For decades, India’s soldiers, sailors and airmen fought with valour but seldom in unison. Each service crafted its own plans, maintained its own logistics chains and operated through its own intelligence picture. In Kargil in 1999, this meant the Army calling for air support that had to be cleared through layers of bureaucracy. In 1962 and again in 1965, the lack of synchronisation led to disjointed responses that blunted national power. Committees wrote reports, governments took note of their recommendations, yet the integration of the armed forces remained the “unfinished reform.”
That pattern began to change in recent years. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, jointness and theatre commands have travelled from seminar discussions to statutes and notifications. The creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in 2019, the passage of the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control & Discipline) Act in 2023 and the issue of detailed rules in 2025 have given India both the institutional spine and the legal authority to shape a truly integrated force. What was once spoken of in abstract terms—unity of effort and synergy of arms—has now been translated into practice through law and policy.
In modern war, time is measured in minutes rather than days. Targets appear and vanish quickly, cyber intrusions can blind command networks, and drones and precision missiles compress decision cycles. In such conditions, three services fighting in parallel risks duplication at best and disaster at worst. The logic of theatre commands is therefore straightforward: organise forces by mission and geography rather than by service loyalties. A Northern Theatre would take responsibility for the China front, a Western Theatre for Pakistan, while a Maritime Theatre would oversee the Indian Ocean. Each theatre commander would control the mix of land, sea and air assets needed to defend that sector and, crucially, would have the legal authority to command them.
The call for jointness has been made many times before. The Kargil Review Committee in 2000 and the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012 both recommended the creation of a CDS and unified commands. But political caution, inter-service rivalry and bureaucratic hesitation meant the files never moved beyond committee rooms. Service chiefs worried that their authority would be diluted, while civilian officials feared concentrating too much power in a single military post.
That deadlock broke with political will. In December 2019, the Cabinet approved the post of CDS, and General Bipin Rawat assumed office the following month. For the first time, the three services had a single military voice in the Cabinet Committee on Security. The CDS was tasked not only with coordination but with driving the process of theatreisation.
The crucial legal step followed. Until recently, an Army officer commanding a joint organisation could not legally discipline naval or air force personnel serving under him; each remained bound by separate service Acts. This was untenable in combat, where swift authority is as important as swift firepower. The Inter-Services Organisations Act of 2023 corrected the anomaly, giving commanders of joint structures full disciplinary and administrative control over all personnel assigned to them. In May 2025, the government notified the rules that operationalised this law. Jointness had thus moved from PowerPoint slides to the pages of the Gazette of India.
What might the new structure look like? Current thinking points to a Northern Theatre Command based in Lucknow for China, a Western Theatre Command in Jaipur for Pakistan and a Maritime Theatre Command likely spread between Karwar and Thiruvananthapuram. Functional commands for logistics, training, space, cyber and special operations would support them. The Andaman & Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command already serve as useful precedents for what integrated structures can achieve.
The benefits of this shift are clear. Instead of three chiefs pushing up parallel operational plans, a single theatre commander will decide how to use fighters, artillery, warships or drones to achieve his mission. Intelligence will be fused, logistics will be shared and duplication will be avoided. India will, for the first time, be able to fight as one force. Early demonstrations of this thinking were evident during Operation Sindoor in 2025, when, in response to a terror attack, the Army, Navy and Air Force coordinated strikes under a common plan. Jointness is already being rehearsed in anti-submarine operations, where P-8I aircraft, surface ships with Varunastra torpedoes and space-based ISR assets now operate under integrated tasking.
Naturally, concerns remain. Air Force officers worry that dividing aircraft among land-based theatres may erode the ability to mass firepower across fronts. Naval planners caution against subordinating littoral operations to land-centric commands. The Army, while supportive, has questions about the balance between geographical and functional commands. These anxieties are not unique to India; the United States and China faced similar debates when they reorganised.
The answer lies in careful design. Air power must remain centrally planned and theatre-allocated rather than fragmented, ensuring national flexibility. Maritime theatres must be given their own aviation and carrier groups so sea control remains intact. Functional commands must serve all theatres directly through the CDS, rather than being carved up piecemeal.
Change is never comfortable, but it is necessary. Theatreisation does not shrink any service; it amplifies all of them by eliminating waste and fusing effort. China restructured seven military regions into five theatre commands in less than two years, aligning its forces for a sharper strategic edge. The United States has operated unified combatant commands across the globe since World War II, each empowered to wield joint power in its area of responsibility. India must chart its own model—tailored to its twin-front threat, Himalayan terrain and Indian Ocean commitments—but the principle remains the same: unity of command and unity of effort.
The real work now lies ahead. Joint doctrines must be written and taught at staff colleges. Officers must serve across services early in their careers so that jointness is lived, not merely studied. Logistics chains must be consolidated so that ammunition, fuel, spares and medical support flow through common pipelines. The money saved from eliminating duplication must be channelled into drones, precision weapons, cyber capabilities and secure networks. Above all, investments in technology must allow theatre commanders to see across domains, decide quickly and strike decisively.
India’s armed forces have never lacked courage. What they lacked was a system to let their courage converge into unified combat power. Under Prime Minister Modi, that system is being built. The creation of the CDS, the enactment of the Inter-Services Organisations Act and the notification of rules in 2025 together mark a watershed in higher defence management. Theatre commands will not be raised overnight. There will be debate, adjustment and friction. But the direction is irreversible. For the first time since Independence, India’s military is being structured as a single, cohesive instrument of national power.
In the conflicts of tomorrow—on icy ridges, in ocean depths or across digital networks—unity will determine whether India acts with delay or with decision, whether it suffers attrition or delivers dominance. Jointness is no longer a buzzword. It is the doctrine of India’s future wars, and under the Modi government, India has finally begun to give that doctrine flesh, blood and authority.
Col Danvir Singh (Retd) is a decorated infantry officer, strategic affairs analyst and host of a leading television show on India’s military and security issues. He can be reached by email at danvirsingh34@yahoo.in and posts on X: @danvir_chauhan.
