Pulling no punches, Jaybee states that if Mrs Indira Gandhi had shown statesmanship, we would be a safer and secure country today, as she failed both India and Bangladesh in spite of a brilliant victory.
NEW DELHI: An autobiography is literature that provides an outsider unique first-hand perspective on a person’s life, on how their experiences shaped them in the context of their time, culture, societal changes and influences. Among autobiographies, military ones are a genre apart. Though personal they become a historical source for accounts of war and combat, in an operational environment, where truth in detail rarely comes out.
The new military autobiography from the stable of the Pentagon Press, “No Mission impossible”, is the memoirs of Lt Gen J.B.S. Yadava through 40 years of service in the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, and insurgencies in Nagaland, Mizoram, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir. Also, Jaybee, as he is called behind the back, while commanding the Corps South of Pir Panjal had a ringside view of the extra-ordinary military mobilisation called Operation Parakaram in 2002 that could have well escalated in a war.
The author has intellectually explored politico-military history of over for decades. Be it 1965 or 1971 Wars, or the various insurgencies, there is intensive deliberation on the background in military historical eventology, to the build up to the operational scenarios. There is ring-side view of the First Iraq War, the historic emergence of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir insurgencies and the 1999 Kargil War.
In doing so, there is an invariable summation that has the author taking firm positions and bold assertions. Of the 1965 war, Jaybee writes that our political-military objectives were not clear. The war ended in a stalemate with a marginal advantage for India, with whatever leverage was given away in Tashkent.
The crowning glory of the author’s career is his company command as part of 5/11 Gorkha Rifles, in the Hilli-Bogra sector of East Pakistan in 1971. Despite being wounded the author rejoined the war, and displaying great valour was awarded Vir Chakra. In the 1971 War, the author writes, India did not extract the most advantageous solutions, not negotiate the security of Kishanganj and Siliguri Corridors, or an outlet to Bay of Bengal through Tripura/Mizoram. Categorically commenting, the author opines that many of us will continue to think whether our sacrifices went waste or was it worth it to let go Pakistan and Bangladesh scot-free at the cost of our national security. Pulling no punches, Jaybee states that if Mrs Indira Gandhi had shown statesmanship, we would be a safer and secure country today, as she failed both India and Bangladesh in spite of a brilliant victory.
Similarly, the author is scathing about the 2002 military mobilisation named Op Parakram, describing it as a failure, and a futile exercise that exposed the weakness in decision-making and political will to fight. The sterile mobilisation ended after 10 months of deployment, costing the nation Rs 8,000 crores, and extensive wear and tear of equipment. The author opines that there exists excessive dependence on the USA and knee-jerk action by the defence forces (to undertake the mobilisation) without obtaining a war directive from the government or political and operational aims.
There are intensive tactical and operations lessons that can be drawn from the episodic accounts. Jaybee is apparently a strong proponent of offensiveness, from his views on Chhamb, the 1971 War in Bogra sector of East Pakistan, the advocacy of forceful participation in the expansion of the Kargil War to the plains sector and the many shallow offensives undertaken across the Line of Control during Op Parakram. Instances of personal valour abound, and the General can easily fall in the bracket of proverbial cat having nine lives. There are also intensive learning of relevant lessons of leadership, by personal example often, of command of the battalion, of diplomatic finesse as DA in Malaysia, and as Principal Staff Officer, Deputy Chief of Army Staff in Army Headquarters.
Another facet that comes out significantly is Jaybee’s incredible and surreal remembrance for names from his instructors in the NDA and places through the four decades in uniform. The book also pulls no punches, even in naming from political personalities to military leaders at all levels, calling spade a spade and critiquing candidly, even characteristically undiplomatically. The bold assertions about defence and security issues are important in that they continue to have a contemporary relevance.
The important part of No Mission Impossible, is its positive outlook and that disagreeable facts are not glossed over, or the truth repressed or distorted for the sake of convenience of being politically and military correct. There is also no unjustified egotism or arrogance and excessive self-praise as comes normally among autobiographers. Truth is also not rearranged, repackaged or selected to suit a preconceived purpose. Readers can agree or disagree on the content as is natural, yet the book forces serious contemplation in politico-military thought, with contemporary relevance.
That brings in the optimal necessity of military autobiographies or biographies as they help historians understand the experience and emphasise the genre’s relevance to the study of military command, of military culture and of the experience of war and insurgencies. May be where necessary, some self-critique is also essential, for all in 40 years cannot be smooth sailing and hunky-dory.
* Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma retired from the Indian Army.