The killing of Madvi Hidma the most feared, brutal and operationally effective Maoist commander in Bastar is not merely another successful encounter
The killing of Madvi Hidma the most feared, brutal and operationally effective Maoist commander in Bastar — is not merely another successful encounter. It marks the culmination of a six-year counter-insurgency doctrine personally driven by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, one that combined political clarity, operational aggression and unprecedented state–state coordination.
From the moment Shah took charge of the Home Ministry in June 2019, he made it publicly, repeatedly and forcefully clear that Naxalism would be eliminated. Not reduced. Not contained. Eliminated. He said this in Parliament and in multiple public programmes with a conviction intended not only for citizens but also for Maoist leadership and their sympathisers. The message was unmistakable: the MHA under him was not in the mood for compromise.
This clarity extended to the question of surrender. When some civil society voices suggested incentivising mass surrenders as a confidence-building measure, Shah's response was unequivocal: they must first lay down arms. Only then would the government consider the terms of surrender. This sequencing — disarm first, negotiate later — set the tone for the policy framework that followed.
Inside the system, the political intent translated into direct instructions to police leadership across all affected states. Senior officers posted in the Naxal belt recall that the Home Ministry's message in those early months was unusually blunt: If you face operational or logistical challenges, tell us. We will remove them. But the mission is fixed: eliminate Naxalism.
To ensure this did not remain rhetoric, Shah instituted regular review meetings, many of which he personally supervised. Officers who attended these meetings say one thing stood out: Shah demanded factual, verifiable progress every single time. No vague updates, no bureaucratic jargon, no speculative projections. Every review began with a simple, unavoidable question: What has actually changed on the ground since the last meeting?
This changed behaviour across the board. Officers stopped preparing cosmetic presentations; they started preparing operations. The next meeting couldn't be answered with words — it had to be answered with results.
The impact is measurable: LWE violence incidents dropped from 501 in 2019 to 374 in 2024, a 25% reduction, while total deaths declined from 202 to 150 during the same period—a 26% decrease.
More dramatically, Naxal-affected districts shrank from 126 in 2018 to just 12 by April 2025, with only 6 classified as "most affected".In 2024 alone, 184 Maoist deaths were recorded by early September—the highest annual figure since 2009.
The leadership decimation is equally stark. In May 2025, security forces neutralized 27 Maoists including Nambala Keshav Rao (alias Basavaraju), the CPI-Maoist General Secretary—the first time in three decades a general secretary-ranked leader was killed . By October 2025, senior politburo member Mallujola Venugopal surrendered in Maharashtra. And now, Hidma—the commander of Battalion No. 1 and mastermind behind at least 26 armed attacks including the 2010 Dantewada massacre that killed 76 CRPF personnel—has been eliminated in Andhra Pradesh.
One of the earliest structural reforms was the creation of a consolidated, centralised list of Maoist leadership across all affected states: Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand and parts of Madhya Pradesh. Every top commander on that list was assigned a timeline for neutralisation. This shifted the approach from broad area control to targeted, time-bound leadership elimination.
But the real breakthrough came from Shah's instruction to state governments: coordinate, don't compete. Intelligence, intercepts, leads and movement cues had to be shared in real time. No state was permitted to treat anti-Naxal operations as a turf battle or a prestige exercise.
The effect was transformative. Even politically non-aligned states like Jharkhand under the JMM government cooperated proactively. Officers say this was the first time in decades that inter-state one-upmanship vanished. Information flowed freely. Leads were shared instantly. The operational machinery across multiple states began functioning as a single grid.
The pursuit of Madvi Hidma illustrates how this architecture worked in practice. For months, Chhattisgarh's DRG and other agencies applied relentless pressure on him in Bastar, choking his familiar escape routes and tightening the perimeter around his movements. The sustained, multi-state pressure forced Hidma to move southwards into Andhra Pradesh. And once he crossed over, the Greyhounds—armed with continuous intelligence from Chhattisgarh and Telangana—closed in and killed him alongside his wife Raje and four gunmen in the Maredumilli forest area.
Hidma was not taken down by a single state. He was taken down by a coordinated ring that left him no room to breathe.
This "surround and squeeze" model was applied to nearly every senior Maoist commander. As pressure intensified in one zone, they were forced to shift — only to find themselves entering another state's kill box. The idea of "safe corridors" — once the backbone of Maoist survival — collapsed entirely.
Parallel to the security operations, Shah made it a personal priority that development in Naxal-affected districts move without disruption. Roads, telecom towers, bridges, schools, health centres and livelihood schemes — projects that had been stuck for years due to insurgent threats — were fast-tracked.
Between 2014 and 2024, 12,000 kilometers of roads were constructed in LWE-affected states, 5,000 mobile towers installed, 1,060 bank branches opened, 937 ATMs set up, and 850 schools established. By 2025, significant infrastructure was in place: 14,618 km of roads completed, 7,768 mobile towers commissioned, 1,007 bank branches opened, and 179 Eklavya Model Residential Schools made operational. The number of fortified police stations increased from 66 in 2014 to 612 by 2024, with over 300 security camps established in Maoist-infested areas in just the last five years.
The MHA ensured funds were released quickly, clearances were expedited, and implementation was monitored. This was deliberate: counter-insurgency, Shah believed, needed both the elimination of violence and the arrival of development.
Critics have argued that heavy-handed tactics risk alienating tribal populations or that development remains uneven. But the ground reality tells a different story. In 2024 alone, 881 Maoists surrendered, and by March 2025, 164 more had laid down arms . Over 10,000 insurgents surrendered between 2015 and 2025. These aren't numbers driven by desperation from state violence—they reflect calculated decisions by cadres who see development reaching their villages and realize the futility of armed struggle.
The Maoist leadership's desperation—not popular resistance—is what collapsed. The CPI (Maoist) Central Committee shrunk from 42 members in 2004 to just 13 by 2025 , while tribal communities that once provided overground support grew disillusioned with violence from both sides.
It was this dual-track strategy — uncompromising security pressure alongside uninterrupted development — executed through unprecedented state–state cooperation, that broke the back of the Maoist network.
Hidma's fall is therefore not an isolated operational success. It is the clearest example of what a clear doctrine, firm political will and disciplined execution can achieve. Amit Shah didn't merely promise the elimination of Naxalism — he designed and enforced the machinery to make it possible. And when the history of this campaign is written, it will be impossible to separate the outcome from his leadership: deliberate, forceful and anchored in accountability.
The challenge now is not elimination but consolidation—ensuring development reaches the last mile and that the vacuum left by Maoist collapse is filled with governance, not neglect. With Shah's stated deadline of March 2026 approaching, the focus must shift to sustaining this success: ensuring roads stay open, schools remain functional, and tribal communities see tangible benefits from peace. Only then will this victory be permanent.
