Bangladesh is still living with the shock of the 2024 uprising. Streets that filled with students and workers are quieter now, but the wounds are fresh. In August 2024, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus took oath as chief adviser of an interim government after Sheikh Hasina stepped down. He was tasked with calming the country, guiding reforms, and getting to national elections without sliding back into violence.
The human toll of the crackdown weighs on every conversation about the future. The UN human rights office says the former government and allied groups used brutal, systematic force that left about 1,400 people dead during the unrest. Its February 2025 report calls for accountability and warning signs remain etched in testimonies from families and activists. This figure is not a rumor. It is the UN’s own estimate and it shapes how citizens judge any promise of justice today.
Yunus entered office with international attention and initial support. Washington’s public line has been to engage the interim authorities, push for a credible roadmap and keep human rights at the centre of talks. The State Department’s 2024 country report notes the formation of the interim government under Yunus and frames US engagement around reforms and accountability. Later statements and calls with Dhaka stressed economic ties and the path to elections. All of this is conditional support tied to progress.
Europe took a similar stance. The EU publicly welcomed the swearing-in of the interim cabinet and urged the authorities to uphold the rule of law, protect minorities and prepare for free and fair polls. Brussels also kept a close watch on rights concerns and encouraged regular political dialogue. This approach, coupled with pressure, has become the default European response to the transition.
India’s response matters most for daily stability. New Delhi’s first moves were practical–keep the long border calm and prevent the turmoil from spilling over. In early August 2024, the Border Security Force went on high alert along the entire frontier. It even evacuated stranded Indian workers from inside Bangladesh during tense days. The message was that the border would be managed firmly but also with an eye to humanitarian needs. As politics settled, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Yunus on April 4, 2025, on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok.
India said it wanted a “positive and constructive” relationship and stressed protection of minorities and the need for an election timetable. These contacts did not remove all friction, but they lowered the temperature and reopened direct channels.
The next test is the election schedule and the reforms needed to make it credible. Yunus initially floated April 2026. By August 2025 he said February 2026, before Ramadan. Local media and international outlets reported the shift and India publicly signaled support for a February timeframe. The back-and-forth shows the pressure the interim government faces from parties that want earlier polls, from civil society that wants deeper reforms first and from neighbours who want clarity. What matters now is a clear roadmap from the Election Commission and transparent rules that all sides can accept.
Stability will also depend on how Bangladesh handles two linked stresses–the economy and the Rohingya crisis. The economy went through a rough patch in FY25. Global lenders say recovery is possible but not guaranteed. The IMF’s data for 2025 point to growth coming in lower than the pre-crisis years, while the World Bank’s October 2025 update notes a rebound in the second half of FY25 and lays out the conditions for a stronger FY26—export strength, remittances and higher reserves—if reforms stick. People will judge the interim government on prices, jobs and energy supply as much as on politics.
The Rohingya situation is a constant strain on resources and security. Cox’s Bazar hosts nearly a million refugees who rely on aid for food, health and schooling. Funding shocks this year nearly halved rations to survival levels, emergency contributions later helped stave off the worst but agencies warn the situation remains fragile and cuts in other services are already biting. Each shortage risks unrest in the camps, more crime and trafficking and pressure along the border. Dhaka cannot carry this alone. It needs steady, predictable support, not month-to-month rescues.
Regional stability is part of this story. Violence and deprivation in the camps feed recruitment by armed groups across the border in Myanmar and surges of fighting there push more civilians toward Bangladesh. UN agencies and analysts have warned that any big drawdown in aid raises the risk of dangerous choices by desperate families. That is not just a humanitarian risk. It is a security risk for Bangladesh and for India’s northeast. Coordinated planning by Dhaka, New Delhi and the UN system is essential to keep the border calm, prevent refoulement and preserve the space for a political settlement inside Myanmar.
Justice and rule of law are the most sensitive pieces at home. The UN report documented patterns of abuse during the protests and called for investigations. At the same time, there are fears of selective cases or political score-settling.
Bangladesh has pulled back from chaos once already. Whether it can hold that line depends on choices made in the next few months. If the interim government delivers a credible roadmap, protects rights and keeps the economy steered toward recovery, voters will walk into polling stations in early 2026 with more confidence than fear.
(Aritra Banerjee is a defence and strategic affairs columnist)
