NEW DELHI: Bharat is currently engaged in a process of re-imagining itself. For about seven decades after Independence in 1947, the country saw itself in terms of a liberal democracy in the Western mould, pursuing economic policies based on Fabian socialism. As the authors of the book under review note, “Independent India simply fell into another British-constructed identitarian cul-de-sac”. But all that changed with the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, when, for the first time in 30 years, a single political party won an absolute parliamentary majority on its own. Even more remarkably, that political party was the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), whose earlier incarnation (the Jan Sangh) had once been banned and which in 1984 had only two seats in Parliament. Something clearly had changed in the country’s political landscape; something much deeper than just outrage at the unchecked corruption of the Indian National Congress (INC) that had led a coalition government since 2004. In fact, the 2014 election can now be seen as a political watershed, when Bharat signaled that it was time to slough off an ill-fitting and uncomfortable skin and start developing a persona more in tune with its dharmic civilization and heritage.
The years since 2014 have seen an outpouring of books, podcasts and articles giving voice and shape to the new Bharat that is emerging. Desiraju’s earlier book (Bharat: India 2.0) sat squarely in this renaissance of Indic writing. It set out radical new thinking about the fundamental changes required for the new Bharat to come fully into being. It also pre-figured a bold proposal for reorganizing the country into 75 small states (in place of the current 28 states and 8 Union Territories). In his new book under review, co-authored with Deekhit Bhattacharya, Desiraju fleshes out his thoughts on states’ reorganization, marries them to the impending delimitation of parliamentary constituencies, and shows why constitutional concerns need not be a constraint.
The great merit of the book is that it gets the basics right. As the authors aver, the primacy of individualism, societal order and democracy are all rooted in sanatana dharma, Bharat’s civilizational tradition. While the first two in that trinity are universal and timeless, democracy is ever a work-in-progress. The arrangements that give effect to it vary from country to country and may also have to change over time. The important thing is to ensure that the democratic set-up respects the sovereignty of the individual while also being mindful of the the need for societal harmony.
For the authors, this means recognizing two foundational (and, to my mind, unexceptionable) principles. The first is Each Vote, Same Value, that is, the weight of any Bharatiya’s vote should be the same as that of any other citizen. The other is Each State, Same Heft, that is, all states should have roughly the same size (population and area). It would also help if states were much smaller, since “the general rule of thumb in India is that the worth of a citizen is inversely proportional to their distance from the state capital”!
The core of the book is a deeply researched and powerfully argued tour de force on the two subjects contained in its title. The authors begin by establishing, with compelling logic, that:
• given the diversity of Bharat in terms of culture, language, religion and geography, forming States on the basis of a single factor alone (viz., language) makes little sense;
• that, in fact, the recommendations (on linguistic States) by the States Reorganizing Commission were never followed;
• that the more recent formation of States has responded more to political convenience and has, in all cases, shown a preference for smaller States; and
• the Lok Sabha is constitutionally capable of demarcating States.
On the back of this analysis, they present a case for reorganizing Bharat into 75 small States, each with a population of around two crores. At first blush, this may seem far-fetched but there is little doubt that (i) the current differences in the size of States – and, hence, their relative weight in terms of power and influence – is unhealthy, and (ii) that, for states, small is beautiful. Smaller states would also be conducive for applying the principle of subsidiarity pioneered by the European Union. This means taking decisions and actions at the lowest, most local level possible, with higher authorities (i.e., the Central government) intervening only when necessary and when the lower level cannot address the issue effectively. Smaller—and, importantly, equally small—states also imply Each State, Equal Heft.
The authors then turn to delimitation, a topic that may be top of mind for the political class today. The current Lok Sabha has 543 seats but this reflects a delimitation exercise that was carried out in 1976, on the basis of the 1971 census. Although delimitation is required after every census, it was decided to freeze it for a period of 25 years. Then, in 2001, delimitation was frozen for a further period of 25 years, i.e., up to 2026. The issue now is whether – after a hiatus of 50 years – delimitation will be allowed to take place next year. Of equal significance is whether – if delimitation is to be undertaken – it will be based on the latest census or, as Tamilnadu’s DMK demands, on the basis of the 1971 census.
The need for delimitation to follow each census is to ensure that people’s representation is not diluted by population growth, i.e., the number of people an MP represents remains manageable over time. Given the increase in population since 1971, Tamilnadu’s demand would make a mockery of this. It is also, as the authors point out, based on the specious argument that taking population increase into account penalizes states with superior performance in economic growth and population control. For one thing, differences in economic growth between states are much less now than before. For another, 2026 represents the year in which the National Population Policy expected Bharat’s population to stabilize. So, the impending census should definitely be the basis for the next delimitation.
The new Parliament building has provision for 858 seats. Would that number be sufficient to reflect population growth since 1971? It would appear unlikely. If the ratio of electors to the elected is to remain manageable, delimitation should result in many more seats than 858, perhaps even as high as double that figure. Is that unreasonable? In China, a country with a comparable population size, the People’s National Congress accommodates 3,000 members!
The authors make two other crucial points. First, for Each State, Equal Heft and Each Vote, Equal Value to have meaning, states reorganization and delimitation need to go hand-in-hand. As they observe, “there is no way a rational and fair nationwide delimitation of constituencies can be achieved without a complete redrawing of state borders.” Second, it is perfectly possible to implement these changes—as fundamental as they are—within the ambit of the present Constitution. However, they clearly prefer doing so under a new Constitution. This is also this reviewer’s preference.
Clearly, the authors dream big: reorganizing states, hugely increasing the number of Lok Sabha seats, and envisioning a new constitution. But a blueprint for a Viksit Bharat demands nothing less. While rapid economic growth will be essential, Bharat will not realize its full potential as a civilizational entity through economics alone. It must become a better democracy and a Ram Rajya worthy of its heritage. Desiraju and Bhattacharya deserve our gratitude for the ambition of their thought and the incisiveness of their analyses. In sum, a timely and must-read book!