India must proactively engage with Lee Jae-myung’s upcoming South Korean administration to strengthen strategic, economic, and diplomatic ties
SEOUL: With South Korea’s presidential election just weeks away, momentum appears to be firmly on the side of Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung. Despite a recent Supreme Court ruling overturning his acquittal in an election law violation case, Lee continues to lead in every major opinion poll.
His enduring support suggests that unless a major political disruption occurs between now and June 3, Lee Jae-myung is poised to become the next president of the Republic of Korea. This emerging political reality carries important strategic implications for India, which has steadily built a multifaceted partnership with South Korea over the past two decades.
As the geopolitical center of gravity shifts across the IndoPacific, it is vital that India prepare itself for the policy direction likely to be set under a Lee administration— one that will differ markedly from the ousted leadership of President Yoon Suk-yeol. LEE’S ENDURING ELECTORAL LEAD In the latest surveys reported in Korean media, Lee Jae-myung continues to lead the presidential race with notable consistency, even after the Supreme Court overturned his acquittal in an election law case and referred it back to the Seoul High Court for retrial.
According to an aggregated analysis of 95 opinion polls conducted since December 4, Lee maintains close to 50% support in a three-way contest—holding steady despite mounting political and legal pressures. In the most recent hypothetical matchup against People Power Party nominee Kim Moon-soo and Reform Party leader Lee Jun-seok, Lee recorded 50% support, In another scenario replacing Kim with former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, Lee secured 47.4% support—maintaining a 12-point lead over Han, who polled at 35.7%.
These numbers are more than mere statistical margins—they reflect widespread public dissatisfaction with the conservative bloc and strong support for Lee’s agenda of social reform, economic fairness, regional revitalization, and a foreign policy grounded in strategic autonomy. His ability to sustain voter trust amid legal uncertainties highlights a significant degree of political resilience and public resonance.
Barring a major disruption—such as conservative consolidation, sensational new disclosures, or an intensified judicial-political confrontation—Lee’s path to the presidency appears increasingly assured. A SHIFT FROM YOON’S FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE President Yoon Suk-yeol’s foreign policy was defined by close alignment with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and a confrontational stance toward China and North Korea. His administration deepened trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, joined strategic initiatives such as the Chip 4 Alliance, and positioned South Korea as a key player in the emerging tech-driven rivalry between democratic and authoritarian powers. In contrast, Lee Jae-myung is expected to pursue a more independent, pragmatic, and regionally balanced approach.
While reaffirming the importance of the U.S.-Korea alliance, he has voiced concern over excessive reliance on U.S. security guarantees and the risks of entanglement in great-power competition. Lee consistently advocates for South Korea’s right to chart its own foreign policy based on national interests and economic logic. LEE’S LIKELY FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY VISION Lee’s foreign policy is expected to center on three interlinked principles: regional balance, economic pragmatism, and strategic autonomy. First, he promotes “independent diplomacy” that allows South Korea to serve as a bridge between competing powers rather than a subordinate in bloc politics.
This could involve recalibrating military alignment with U.S. hardline positions while expanding diplomatic outreach across ASEAN, India, and the broader Eurasian region. Second, Lee is expected to pursue a thaw in interKorean relations. While Yoon emphasized military deterrence, Lee believes peace on the peninsula can only be achieved through engagement. He may revive inter-Korean economic and humanitarian cooperation and reopen channels for dialogue—initiatives like the Kaesong Industrial Complex could return to the agenda.
These are platforms where India could play a supportive role through capacity building, technical cooperation, and peace diplomacy. Third, Lee’s prospective China policy is likely to reflect a measured approach focused on risk mitigation. While committed to maintaining robust ties with Washington, Lee is expected to avoid policies that could entangle South Korea in open-ended geopolitical rivalries. His emphasis is likely to be on reducing friction with Beijing where possible, safeguarding Korea’s economic interests, and ensuring regional stability.
