India’s quiet diplomacy tames anti-India rhetoric in Maldives, but China’s shadow still looms. The chess game in the Indian Ocean continues.
PANAJI, GOA: There is a quiet satisfaction in New Delhi’s corridors of power. After all the noise, chest-thumping nationalism, and “India Out” sloganeering that echoed from the archipelago of Maldives, the tune has changed. And how. President Mohamed Muizzu, the very man who built his political rise on anti-India rhetoric, is now softening his stance, sending conciliatory signals, and reaching out to the very nation he vilified. It’s tempting to see this as a diplomatic victory—and in many ways, it is. India, through its calibrated and restrained diplomacy, has managed to tame the Maldivian wolf that momentarily tried to howl against the regional giant. But India must not mistake this calm for a conclusion. This is not the end of the game—this is merely a pause in a more complex and long-drawn chess match. Maldives may have stepped back from the ledge, but it hasn’t fully abandoned its risky dance with China.
Let us first understand the farce that was the “India Out” campaign. It wasn’t a spontaneous eruption of nationalist sentiment in Maldives. It was a carefully curated narrative pushed by vested political interests, with China’s fingerprints all over it. Muizzu’s campaign was never truly about sovereignty or military overreach. It was about aligning Maldives with the strategic objectives of China, the new imperialist disguised as an infrastructure partner. Beijing has long eyed the Indian Ocean region as its next arena of influence. It has tried, tested, and succeeded in several smaller nations— Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and to some extent, even Nepal. Maldives was a juicy prize. Control of its ports, maritime routes, and diplomatic loyalty could provide China with a powerful geopolitical lever against India. When Muizzu took office, it wasn’t just a political transition—it was the opening act of a Beijingscripted drama.
To New Delhi’s credit, the response was not reactive but remarkably mature. India didn’t descend to namecalling. There were no kneejerk diplomatic retaliations. No impulsive withdrawal of support. What we saw instead was classic Indian diplomacy under Prime Minister Modi—calibrated calmness, regional engagement, and quiet assertion of strength. India maintained humanitarian and infrastructural assistance to Maldives, without feeding its political hysteria. It reminded Male of the deeprooted historical, cultural, and economic ties, while silently watching as Muizzu’s government found itself economically cornered. Because here lies the core reality: Maldives needs India. Not just as a neighbour. Not just as a regional stabilizer. But as a financial cushion.
The Maldivian economy is in distress. Tourism—its lifeline—is heavily reliant on regional stability and air connectivity. It took a severe beating during the pandemic and has not fully recovered. Meanwhile, the Chinese loans—taken during the Abdulla Yameen era and extended during the Muizzu tenure—have begun to bite. Chinese infrastructure projects in Maldives, like in other countries, are rarely about altruism. They come with fine print. Unsustainable interest rates, opaque contracts, and political strings. Maldives, much like Sri Lanka, is now realizing that Chinese generosity is debt wrapped in diplomacy. When Male sought support, it wasn’t Beijing that offered debt waivers or currency swaps. It was New Delhi that quietly extended lines of credit, provided medical and food aid, and ensured that tourism remained uninterrupted from the Indian subcontinent.
This is the paradox Maldives finds itself trapped in: emotionally in awe of China’s infrastructure prowess, but practically dependent on India’s economic and geopolitical support. Beijing may fund bridges and luxury housing, but it cannot offer the kind of neighbourhood stability or crisis support that India can—and has, time and again. The problem is psychological as much as it is political. For a small nation like Maldives, the glitter of Chinese investments can appear more enticing than India’s structured support. But this short-term awe has long-term consequences. Every country that danced with China in the past decade is now paying the price—from Hambantota in Sri Lanka to Gwadar in Pakistan. India, therefore, must be very cautious in how it navigates this fragile return to trust.
India should not fall into the trap of excessive generosity. We cannot afford to be the ATM that keeps dispensing cash to those who publicly humiliate us and privately beg for our help. Every rupee of support must come with strategic accountability.
We must invest in strengthening democratic institutions in Maldives— not personalities. Our support should not feed regimes that are easily swayed by foreign influence, but instead empower civil society, education, health, and youth engagement programs that build long-term goodwill towards India. India must also make it clear—without arrogance, but with assertiveness— that any foreign military presence in the Maldives, particularly Chinese, is a red line. Our national security and maritime interests cannot be compromised in the name of diplomacy.
Beyond diplomacy, India must focus on the people of Maldives. The youth, the entrepreneurs, the students—they are the future policymakers. We must foster cultural exchanges, scholarships, tourism collaborations, and regional educational hubs that make India the natural partner for Maldivians, not just politically but emotionally. Anti-India sentiment festers when perception is divorced from reality. India must invest in changing that perception. Just as China buys loyalty through debt, India must earn respect through meaningful, human-centric partnerships.
Let’s not delude ourselves— China isn’t going to walk away. If anything, it will intensify its charm offensive. More loans, more visits, more symbolic gifts. Beijing understands the strategic importance of Maldives in the Indian Ocean. The country is a pivot point in the regional balance of power. India must not drop its guard. We may have tamed the fire for now, but the embers of pro-China sentiment still simmer beneath the surface. Any complacency on our part will be an open invitation for China to re-enter—this time more aggressively.
India must remain the reliable partner—but not the blind friend. Our soft power is a strength, but we must back it with hard realism. Maldives may smile for now, but if the cheque from Beijing is big enough tomorrow, the smile could vanish. Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean is not about permanent friends. It’s about permanent interests. India has done well to reclaim space in Maldives. The challenge now is to hold that ground— with wisdom, vigilance, and strategic clarity. The wolf has been tamed, but the cage is still rattling. Let us not drop the key.
Savio Rodrigues is the Founder and Editor-in-Chief of GoaChronicle.
