With New Delhi outrightly rejecting Permanent Court of Arbitration at Hague’s recent ruling that IWT remains fully in force and India should continue to ‘observe its obligations under the Treaty,’ India’s IWT approach has now entered the assertive domain.
EXEMPLARY AGREEMENT
Much has been said and written about the Indus Waters Treaty [IWT]. According to a media report, “The IWT [1960] represents one of the world’s most successful water sharing agreements, demonstrating remarkable resilience despite decades of Indo-Pakistani hostility.” It goes on to say, “Signed between India and Pakistan with World Bank mediation, this treaty has withstood multiple wars and conflicts, establishing a comprehensive framework for equitable distribution of the Indus River system’s resources and creating mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution.” As it has survived unending ravages of Indo-Pak hostility including wars, there’s no doubt that IWT is definitely one of the world’s most successful water-sharing arrangements. However, the supposition that it provides “a comprehensive framework for equitable distribution of the Indus River system’s resources and creating mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution” is far from true. In fact, it’s the issues of inequitable water distribution arrangements and dispute resolution mechanism in IWT that is at the heart of the current deadlock between India and Pakistan.
‘BLOOD AND WATER’
Many believe that New Delhi’s 2025 decision to hold IWT in abeyance was an impulsive move triggered by the Pahalgam massacre of tourists by Pakistan sponsored terrorists and cite Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “blood and water can’t flow together” declaration to support their view. While it’s a fact that Modi assigned this reason for putting IWT in abeyance, it would be naïve to think that this was an impetuous act. Readers would recall that he had first used this phrase as a cryptic warning a decade ago while addressing a high level internal review meeting on IWT after the Uri terrorist attack.
New Delhi was seeking modifications in IWT even before Pahalgam happened. Its first formal notice was issued to Islamabad in 2023, and when no reply was received, another notice was given in 2024 seeking to “review and modify” the treaty as it was “one-sided.” So, it is evident that New Delhi was not happy with certain provisions in the IWT that did not measure up on the touchstone of impartiality.
The preamble of IWT presupposes an enduring “spirit of goodwill and friendship” between India and Pakistan. However, since Rawalpindi continues to incite cross border animosity by waging proxy war in J&K, the very basic edifice on which IWT stands has been destroyed. New Delhi is hence well within its rights to hold this treaty in abeyance until Pakistan mends its ways, and it’s in this context that the “blood and water can’t run together” remark makes complete sense.
MIND GAMES
After expiry of the Standstill Agreement signed between what was then referred to as East Punjab [India] and West Punjab [Pakistan] in 1948 maintaining status quo on water flow, India stopped water supply to West Punjab province. The supply was resumed five weeks later only after Pakistan agreed to attend an interdominion conference to negotiate a water sharing agreement.
Having realised its vulnerability as a lower riparian state, Pakistan adroitly played some really wily mind games for getting an advantageous water sharing deal. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who was then at the helm of affairs in Pakistan, used his military experience to overawe both the World Bank President and India as is evident from his autobiography, “Friends Not Masters”.
Field Marshal Ayub Khan mentions telling the World Bank President while IWT was still being drafted that “I have been around these areas which are going to be affected by the withdrawal of waters by India. People have told me very plainly that if they have to die through thirst and hunger they would prefer to die in battle and they expected me to give them that chance.”
To make the situation appear more menacing, he even told the World Bank President that “Our jawans [soldiers] and the rest of the people felt the same way. So this country is on the point of blowing up if you don’t lend a helping hand.” By painting a doomsday scenario, Field Marshal Ayub Khan was able to get additional developmental funds.
India’s then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was an incurable optimist to a fault who genuinely believed in peaceful coexistence and was prepared to walk the extra mile to achieve this. Gen Ayub Khan must have realised this as he has mentioned in his autobiography that “Soon after promulgation of Martial Law [in 1958], I told a news conference in Karachi that if the Kashmir and canal water disputes were settled peacefully the new regime should be able to work out some mode of coexistence with India.”
‘PURCHASING PEACE’
It seems that Nehru swallowed the “water dispute” bait hook line and sinker, and in the “spirit of goodwill and friendship” incorporated in its preamble, signed the IWT that gave Pakistan a whopping 80% of Indus Basin waters and India just a measly 20%.
That he knew this was unfair is borne out by three things—one, he didn’t seek formal approval from his Cabinet or Indian Parliament, which was in session shortly before IWT was signed; two, this important treaty was placed before Parliament after an inexplicable delay of two months. Lastly, while defending IWT in Parliament, Nehru said, “Wpurchased a settlement, if you like, we purchased peace, and it is good for both countries.”
APPEASEMENT POLICY
That Pakistan attacked India just five years later demolished the IWT’s “peace purchase” myth. However, it still endured the war and several humongous upheavals in Indo-Pak relationship thereafter for obvious reasons. Pakistan had no cause to complain as IWT was heavily loaded in its favour while India remained seduced by accolades for unconditionally upholding its international commitments.
Islamabad has consistently displayed an obstructionist approach on IWT related matters, which National Security Advisory Board member and Former Chairman, Bhakra Beas Management Board, Devendra Kumar Sharma describes as “Advocating narrow interpretations that prevent technical advances from being implemented in Indian hydropower projects and effectively bind India to outdated technologies and concepts.”
New Delhi on the other hand has curiously been meeting Islamabad’s obduracy with appeasement. Former Indian diplomat and Director General of Indian Council of World Affairs, T.C.A. Raghavan explains: “From the 70s and up till the late 90s, there was something which we used to term as called the Salal Mindset. And the Salal Mindset was that let’s try to keep any IndiaPakistan riparian difference away from the dispute resolution mechanisms. Let the Indus Commissioners handle it and if a compromise requires that you concede a little more than is required, then you do so.”
He adds that “in the Salal project we agreed to make design changes which in the end the engineers didn’t like, but because of this view that we shouldn’t escalate it and take it to a third party or to a neutral expert, we went along with it.”
ASSERTIVE MODE
With New Delhi outrightly rejecting Permanent Court of Arbitration [CoA] at Hague’s recent ruling that IWT remains fully in force and India should continue to “observe its obligations under the Treaty,” India’s IWT approach has now entered the assertive domain.
By stating that the CoA “was constituted by the World Bank in patent breach of the terms of the Treaty and [hence] India categorically rejects its so-called award, just as it has firmly rejected all prior pronouncements by this illegally constituted body,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs has made it clear that IWT continues to remain in abeyance.
The current rules of engagement are unambiguous—one, if water is Pakistan’s red line, Pakistan sponsored terrorism is India’s red line; two, review of IWT to make its provisions more equitable and relevant to changing times is an inescapable as this Treaty in its present discriminatory form isn’t acceptable to India anymore.
The writing on the wall is clear!
Postscript: it’s a curious case of two field marshals. One managed to secure the world’s most extraordinarily generous water sharing treaty for his country in 1960, despite it being a lower riparian. On the other hand, Pakistan’s present field marshal through his acerbic Hinduphobic utterances in 2025 incited a terrorist attack on tourists of this community as a result of which New Delhi promptly put IWT in abeyance. Is this karma or poetic justice?
*Formerly of the Indian Army, Col Nilesh Kunwar (Retd) is a Pakistan watcher.
