India faces an emerging maritime challenge from a coordinated China-Turkiye-Pakistan naval build-up by 2040.
NEW DELHI: India is now less than 15 years away from encountering what defence planners increasingly recognise as the most formidable maritime challenge in its history—a coordinated naval build-up by China, Turkiye, and Pakistan.
While the three nations are not part of any formal alliance as of now, their hidden coordination—on display during Operation Sindoor—and converging maritime postures suggest the emergence of a strategic triangle. If left unchecked, this triad could outmatch India’s projected naval capabilities by 2040.
Notably, the Indian military, under clear instructions from Prime Minister Narendra Modi, undertook Operation Sindoor without any military assistance, acting alone across multiple domains—land, air, cyber, and naval—even as allies and friends limited themselves to lip service. In stark contrast, Pakistan received covert support during and after the operation from China and Turkiye.
This asymmetry in external support sets a clear precedent—one that underscores the possibility that India may again have to act alone in a future multi-theatre maritime conflict, even as adversaries draw upon shared platforms, logistics, and real-time intelligence.
China, already the world’s largest navy in terms of total ship count according to official assessments, is on track to operate by 2040 no fewer than six aircraft carriers—including nuclear-powered carriers—alongside 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines, over 60 conventional and air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines, and a surface fleet of more than 150 warships.
Significantly, its overseas basing infrastructure in Djibouti is now fully operational, and its access to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, integrated with the Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system, offers dual-use capabilities for both commercial and military objectives—something that has not escaped relevant eyes.
Turkiye’s naval modernisation is being executed under the MILGEM (National Ship) programme, the TF-2000 air defence destroyer project, and the MİLDEN (National Submarine) initiative.
By 2040, Turkiye is expected to deploy an aircraft carrier, destroyers equipped with up to 96 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, and stealth submarines incorporating advanced sonar and acoustic dampening technologies.
Turkiye is also investing in the integration of unmanned surface vessels, underwater drones, and drone-based intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) systems. These developments, in turn, are leading to joint development and technology transfer arrangements with Pakistan.
Pakistan, although limited in domestic naval manufacturing, is actively leveraging this trilateral axis. It is expected to field eight Hangor-class submarines equipped with AIP systems, four Type 054A/P guided missile frigates from China, and four Babur-class corvettes being built with Turkish assistance by 2040. With the development of the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile, Pakistan is moving toward acquiring a limited but credible second-strike nuclear capability from the sea.
By 2040, the combined strength of these three navies—all considered hostile to India as of now—is projected to include more than 80 submarines, at least seven aircraft carriers, and between 180 to 200 surface combatants equipped with integrated combat systems, interlinked ISR platforms, and multi-layered missile defence systems.
Their regional footprint—China in the Indo-Pacific and South China Sea, Turkiye in the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, and Pakistan in the Arabian Sea—will impact a triangulated maritime grid that not only directly challenges India’s operating space but also affects global maritime movement.
It is important to mention that convergence between these three countries is already happening through joint maritime exercises, bilateral defence logistics agreements, ISR sharing, and technology transfer arrangements.
According to multiple assessments, Pakistan’s new frigates now operate with Turkish combat management systems, while Chinese vertical launch cells and HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have been integrated into Pakistan’s naval air defence structure. Chinese ISR assets operating via satellite-linked infrastructure in Gwadar and elsewhere are being used to monitor Indian naval movements in real time.
For India, the military implications are profound. This trilateral coordination presents a multi-axis challenge. If China, Turkiye, and Pakistan converge operationally at sea, India could face simultaneous threats on the Eastern seaboard (Bay of Bengal), Western approaches (Arabian Sea), and from the Northern littoral via Turkish-influenced corridors.
This would force the Indian Navy to split its forces across three distinct theatres, stretching available assets and operational endurance.
