No large democracy in the world has more than three quarter million residents to a constituency; most much less. UK, on which our Parliament is modelled, has 69.5 million (below half our current population) but 107 more MPs.
Fearing a Special Session of Parliament may yet be called since Monsoon session is not prorogued, Opposition voices are vociferously reiterating opposition to delimitation while separating and supporting one third reservation for women within the present 543 seats.
Fifty per cent pro rata increase (50% pro rata) of seat numbers for each state in Lok Sabha—raising number to 815, one third for women, under an overarching ceiling of 850 seats—was verbally canvassed by the government earlier. But the verbally communicated formula was not codified and tabled within the proposed law which, in contradiction, benchmarked Census 2011 and further sought authorization for Parliament to time delimitation and census year. Acrimonious debate ended with rejection. The Home Minister’s verbal offer to rework the tabled law was ignored.
The opposition’s rigid return to the old “one third women within 543 seats” mantra and freeze extension at 543 is short sighted. The imbroglio needs sorting out, earliest. Statesmanship, rising above partisan politics, must tackle a very complex demographic and political challenge: all constituencies have grown grossly large and malapportioned, individual democratic rights are severely compromised and the North and South are polarized on remedies. The problem grows increasingly insoluble with time, while women’s greater political inclusion is hostage to power play.
Renewed insistence to this mantra will only extend the women’s stalemate.
The women’s question apart, let us examine other 543 freeze arguments. Also understand why 50% prorata offers a most logical solution to a knotty problem and so requires refinement not rejection. Other suggestions, such as a hybrid model with equal weightage to population and economic contribution or moderated expansion assuring no loss of seats to any state while giving underrepresented states enough additional seats to bring in line with their populations, are overly sophisticated formulations that make a complex issue more complex.
But apprehensions around Census 2011 are credible. Scholars estimate that with Census 2011 numbers, the five southern states would lose 27 seats; the four largest northern states would gain 52; smaller adjustments in several other states. Lacking political agreement, delimitation is constitutionally mandated on Census 2027 completion. Then, southern loss antes up to 38 seats; another 12 between West Bengal, Odisha and Punjab, while the four northern largest states gain 52 seats and 16 in various other states. Delay compounds, doesn’t resolve.
This snarled situation is the outcome of a misguided Emergency era constitutional amendment and 50 years of refusal to face reality. Properly codified, 50% pro-rata increase on the accepted existing 1971 base allocations is a positive alternative on two counts: one, it is an almost magical valid arithmetic formulation: 50% added to any number results in an exact one third addition within the final total no matter what baseline. An exact match to women’s reservation requirement; applicable to Lok Sabha/ all state legislatures, big or small. More significantly, if every state’s share increases 50% pro-rata there is zero disruption of the ongoing delicate balance between states’ seat allocations. Yet, it provisions very substantive mitigation of the problem of exploding constituency sizes bedevilling every large state.
Tightly legislated to achieve clearly enunciated objectives, it would be a clear win-win: no alteration of accepted status quo; significant increase in representative numbers for all; seating 272 women representatives, i.e. 91 more than the 181 promise through one third of 543 mantra.
Several fallacious arguments have arisen against. For one, the counter arguments point to an “unwieldy” Parliament (earlier, lack of space cited). Further, notwithstanding proportionate ratios maintained numerical advantage accrues to majoritarian groups because Parliament votes in numbers not ratios. How? If UP’s MPs are a new 120 (80+40) to Tamil Nadu’s new 59 (39+19.5 rounded) or Bihar’s 60 (40+20) to Kerala’s new 30 (20+10) how can that make a difference in vote count? Voter numbers may be larger but so is the overall numerical denominator of voting eligible. The only time disadvantage could accrue is if those elected fail to attend to vote. That underlines party discipline not excuses to stymie increase.
Then no other democratic country has 800 plus elected chamber; nor has any democratic country increased representation as population increases. Frequently quoted are USA and UK. But no large democracy in the world has more than three quarter million residents to a constituency; most much less. UK, on which our Parliament is modelled, has 69.5 million (below half our current population) but 107 more MPs; the tiny House of Commons hosts 650. The USA: population 342.8 million—about a quarter of India’s—435 representatives; each district not exceeding three quarter million. No country has ever frozen representative numbers, much less for half a century.
We are now 1.4 billion; triple the 548 million of Census 1971 when the population was in near equal distribution between states. Thus 543 (actually 545 within 550 ceiling) representatives for constituency sizes averaging a million. Now, nationally, each Parliament constituency averages 2 to 2.6 million; many in the North are 3 million plus, a few around 4 million. (The untampered constitutional ideal was three quarters million as in other democratic countries.) These bloated constituency sizes is what Nobel Laureate Abhijit Bannerjee terms the “structural violence in Indian democracy”. Huge constituency sizes are also responsible for increasing criminalization of politics/politicians as muscle/money power has filled the vacuum from lack of public connect.
50% pro-rata does not bring back one person one vote equality. But it does offer a most equitable, effective compromise to reduce all constituency sizes very considerably without bitter controversy. Political leaderships require to revisit the formula devised in Delimitation 2002 when within state constituencies were demarcated according to Census 2001 population, bringing near uniformity within each state, while the numbers of constituencies remained unaltered at 1971 fixed state allocations both between and within states. Political negotiation could rework this fixed allocation at 50% pro-rata.
That brings up another fallacious argument: lack of constitutional validity for 50% pro-rata increase. But stopping decadal delimitation was also definitely outside Constitutional mandate. However, united Parliament will prevail over constitutional instruction. That move actually amended a very basic feature of the Constitutional mandate; so what stops Parliament to make a Constitutional amendment that only builds on the previous position by adding 50% pro-rata to every state’s share? It uses a precedent with a further positive imaginative twist.
Then, the hue and cry around “gerrymandering” i.e. demarcating to achieve electoral advantage. Surely, opposition politicians require to gear themselves to greater vigilance to ensure an independent Delimitation Commission with inbuilt judicial safeguards and accountability procedures does function independently as it has over past decades.
Finally—a larger Parliament further diminishes MPs’ opportunity already hard pressed to secure intervention time. This charge requires scrutiny of present Parliament work schedules. Research shows the first Lok Sabha sat for 135 days in a year; post Independence decades averaged 120 days. The past decade has seen this shrink to 70 day average; the 17th Lok Sabha met roughly 55 days; in 2020 just 33 days; in 2008 46 days. Earlier workday figures align closely with peer global democracies like USA and Japan where parliament sittings still average 120-140 days. This problem requires resuming earlier working norms and greater, more regular participation in Committees examining legislation/government performance not 6-day 6-hour schedule, 70 days in the year, if actually working and not in adjournments.
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Rami Chhabra is a veteran journalist.
