This is the first time after 1971, that Indians have struck so deep into Pakistani territory, something that was not done even in the Kargil War. This message would have been driven home.
PUNE: THE STRIKE
When the horrific massacre of civilians took place in the meadows of Pahalgam by terrorists trained and sponsored by Pakistan, retribution had to be coming. And retribution came exactly 15 days later, when Indian struck nine terrorist camps deep within Pakistan in an action appropriately code-named OPERATION SINDOOR. The symbolism of the name, chosen by Prime Minister Modi himself, was lost on no one and found resonance with all Indians.
On the night of 7 May, a IAF strike package of Rafales, Mirage 2000s, and Sukhoi 30 MKI fighters launched a precision strike on terrorist camps within Pakistan, firing SCALP Storm Shadow long range cruise missiles and Hammer air-to-ground precision bombs. The projectiles were launched from within Indian territory, obviating any risk to the aircraft or the pilots. The entire operation was controlled by an Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, while loitering drones hovered overhead relaying vital information, sending back videos of the strike and the damage, before they too finally crashed into their designated targets with their explosive payloads.
The entire strike lasted just 24 minutes—from 01.04 am till 01.30 am. By the time it was over, 24 missiles had hit nine terrorist camps—five in POK and four in Pakistani Punjab. These included the Sawai Nala training camp at Muzzafarabad, the Bilal camp in POK, the Gulpur camp in Kotli, the Barnala camp in Bhimbar, the Kotli Abbas camp and the Sarjal camp in Sialkot—all around 9-30 kms deep. The more significant targets were deeper in Pakistani Punjab. Markaz Taiba camp in Muridke, near Lahore—the HQ of the Lashkar-e-Taiba – from where its chief Hafiz Saeed, planned the Mumbai blasts and other terrorist attacks – was levelled with a high precision missile strike. At Bahawalpur, over a 100 kms deep, the Markaz Subhan camp, HQ of the Jaish-e-Mohammed was similarly eradicated. Its chief, Masood Azhar, who lost 10 members of his family in the strike, bemoaned at their funeral, “I wish I had also joined this lucky caravan.” It is a wish that perhaps would be fulfilled soon.
This strike was a clear statement of intent. And more than that, this precise intelligence-based operation targeted the entire LeT, JeM and Hizbul Mujahideen infrastructure, eliminating 9 of the 21 terrorist camps which have operated for decades with impunity in Pakistan.
THE ESCALATION
The Pakistani reaction came the very next day. Over 500 drones targeted Indian military installations all along the western border from Bhuj to Srinagar. That same afternoon, India attacked Pakistani military installations at Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Miano, Bahawalpur, even as far as Karachi, destroying the HQ-9 Air Defence system at Lahore with Harpy Kamikazi drones. That same night, a flurry of drones and missiles were launched towards Jammu, which were successfully intercepted and destroyed by multi layered Air Defence. Another salvo of around 300 drones were launched the next night directed at 26 installations along the western border, which escalated the situation considerably.
India followed up by targeting five Pakistani air bases, the very next day – including the critical Nur Khan Air base, just 10 kms from Islamabad, the Murid Air base in Chakwal and the Rafique Air base in Punjab. A Pakistani Fateh 2 missile fired towards Delhi—as part of their OP BUNYANN MARSOOS was intercepted and downed in the area of Sirsa. Even as both sides mobilised their forces along the International Border, the ceasefire along the 778 km long Line of Control broke down completely with artillery duels, mortar and small arms fire raging across the entire frontage. It was fortunate that the firing was still ‘non-contact’ and troops had not physically confronted each other, but the situation was close to ground actions breaking out. And even as alarm bells were ringing, both sides agreed to a “full and immediate ceasefire” on the evening of 10 May.
THE AFTERMATH
The cessation of this round of hostilities is a welcome step. India has made a clear statement of intent, that Pakistani sponsored terrorism would not be condoned, and could meet with a response that could impose severe costs on Pakistan. This is the first time after 1971, that Indians have struck so deep into Pakistani territory—something that was not done even in the Kargil War. This message would have been driven home.
But even with the ceasefire, there will be considerable tensions for quite some time. Troops will remain deployed at the IB, and gradually move back. It is not clear if the ceasefire along the LOC will come back into place, but that may happen during the course of subsequent talks. Pakistan would definitely want that. This bout of tensions had drawn the bulk of the Pakistani army to the Eastern borders, leaving a severe vacuum in the counter-insurgency grid in Baluchistan and Waziristan. In that period, actions in Baluchistan and Waziristan had already intensified, with Baloch freedom fighters blowing up an army vehicle killing 14 soldiers, and the Tehreek-e-Taliban attacking army posts in Waziristan. These fault lines of Pakistan’s would have been further widened with this round of tensions.
However, the pressure would have to continue being applied on Pakistan, to prevent a recurrence of such activities. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty has shown how India can control the flow of flow of water from the Jhelum and Chenab into Pakistan—even if the waters cannot be completely harnessed. This trump card can be held with India for quite a while to make it contingent on Pakistan’s good behaviour.
This round of escalation has also demonstrated, India’s friends and adversaries. Turkiye had shamelessly sided with Pakistan, even providing it with emergency supplies of drones and hardware—in fact, even more than China. And though most of the international community did support India’s stance against terrorism, few—less Israel and Russia—voiced it equivocally. In fact, at the height of tensions, Pakistan received a $2.3 Billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund—a bailout which was ironically linked to its behaviour and good fiscal management.
There would be relief that this exchange of fire has subsided, without it having escalated further. We have degraded Pakistan’s military capabilities, eliminated the terrorist camps, and demonstrated our reach, and now, a full-fledged war would not have served our interests. But we have made a statement to Pakistan—that the response will be hard and could even pose an existential threat to the nation. That should serve as a deterrent for a while, and perhaps prevent further attacks on our soil. But we cannot afford to let our guard down. If anything, our intelligence and internal security needs to be heightened. But what is of concern, is that in the war of perception, much of the foreign media seemed to be touting the Pakistani narrative. That is something that needs to be addressed for future contingencies. The ball in now in Pakistan’s court. It is unlikely to change its ways—as the presence of Army officers at the funerals of dead terrorists show—but it would be well warned of the dangers of sponsoring terrorism on Indian soil. If that message drives home, OP SINDOOR would well and truly have attained its aims.
* Ajay Singh is a reputed author and military commentator who has written 7 books and over 200 published articles. He writes regularly for The Sunday Guardian.