London: The smiles on the faces and the grasping of hands said it all. Even President Xi Jinping, not known for his social exuberance, was observed giving a cautious grin. When the leaders of China, India, Russia and more than 20 other countries met in Tianjin last week for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, the optics marked another milestone away from the US-led global order. This Eurasian political and security gathering was in part designed to cement Beijing’s clout and champion its vision of a “multipolar world order”. But the sight of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi holding hands and pledging cooperation also sent a clear message to President Donald Trump.
Observers were quick to notice. “How the hell did Trump so alienate Modi that he’s now attending a summit with autocrats, Xi and Putin?” wrote the former US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, on X. “Just last year China and India were at war with each other!” he added.
The simple answer, of course, is Trump’s trade war, which inevitably brought former foes together. Recently, Trump slapped 50% tariffs on Indian goods over New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian oil. Putin, meanwhile, is facing fresh Western sanctions tied to his ongoing war in Ukraine. “United we stand”, as the old saying goes. Or was it a case of “My enemy’s enemy is my friend?” Whatever the answer, both Xi and Modi appear to be seeking a reset in a relationship long strained by mistrust and unresolved border disputes.
As two of the world’s most populous countries, the rapport between India and China has profound implications not just for Asia, but for global peace, power dynamics, and order. The relationship is also crucial as the world moves into a multipolar phase.
For 46 years after WWII, a period known as the Cold War, two superpowers shaped global politics, alliances and conflicts: the USA and the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 brought an end to this bipolar state and introduced a world dominated by a single superpower with unmatched global influence—the USA.
Unipolarity didn’t last long, however. By the 2020s, the world was clearly becoming multipolar, driven by a combination of China’s rise as a global economic and military power, and Russia’s resurgence under Vladimir Putin. America’s economic vulnerability was also exposed during the 2008 financial crisis as was its over-reach during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This change was well received by China, which saw multipolarity as a way to reshape global norms and institutions around its own interests, using economic power, diplomacy, and soft power. Russia, on the other hand, pushed for multipolarity more destructively by undermining the current system, rather than building alternatives, all the while aligning with China whenever convenient.
As for Washington, which frames international politics as a strategic competition between democracies and autocracies, binding multilateral commitments are best avoided as they might constrain America’s freedom of action. Donald Trump’s lack of understanding of diplomacy and soft power has been more of an accelerant to multilateralism than a cause and his unpredictability simply encourages allies and rivals alike to act more autonomously.
Trump’s “America First” stance, his questioning of long-standing alliances and erratic behaviour, such as cozying up to autocrats while undermining allies, has shaken confidence in America as a stable global leader. This alone is causing many countries, such as India, to hedge their bets and diversify partnerships, thus speeding up multipolar alliances.
When Trump pulled America out of several international agreements such as the Paris Climate Accord, Iran nuclear deal and particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which effectively ended any prospect of the agreement entering force, it signalled to the world that relying on US leadership is risky and best avoided.
Beijing clearly sees Trump’s character and unpredictable behaviour as an opportunity. As the second most powerful country on the planet, China is telling the world that unlike the United States, “if we say we’re going to do something, we stay committed to it. If we say we’re going to be part of a multilateral organisation, an agreement, a treaty or a deal, you can rely on us”. Beijing makes the point that this is in contrast to an “on-again, off-again” US President who changes his mind almost daily with a tweet.
To support this message, Xi Jinping unveiled at the SCO last week a new, US-free vision of global development. His plans include an SCO development bank that would lend in currencies other than the US dollar; diminishing the dollar would make it harder for the US to use sanctions against countries that it unilaterally considers to be rogue. This move is also calculated to limit the attraction of Trump’s “America First” strategy, designed to draw countries and companies away from Beijing to invest in or relocate production to the US. Beijing also pledged 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) in loans for an SCO banking consortium and 2 billion yuan ($280 million) of free aid to member states in 2025. The sums are not insignificant, but are dwarfed by spending on Belt and Road activities in the first half of 2025 alone, where China’s investments and construction contracts across 150 countries totalled $125 billion and are a major factor in China’s rising Soft Power.
Contrast this with Trump’s cataclysmic damage to America’s Soft Power. One of his first acts on returning to the White House was to destroy the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which instantly undermined decades of US global goodwill, diplomatic leverage and moral leadership. The cynical purpose of the closure was transparent—to give more tax cuts to America’s already wealthy Trump supporters.
Between late January and early February this year, nearly the entire USAID workforce of over 10,000 people were sacked, the website taken down and the building closed. USAID had been one of the most visible symbols of American generosity, providing disaster relief, vaccines, food and education in over 100 countries and suddenly it was no more. It’s not surprising, therefore, that polling by both Pew and Gallup in 2025 shows a sharp drop in favourability towards the US across Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, regions heavily dependent on US development aid. It’s also not surprising that former partners now describe the US as “unreliable” and “inward-looking”.
In its day, USAID was critical in countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative by promoting democratic governance and civil society. With its closure, China has gained more influence in Africa and Southeast Asia, while Russia and Iran are happily expanding influence through humanitarian and medical diplomacy in the Middle East.
The result is that while the US traditionally led with values-based aid, Trump’s rollback has created an ideological and operational vacuum, now largely being filled by China’s pragmatism, investment and strategic alignment. Beijing, not Washington, is being viewed by more and more countries as a more consistent and committed global partner.
There is little doubt that by challenging US hegemony, reshaping global institutions and offering alternative models of development and governance, China’s growing dominance is contributing to a growing multipolar world. China is not the only reason, of course, as India, Europe, Russia and regional blocs are also playing major roles. But for many analysts, what stands out as the most significant driver of the shift towards multipolarity in the world is plain for all to see—Donald Trump’s poor judgement and erratic behaviour.
John Dobson is a former British diplomat, who also worked in UK Prime Minister John Major’s office between 1995 and 1998. He is currently a visiting fellow at the University of Plymouth.