This stance should be viewed not as a shift in allegiance, but as an effort to preserve strategic flexibility in a complex and rapidly evolving regional landscape. INDIA-KOREA STRATEGIC MOMENT India must not wait for Lee to assume office before recalibrating its Korea strategy. The political transition presents a timely opportunity to forge deeper and more dynamic ties. Lee’s emphasis on inclusive development and regional multipolarity aligns closely with India’s strategic outlook, which values autonomy, balanced diplomacy, and sustainable economic growth.
India should initiate outreach to Lee’s key advisors and the Democratic Party leadership now, laying the groundwork for a renewed strategic framework. Track 1.5 dialogues, policy coordination, and civil society exchanges must be scaled up urgently. High-potential sectors for cooperation include semiconductors, electric vehicles, defense production, quantum computing, and AI-driven manufacturing. Moreover, Lee’s domestic focus on welfare, regional equity, and innovation offers fertile ground for collaboration. India’s successful rollout of initiatives such as Aadhaar, UPI, Jan Dhan, and digital health services in underserved regions can offer models for Korean adaptation.
India’s digital public infrastructure may provide inspiration for a Korean administration seeking to bridge social and economic gaps without excessive state centralization. Lee’s belief in strategic autonomy presents a compelling opportunity for India to elevate its partnership with South Korea. New Delhi’s experience in navigating a multipolar world—balancing strong U.S. ties while preserving space for engagement with China, Russia, ASEAN, and the Global South—offers valuable lessons for Seoul.
This shared commitment to autonomy and balance can help move the bilateral relationship from transactional cooperation to long-term geopolitical trust. CHINA, THE U.S., AND STRATEGIC BALANCING A Lee presidency could introduce friction with Washington’s Indo-Pacific expectations, particularly where automatic Korean alignment is presumed. However, this shift also opens a strategic window for India to position itself as a credible intermediary. With its reputation for issue-based diplomacy and ability to engage across multiple strategic theatres, India is uniquely placed to support Seoul in shaping a more sovereign and balanced foreign policy.
India must also prepare for Beijing’s likely efforts to reset relations with Seoul under a Lee government. China may seek to deepen its influence in Korean trade, tech, and security discourse. India should not respond passively, but act decisively—strengthening trade ties, launching cultural diplomacy initiatives, and facilitating deeper Korean integration into India’s industrial and tech ecosystems. A major upgrade of India’s Korea policy is no longer optional—it is imperative. YOON LEGACY AND CONSERVATIVE COLLAPSE The implosion of the Yoon presidency and the resulting snap election have redrawn the political map in Korea.
Yoon’s increasingly authoritarian tactics and failed bid to expand executive power through unconstitutional means shattered his credibility and fragmented the conservative camp. Even experienced figures like Kim Moon-soo and Han Duck-soo have struggled to unify the right or offer a compelling alternative. Lee’s ability to maintain political momentum despite ongoing legal scrutiny underscores his strategic clarity and political resilience.
His message of balanced governance, peace, and economic justice resonates with a public weary of ideological polarization and institutional overreach. India should take note: the next Korean government will likely prioritize inclusive growth, civil discourse, and calibrated diplomacy. Aligning with this new tone will be essential if India hopes to expand its influence and relevance on the Korean Peninsula. ACT NOW, NOT AFTER JUNE The message is clear.
Barring a political shock, Lee Jae-myung is on course to become South Korea’s next president. India cannot afford to wait until after the election to engage. Strategic groundwork must begin now—through high-level dialogue, policy proposals, and targeted outreach. As Korea moves into a new phase—more inward-looking, progressive at home, and pragmatic abroad—India has a rare opportunity to step up as a key partner. Not as a junior stakeholder in a U.S.-led framework, but as a sovereign peer offering compelling alternatives in trade, innovation, and global governance.
The future of the India-Korea partnership will not be shaped by good intentions alone. It will be defined by timely action. And that action must begin now. Dr Lakhvinder Singh is Director of Peace and Security Studies at the Asia Institute in Seoul, South Korea.