New Delhi: In most modern democracies, the armed forces swear allegiance to the constitution and serve the state. In China, however, the story is starkly different. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) functions not as a national army but as the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This design is no accident; it is rooted in law, ideology and practice and has been carefully reinforced under President Xi Jinping.
CONSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY TO THE PARTY
China’s legal framework leaves little ambiguity. The National Defence Law and the Chinese Constitution position the PLA firmly under the Party, not the state. Article 19 of the Defence Law specifies that “the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are led by the Communist Party of China.” Unlike democracies, where armies are bound to civilian institutions of the state, the PLA answers to the Central Military Commission (CMC), a Party organ chaired by Xi.
This party-centric design has blurred lines between state and Party, with constitutional amendments further embedding “Xi Jinping Thought” into governance, defence and national life. Analysts note that the subordination of the PLA to the CCP is a fundamental departure from international military norms.
MAO’S LEGACY OF CONTROL
The roots of this arrangement stretch back to Mao Zedong, who famously declared that “the Party commands the gun.” The maxim has remained a guiding principle, ensuring that the PLA exists to protect the CCP’s monopoly on power. History bears this out: whether during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution or the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, the PLA’s role has been to preserve Party control above all else.
COMMISSARS AND COMMITTEES
Institutionally, the CCP’s grip over the PLA is enforced through commissars, Party committees and political work departments that pervade the military hierarchy. Every unit has a political commissar with equal authority to the commander, ensuring that ideology and discipline are never divorced from Party directives. Party committees deliberate on operational decisions, embedding the principle of “democratic centralism” where political guidance trumps military logic.
The PLA’s Political Work Department, in charge of propaganda and indoctrination, is the lifeline of this system. Scholars often compare this framework to the Soviet commissar model, but with tighter controls adapted to Chinese conditions. In stark contrast, armies in India, the U.S. or Europe remain firmly under constitutional oversight, not partisan authority.
XI’S TIGHTENING GRIP
Since taking power in 2012, Xi has elevated loyalty to the Party as the PLA’s defining mission. At the 2024 Yan’an CMC Political Work Conference, he reiterated that “the gun barrels must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the Party.” His anti-corruption campaigns have purged scores of senior officers, ostensibly for graft, but in practice for insufficient political loyalty.
Xi has also deepened political education within the PLA, placing “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” at the core of training. Personnel management, operations and political work have all been centralised under the CMC, leaving little room for dissent or professional independence.
RISKS BEYOND CHINA’S BORDERS
The implications of this Party-army model extend well beyond Beijing. In crises, from Taiwan to the South China Sea or the India-China border, the PLA’s operational logic is shaped less by national defence considerations than by the CCP’s need to project strength and preserve legitimacy.
American think tanks, such as RAND and CSIS, warn that this politicisation breeds rigidity, heightens the risk of miscalculation, and undermines crisis management. Equally concerning, China has begun exporting this model abroad, through training, ideological education and arms sales, encouraging ruling parties in other states to shape militaries in their own image.
A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL NORMS
International military professionalism is built on the principle that armies serve states, not parties. North Korea’s Korean People’s Army and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps are rare exceptions. The PLA’s model, now increasingly promoted overseas, disrupts this global consensus.
For India, this reality carries particular weight. Along the contested Himalayan frontier, PLA deployments and infrastructure build-up often reflect Party political imperatives rather than defensive military logic. In Taiwan, the CCP’s insistence on “reunification” by 2027 ties PLA modernisation timelines directly to the Party’s legitimacy.
A PARTY’S ARMY, NOT A NATION’S
The bottom line is clear: the PLA is not China’s national army; it is the armed wing of the Communist Party of China. From Mao’s gun-barrel doctrine to Xi’s purges and ideological campaigns, the PLA has been designed to serve the Party’s survival. As China’s military footprint expands across Asia and beyond, this party-first loyalty represents not just a domestic quirk but a global risk.
For policymakers in India and elsewhere, the recognition that the PLA is ultimately the CCP’s army is vital. It explains Beijing’s assertive posture, its ideological rigidity, and its willingness to prioritise regime survival over regional stability.
Ashish Singh is an award-winning senior journalist with over 18 years of experience in defence and strategic affairs.