India’s submarine fleet—projected to reach 24 by 2040—would be numerically outmatched and exposed to hostile undersea ISR grids and active tracking, especially by Chinese SSNs and AIP-equipped vessels. This endangers India’s sea-based nuclear deterrence and freedom of manoeuvre in contested zones. Carrier battle groups would be exposed to long-range anti-ship missiles and unmanned drone swarms developed by Turkiye and China. If deployed from Gwadar or forward operating bases in the Red Sea or East Africa, these systems could deny India maritime superiority even in its own backyard.
Electronic warfare, real-time tracking, and integrated surveillance via Chinese BeiDou satellites, Turkish AI-enabled ISR drones, and Pakistani coastal monitoring systems would degrade India’s command-and-control infrastructure in a conflict scenario.
India’s current advantage in logistics and basing would be offset by the trio’s growing access to multiple Indian Ocean ports—from Djibouti and Gwadar to Sudan and possibly Jask in Iran. This would allow sustained forward deployment, quick resupply, and repair capacity—something India would need to match through partnerships in Oman, France’s Réunion, and Southeast Asia.
Even vital choke points—Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Mozambique Channel, and the Strait of Malacca—could be contested. India’s commercial shipping and energy imports would be vulnerable to disruption from both state and proxy actors in a prolonged standoff.
To effectively defend and attack simultaneously in such a scenario, as its military effectively did during Operation Sindoor, India’s naval force structure must evolve rapidly from projection to presence. India’s stated objective of deploying three aircraft carriers, 200 warships, and 500 naval aircraft must be realised within the next decade. Key programmes such as INS Vishal, the planned aircraft carrier using catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) technology, must move from the conceptual to construction stage without additional slippage.
The six planned nuclear-powered attack submarines under Project SSN must be delivered on schedule. The Arihant-class SSBNs must continue uninterrupted deterrent patrols to uphold India’s sea-based second-strike capability. By 2040, India’s submarine fleet is projected to include six SSNs, four Arihant-class SSBNs forming the backbone of its nuclear deterrent, and approximately 14 conventional submarines—comprising both upgraded Scorpene-class boats and new-generation AIP-equipped platforms under Project 75I or its successor. Adherence to this timeline is critical.
Ensuring this fleet is fully operational and technologically current will be vital to countering the combined underwater advantage of China, Turkiye, and Pakistan.
Delays in critical projects such as Project 75I (next-generation conventional submarines), the Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF) for carrier aviation, and domestic underwater ISR infrastructure would directly reduce India’s deterrence and warfighting flexibility in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Additionally, assumptions that China will act independently in its maritime strategy are increasingly misplaced. The interplay of China’s naval scale, Turkiye’s technological innovation, and Pakistan’s geographic advantage and expanding undersea reach suggests a coordinated challenge to Indian maritime dominance.
What makes this triad more difficult to counter is its deniability. As of now, it is not structured around a military alliance or shared command chain. Instead, it is a decentralised alignment—manifested through joint platforms, real-time ISR coordination, and shared strategic aims—particularly the dilution of Indian naval primacy in the IOR.
India’s response, experts argue, must now be sustained and multi-dimensional.
Naval capital expenditure must consistently exceed 30% of the defence budget. India’s basing access to partner facilities in Vietnam, France’s Réunion Island, and Oman should be upgraded to include logistics, dry-dock refit, and weapons pre-positioning infrastructure. The Andaman and Nicobar Command must evolve from a symbolic forward presence to an operational strike node, equipped for rapid response and long-duration deployments.
Indigenisation must be accelerated across sonars, torpedoes, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and electronic warfare systems. Reliance on prolonged foreign procurement cycles should be minimised, as they no longer align with the urgency of the evolving threat.
The strategic triangle of China, Turkiye, and Pakistan is not a future possibility—it is a visible and accelerating convergence. India, having fought alone in 2025, must prepare to do so again in 2040—but this time against a better-armed, better-networked triad.
If India is to retain its centrality and credibility as the primary net security provider in the Indian Ocean, it must decisively outpace this alignment. By the time 2040 arrives, superiority—not parity—must be fully established.