism.
For North Korea, this moment represented a dramatic return to international diplomacy after years of isolation. Kim Jong Un’s participation was more than ceremonial—it signaled Pyongyang’s intent to reposition itself not as a marginal actor dependent solely on Beijing, but as an integrated member of a bloc led jointly by Russia and China. In this sense, Pyongyang’s diplomacy is transitioning from bilateral dependency to multilateral legitimacy.
Each actor gains important dividends from this emerging tryst. For China, it consolidates its image as the central hub of an anti-U.S. coalition while strengthening its influence over the Korean Peninsula. For Russia, struggling with sanctions and battlefield attrition in Ukraine, it provides external legitimacy and much-needed diplomatic support. For North Korea, the most vulnerable of the three, the alignment provides escape from isolation, a de facto recognition as a nuclear power, and a diversification of dependence beyond Beijing.
The message to Seoul was unmistakable. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korea’s supreme leader, recently stated that “there will be no seat for South Korea in our regional diplomacy,” a remark that illustrates Pyongyang’s determination to exclude Seoul from its redefined diplomatic orbit. The statement not only delegitimizes South Korea’s role as an interlocutor but also highlights how bloc politics are being used by Pyongyang to shield itself from reconciliation efforts.
Implications for Inter-Korean Relations
The trilateral alignment reshapes the structure of inter-Korean relations in multiple ways, presenting a less hospitable environment for LJM’s reconciliation agenda. Historically, both China and Russia have balanced their support for Pyongyang with pragmatic engagement with Seoul, often serving as mediators in moments of heightened inter-Korean tension. The new alignment threatens to transform this balancing role into outright patronage of North Korea, as Beijing and Moscow increasingly act as guarantors of regime stability and supporters of Pyongyang’s nuclear posture. This reduces Seoul’s leverage in negotiations and undermines the credibility of dialogue on denuclearization.
LJM’s reconciliation plan rests on reopening humanitarian channels, expanding economic cooperation, and initiating phased political dialogue. Yet, with Pyongyang feeling more secure within the trilateral bloc, it is unlikely to view Seoul’s overtures as essential. Rather, normalization offers may be dismissed as redundant or strategically irrelevant.
South Korea’s policy environment is complicated further by its alliance with the United States. As North Korea deepens ties with Moscow and Beijing, Washington is likely to respond by pushing Seoul into closer trilateral security coordination with the United States and Japan. Such pressures will further shrink the space available for independent reconciliation policies.
A longer-term concern for Seoul is the possibility of Pyongyang’s accession as an observer to SCO or BRICS. If this occurs, North Korea would gain additional institutional legitimacy within emerging multilateral platforms, while Seoul—excluded from these forums—would face a widening diplomatic gap.
Challenges to Lee Jae-myung’s Reconciliation Policy
Against this backdrop, the viability of LJM’s reconciliation strategy faces significant challenges. With economic and political backing from both Beijing and Moscow, North Korea’s reliance on Seoul for material or diplomatic concessions has diminished. This reduces the appeal of inter-Korean cooperation projects or economic incentives that were central to previous engagement strategies.
The trilateral bloc provides Pyongyang with cover to entrench its nuclear position. Supported by great-power patrons, North Korea is less likely to consider negotiations that limit its nuclear arsenal. The shift raises the probability that denuclearization will vanish entirely from Pyongyang’s strategic calculus.
LJM’s reconciliation efforts also face resistance from domestic political opponents who argue that engagement is naïve in the face of Pyongyang’s integration into an anti-Seoul bloc. This polarization risks weakening consensus on inter-Korean policy, further undermining the sustainability of reconciliation initiatives.
The U.S. and Japan will expect Seoul to align against the trilateral bloc, reinforcing a deterrence-first approach. This pressure will constrain LJM’s autonomy, while also making any perceived overtures toward Pyongyang politically costly. The broader implication is that LJM’s pre-election inclination toward closer ties with China now appears untenable.
Together, these challenges paint a sobering picture: reconciliation is not only difficult but increasingly unlikely under present conditions.
Navigating Opportunities Within Constraints
Despite these constraints, limited but important opportunities still remain for LJM to preserve reconciliation efforts in symbolic or incremental forms. So he needs to keep the push for peace building on the Korean peninsula.
Even within bloc politics, humanitarian cooperation—such as food aid, medical assistance, and disaster relief—retains potential. If framed as apolitical and delivered through non-governmental or multilateral channels, such initiatives may still secure Pyongyang’s cooperation while sustaining minimal inter-Korean engagement.
Seoul can also carve out space by working with other stakeholders, notably India, ASEAN states, and the European Union. These actors provide parallel platforms for dialogue that bypass direct confrontation with the China–Russia–North Korea axis. Engaging with these partners would allow Seoul to reduce isolation and create a buffer against exclusion from institutions like SCO or BRICS.
LJM could maintain reconciliation as a rhetorical objective, sustaining dialogue momentum without expecting immediate breakthroughs. By adopting a posture of “strategic patience with flexibility,” Seoul can prepare for eventual shifts in the trilateral bloc’s internal dynamics, such as potential future strains in the Moscow–Beijing partnership.
Strengthening Autonomy Within the Alliance
South Korea must also avoid full dependence on Washington’s deterrence-centered strategy. By articulating its own inter-Korean agenda, Seoul can assert autonomy, prevent over-securitization of the issue, and continue to project reconciliation as an existential necessity for long-term Korean survival.
Although broader reconciliation appears blocked, Seoul could still pursue cooperation with China and Russia in niche areas such as climate change, energy security, and cultural exchange. These areas would not alter the structural alignment but could help preserve limited diplomatic contact.
Finally, LJM must frame reconciliation not as appeasement but as a strategy essential for Korea’s demographic survival, economic resilience, and avoidance of nuclear catastrophe. Effective communication can mitigate domestic opposition and build public support for keeping dialogue alive.
Sum Up
The emerging North Korea–Russia–China alignment complicates President Lee Jae-myung’s reconciliation policy by emboldening Pyongyang and eroding Seoul’s diplomatic leverage. With Beijing and Moscow moving from mediators to patrons of Pyongyang, Seoul faces a narrowing policy space. The immediate prospects for inter-Korean dialogue are bleak, as Pyongyang’s incentives for engagement diminish, its nuclear posture hardens, and domestic and alliance-related constraints tighten.
Yet the path is not entirely closed. Through strategic patience, diversification of partnerships, selective engagement, and humanitarian diplomacy, Seoul can keep the reconciliation agenda alive—albeit in reduced form. The task for LJM is not to secure immediate breakthroughs but to prevent the collapse of dialogue momentum and prepare for a long-term environment in which bloc politics define inter-Korean relations. In such an environment, maintaining even minimal channels of communication will be vital for preserving the prospect of eventual reconciliation and ensuring Korea’s survival in an increasingly polarized multipolar order.
