China is tightening its hold on Africa’s ports through digital systems that embed long-term dependence and reshape regional maritime power.
Chinese-built digital platforms now underpin key African ports, deepening Beijing’s influence across the Western Indian Ocean (Photo: File)
Africa’s coastline is witnessing a power shift, one unfolding not through gunboats or military bases, but through cables, code and cloud-linked systems. Beijing’s presence in the Western Indian Ocean, once defined by the naval base in Djibouti and commercial stakes in Gwadar, has quietly entered a more consequential phase. China is now embedding itself in the digital infrastructure that runs African ports, customs networks and coastal surveillance systems, creating what officials and analysts describe as a new form of strategic depth.
The change has been a decade in the making. Chinese firms, led by Huawei Marine (now HMN Tech), ZTE, China Harbour Engineering Company and China Merchants Port Holdings, have steadily won contracts across Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti, Mozambique and Mauritius to modernise port operations. These projects are packaged as “smart port” upgrades, automation tools, integrated customs platforms, digital cargo-tracking systems and cloud-based dashboards. But the upgrades increasingly place the operational logic of African maritime trade inside Chinese-built technological ecosystems.
At Kenya’s Mombasa Port, the Integrated Customs Management System relies heavily on Chinese networking equipment. The interface linking the port’s cargo terminals with the Standard Gauge Railway freight corridor also runs on Chinese systems. Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Port uses Chinese-origin scanners, fibre infrastructure and digital platforms rolled out as part of the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project. Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal, operated with the involvement of China Merchants Port Holdings, is supported by a broader Chinese-built digital backbone that includes the Djibouti Data Centre—an important East African server hub tied into regional undersea cables.
These systems may appear commercially neutral, but they create a form of structural dependence that is difficult to unwind. Once a port’s hardware, operating software and data storage run on Chinese components, every update, repair, patch or expansion requires Chinese-origin support. African governments, already constrained by budgets, often have little choice but to continue with the original vendors.
Port digitisation itself carries deep strategic implications. Whoever controls the information generated by port operations—container manifests, fuel purchases, berth occupancies, shipping schedules, transhipment volumes—effectively gains a window into the economic rhythms of an entire coastline. Maritime officials in the region privately admit that the data extracted from these platforms is as sensitive as the cargo they track.
China’s influence also extends into maritime security networks. Surveillance systems installed in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and island nations like Seychelles and Mauritius often rely on Chinese-made cameras, communications relays and vessel-tracking infrastructure. These tools are publicly pitched as solutions for curbing piracy, illegal fishing and maritime crime—critical issues for East African states. But their dual-use potential is widely acknowledged. The same sensors monitoring fishing boats can just as easily track foreign naval vessels, map port activity or capture long-term shipping patterns relevant to Beijing’s commercial and military calculus.
Cost and convenience continue to drive adoption. Chinese systems are cheaper, faster to deploy and usually bundled with concessional loans, training modules and technical support teams. Western and Indo-Pacific alternatives rarely match this combination, leaving African states with incentives that tilt heavily toward Beijing’s offerings. The result is a form of digital entrenchment. Data storage tends to migrate to Chinese-linked cloud structures; operational training depends on Chinese technicians; and cybersecurity oversight becomes harder for host countries to exercise independently.
For India, this shift is strategically significant. New Delhi’s maritime engagement with Africa—long centred on naval cooperation, training missions and coastal surveillance support—now faces a digital challenge. The contest around African ports is no longer about breakwaters and terminals alone. It is increasingly about who shapes the informational backbone that runs them. Indian officials say private discussions with African partners often reveal concern about overdependence on proprietary foreign systems but limited financial alternatives to choose from.
To counterbalance Beijing’s lead, India and its partners will need to offer credible options rather than cautionary messaging. That means assisting African states in managing their own digital systems, supporting open-architecture port software, and expanding maritime data-sharing arrangements that do not compromise national control. India’s existing cooperation with Mauritius, Seychelles, Kenya and Madagascar gives it a foothold, but the technological gap is widening quickly.
Africa’s blue economy is set to expand sharply over the next decade. As the region digitises its maritime structures, the most consequential decisions may not involve where ports are built, but whose software governs them. If Chinese platforms remain the default choice, the balance of influence in the Western Indian Ocean will increasingly be shaped not on the water but through the servers and data centres that stand behind it.
(Aritra Banerjee is the Co-author of the book 'Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. He specialises in maritime security, naval affairs and global security)
