Court stresses bail denial rooted in Constitutional law, not political considerations.
New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has underlined that its refusal to grant bail to those accused in the 2020 Delhi riots conspiracy case is rooted in constitutional law and statutory restrictions, not any other external reasons, directly addressing the recurring allegations that the accused have been kept in custody due to political reasons.
In its 2 September judgment in State of NCT of Delhi vs Sharjeel Imam, Umar Khalid and others, that was reserved on 9 July, a bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur dealt in detail with the argument raised repeatedly by defence lawyers that prolonged incarceration and trial delays entitled the accused to release. Imam and Khalid have both been in custody since 2020, meaning they have now spent about five years as undertrials while the case proceeds.
Far from brushing aside these arguments, the court devoted dedicated sections of the judgment to address them. “Delay and Long Period of Incarceration” begins at page 14, while “Bar under Section 43D of the UA(P) Act” begins at page 20. This, the bench indicated, showed that the defence contentions were treated as substantial legal issues deserving detailed discussions before the court arrived at the decision to deny bail.
The court noted at the outset that “the grant of bail is not a mechanical exercise, nor can it rest upon a superficial appraisal of prosecution’s material or evidence.” It emphasised that criminal jurisprudence rests on balancing the liberty of the accused with the prosecution’s right to establish its case. “The assessment of grant or refusal of bail, therefore, is also guided by a judicious balance between these two considerations, so that the enforcement of criminal law is neither diluted nor diminished,” the judgment stated.
The defence argued that with 800–900 witnesses listed by the prosecution, there was no prospect of the trial concluding soon and that this violated the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. They cited multiple Supreme Court precedents, including Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), where the court held that inordinate delay can justify bail even under UAPA, and Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1996), which held that prolonged detention of undertrials must be balanced against their right to a fair and speedy trial.
But the High Court underlined that delay alone cannot be a universal ground for bail. “It is trite law that ‘grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception,’ however, the exercise of such discretion will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no single circumstance alone can serve as a universal yardstick,” the judges wrote.
The judgment highlighted that under special statutes like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, bail is subject to stricter tests. Section 43D(5), it noted, imposes a clear embargo: “no person accused of an offence… shall, if in custody, be released on bail… Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail… if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.” The bench explained that this proviso “circumscribes” judicial discretion and requires that the material produced by the investigating agency be presumed true at the bail stage.
The court leaned on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019), which laid down detailed guidelines for bail under UAPA. As the High Court recalled, Watali held that “the totality of the material gathered by the investigating agency… is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence.” It also stressed that admissibility or credibility of documents cannot be questioned at the bail stage.
While acknowledging that constitutional courts have the power to override statutory bars in extreme cases, the High Court stressed that such relief is not automatic. Citing Najeeb, it observed: “the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.” However, it concluded that the present case did not cross that threshold.
The judgment also rejected the notion that seriousness of charges can be ignored when trials are lengthy. Referring to Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), the bench said: “Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude,” but added that courts must balance this against the statutory embargo under UAPA and the broader interest of society.
By setting out this framework, the High Court made clear that its decisions stem from binding precedent and statutory mandate. Far from being politically driven, the denial of bail reflects the court’s adherence to the principle that liberty and security must be weighed together, and that under UAPA, “the accused shall not be released on bail if the Court… is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”
