The meticulously planned Operation Spiderweb marked a new point not only in the Russia-Ukraine war, but perhaps in the concept of war fighting itself.
Pune: The Ukrainian attack on five air bases deep within Russia, was perhaps the most audacious action of the war. A small fleet of 117 First Person View drones were concealed in crates and carried by long haul container trucks across Russia near their intended targets. At the right time, 1205h on 01 June, the drones were activated which flew out and slammed into the aircraft parked at the bases. According to Ukrainian sources, 41 strategic bombers were “beautifully burning”—though the actual figure was around 20 aircraft. The attack hit five airbases—Belaya, over 4,000 km from the Ukrainian frontier; Olenya, near the Arctic Circle; Ivanevo and Ryazan in Western Russia; and Amur in Siberia—over 4,300 km apart and extending over three time zones. Almost a third of Russia’s strategic fleet, including crucial TU-22 and TU-95 strategic bombers and A-50 surveillance aircraft, was destroyed in a strike that brought the war deep into Russia, caused an estimated $7 billion worth of damages and enormous loss of prestige and face.
The meticulously planned Operation Spiderweb marked a new point not only in the Russia-Ukraine war, but perhaps in the concept of war fighting itself. Planned over 18 months and overseen by President Zelenskyy himself, it involved placing 117 drones in wooden crates. These crates were then transported by container trucks that were then parked close to the targeted areas. Commercial trucks were used and, in most cases, the drivers did not even know what they were carrying—they were merely told where to drive and where to halt. At a signal given remotely, the top of the crates slid open and the drones were activated. Subsequent video footage showed drones flying out of the trucks, hovering briefly and then speeding off towards their targets, some of which could be seen burning in the distance. Each of the drones was controlled by individual pilots who guided them at low altitudes towards the bases, and directed them to the aircraft parked alongside the hangars and runways. Fibre optics were used for the initial guidance, and the drones were infused with artificial intelligence to identify their targets. Once the cameras of the drones identified the bombers, they homed on to them and smashed into the most vulnerable parts, like fuel tanks, engines and weapon systems, setting them ablaze. Real time videos of the attack were sent back to Ukraine, by the operators who had probably planted in Russia months, if not years, earlier. SBU, the Ukrainian intelligence agency that had executed the strike, gleefully announced that one of the operators was located right next to the headquarters of Russia’s FSB, and conducted the operation virtually under the nose of its premier intelligence agency.
The timing of the attack coming just as the Russia-Ukraine talks were ongoing in Istanbul raises questions of what Zelenskyy hoped to achieve. Perhaps it was a message that Ukraine could still inflict tremendous damage and could continue the fight even if US and Western aid dwindled. But the strike effectively scuttled any prospects of peace, and it is no surprise that the talks ended inconclusively with little but a prisoner swap.
Ukraine followed it up with blasts on railway bridges that derailed two trains in Kursk and Bryansk. An underwater blast also damaged one of the pillars of the crucial Kersh bridge—Russia’s only land link to Crimea.
Both sides have fired drones and missiles deep into each other’s territory, but rarely at such a depth and scope. Ukraine attacked Moscow during its Victory Day celebration on 10 May. Russia has been hitting Ukraine virtually on a daily basis and had struck Kyiv with a salvo of 367 drones just a week earlier. Russia has predictably responded by striking Kyiv and hitting all of Ukraine with over 400 drones and over 40 Iskandar and Kalibr cruise missiles—and there will be more to come. Even as the ground war slows, this long-range battle marks a dangerous escalation to the war.
THE INDIA-PAKISTAN EXCHANGE
This kind of non-contact warfare seen in Ukraine, was also visible in the 88-hour India-Pakistan conflict between 7-10 May. There was little physical fighting barring a few raids and skirmishes along the LOC, but it still extended in scope across the entire western borders. India struck targets over hundred kilometres deep without its aircraft even entering enemy airspace. Air and ground strikes launched well within own territory, could hit terrorist camps, air bases, radar and air defence sites with pin-point precision. When aircraft engaged each other, the dogfights were done at distances over a 100 km apart, using Beyond Visual Range missiles. Some of the air-to-air missiles were guided by satellites—implying that the aircraft did not even have to switch on their own radars and thus pre-empting detection. This long-range war also saw drones used on an unprecedented scale in the sub-continent. Pakistan used swarms of up to 500 drones, mixing sophisticated armed drones with hordes of cheap expendable ones, so that at least a few could get through to their designated targets. It is to the credit of the Indian air defence, that virtually all the drones were detected and shot down. India’s own innovative use of drones was far more effective. Drones designed to mimic aircraft signatures forced enemy air defence radars to open up. Their radar emissions were picked up by loitering Harpy and Horop drones, which homed on to the targets and smashed into them. This tactic has been credited with neutralising at least one HQ-9 air defence radar at Lahore, and crippling half a dozen other targets. The Indian attack on 11 Pakistani air bases and radar sites on the last night of the war, inflicted more damage on Sargodha, Nur Khan, Bholari, Rahimyar Khan and Murid bases, than the combined damage caused by repeated air attacks on them in the 1965 and 1971 wars. All this, using Brahmos and SCALP long range cruise missiles that obviated the use of aircraft or pilots.
Although the ground forces of both sides had concentrated along the border and LOC, they were fortunately not utilised. But perhaps the commanders would have been watching the skies for incoming drones and missiles even more than watching the ground for enemy action. The huge impact of drones on the battlefield have significantly changed the way armies wage war now. In the Russia-Ukraine war, over 70% of all tank and vehicle casualties, and 50% of personnel casualties have been attributed to drones—far more than artillery, mortars, mines and small arms fire. This has forced ground forces to restrict movement, operate in smaller groups, and develop a suite of defensive measures against this omnipresent threat. Armies need to revise their tactics to deal with this increasing form of non-contact and long-range attacks. Organisations could be made leaner, faster and smaller, and use a greater component of unmanned vehicles for reconnaissance, surveillance, as part of the “kill-chain” and for specialised roles like mine laying and clearance. Doctrinal changes would have to be made, right from platoon to higher levels.
This form of non-contact warfare that we are witnessing in recent wars could well become the norm. It is cheap and inexpensive and can be used by even a smaller adversary with impunity. The Houthis used it effectively against the Saudis and the US causing billions of dollars of damage with little cost to themselves. It minimises risk to pilots and soldiers, and reduces loss of life—which has its pros and cons. It could embolden political leaders to embark on a military venture, knowing that the adverse impact of body bags would not be there. This would indirectly lower the threshold for the initiation of conflict, and thus increase the frequency. But once the conflict begins, there is no way to prevent it from spiralling out of control. Each strike would be met with a response and could lead to a series of attacks that would slowly climb up the escalatory ladder. There would be the underlying fear that any of the strikes could be a nuclear one, or could be directed at the nuclear arsenal of a nation. This will increase the uncertainty and even reduce the threshold of use of nuclear weapons. Worse, this form of conflict does not recognise geographical boundaries, which can carry the war deep into each other’s nations and blur the distinction between civilian and military targets. The Kargil War, though intense, remained confined to the area of conflict. This bout saw missiles and drones flying along the entire length of the IB and LOC, attacking targets hundreds of kilometres deep. All this increases the chances of a misstep which could lead to drastic escalation.
Will this form of conflict be a new norm? Quite likely. It can also be adopted by terrorists and terrorist sponsors, to reduce accountability, and impose huge costs. This kind of non-contact warfare will only increase in scope and frequency, and in that, lies its real dangers.
* Ajay Singh is the author of eight books and over 200 articles. A recipient of the Rabindranath Tagore International Award for Art and Literature, he is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian.