Deterrence is not simply the use of brute force. It is the expression of coercive credibility. It is defined less by the scale of destruction and more by the adversary’s expectation of future costs. As Thomas Schelling memorably put it, deterrence is the ‘art of convincing someone that the cost of their actions will outweigh the benefits.
NEW DELHI: Operation Sindoor marks a doctrinal shift in India’s national security policy. It is a fundamental reassessment of how India seeks to counter cross-border terrorism in a nuclearised environment. The strikes on terrorist facilities within Pakistan reflect a move from passive restraint to active enforcement of punitive justice.
The operation was expected rather than surprising, and the strategic message lay partly in that very expectation. For decades, India pursued a policy of strategic restraint. This approach to conflict management emphasized diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakist a n i nt e r n at i o n a l ly, and the maintenance of moral high ground.
Despite India’s conventional military superiority, it allowed Pakistan’s military jihadi complex to operate with relative impunity. From the 1980s onward, Pakistan institutionalized proxy terrorism under the cover of nuclear deterrence, outsourcing violence to nonstate actors. This low-cost, deniable strategy became known as “bleeding India through a thousand cuts”. Yet despite the persistent use of this approach, India’s responses ranging from dossier diplomacy to strong official statements rarely imposed tangible cost on Rawalpindi. After 2016, India began to move away from strategic restraint.
The surgical strikes after Uri and air strikes following Balakot in 2019 signalled a shift toward imposing cost through retaliation. This marked a turn to deterrence, aimed at demonstrating both capability and intent. Operation Sindoor extended it further. It was anticipated and carefully executed, targeting terrorist camps while initially avoiding military assets. Thereby, reinforcing the message that the cross border punitive action now lies at the core of India’s counterterrorism strategy. Had the Pakistani air bases not been attacked, critics would have argued that by avoiding military targets and focusing on reconstitutable terror camps, India limits the effectiveness of deterrence.
This view treats deterrence as a rigid concept and overlooks the complex context India faces in a nuclear environment. Deterrence is not simply the use of brute force. It is the expression of coercive credibility. It is defined less by the scale of destruction and more by the adversary’s expectation of future costs. As Thomas Schelling memorably put it, deterrence is the “art of convincing someone that the cost of their actions will outweigh the benefits.” To be clear, achieving stable deterrence is notoriously difficult in international politics. India is not alone in facing this problem.
During the Global War on Terror, the United States struggled to deter asymmetric threats despite its military dominance. Israel, too, continues to face attacks from Gaza despite enjoying conventional superiority in a non-nuclear environment. Deterrence then is constrained not by capability but by the adversary’s incentive structure and ideological depth; this holds true for Pakistan’s deep state as well.
Therefore, expecting perfect deterrence is wishful thinking; what is feasible, and what Operation Sindoor reflects, is a willingness to impose disproportionate costs on terrorism and introduce risk into Pakistan’s decision-making by leveraging the unpredictability of the fog of war. Operation Sindoor was notable for its calibrated escalation. India challenged the assumption that Pakistan’s territory offered safe haven to terrorists by striking inside its borders, yet maintained an off-ramp for deescalation by limiting the first wave of retaliatory strikes to terrorist infrastructure.
From gametheoretic perspective, this is one that punishes, resets, and watches, that is, an iterated tit-for-tat approach. More crucially, it places the onus for any further escalation squarely on Pakistan. India’s messaging formalises this attitude by declaring, “any act of terrorism will now be considered an act of war,” similar to America’s framing of war on terror following 9/11. Op. Sindoor also challenges Pakistan’s longstanding nuclear bluff.
Pakistan has relied for years on the “stabilityinstability paradox,” the theory that nuclear weapons let it engage in the low cost policy of bleeding India through terrorism without running into the danger of full-scale war. Through Op. Sindoor and earlier Balakot, India countered this strategic blackmail. These operations by New Delhi reveal the limits of nuclear deterrence by proving that punitive action is feasible without spiralling into nuclear escalation.
As a result, the framework of interaction between India and Pakistan stands altered. Still, India has to move beyond physical actions if it is to institutionalise deterrence. It can use its growing influence to lobby international institutions like the IMF for imposing stricter conditions on Pakistan’s bailouts, ensuring that these funds are not redirected to military activities. This approach is not unusual, as the Financial Action Task Force has already used economic pressure to influence state behaviour.
Furthermore, it is argued that New Delhi should aim to target Pakistan’s main source of foreign exchange, which comes from textile exports. This can be done through calibrated tariffs, trade agreements, and smart competitiveness in global markets. This should be actively complemented by diplomatic efforts to pressure Pakistan in international forums to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. The United States’ declining reliance on Pakistan following the end of its war on terror presents an opportunity to increase pressure on Rawalpindi through coordinated engagement.
As Jaswant Singh observed, “Deterrence is not a fixity.” It is shaped by the interplay of leadership preferences, technological capability, adversary’s perception, and the broader strategic environment. Making the equilibrium contextual and situational. As a deterrence strategy then, Operation Sindoor then does not signal the end of cross border provocations or offer a definitive solution to terrorism.
Rather, it marks a shift in India’s strategic grammar. The longstanding reliance on dossier diplomacy has given way to calibrated use of force. One that conveys coercive credibility through precise and deep strikes. * Aditya Sinha (x:@adityasinha004) writes on economic and geopolitical issues. * Paras Ratna (x: @parasratna) is a Research Scholar in International Relations at the National University of Singapore. Views personal.