NEW DELHI: With the West Bengal Assembly election just five months away, the BJP will enter the contest with a significant structural disadvantage rooted in the state’s demographic map. Nearly 160 of the state’s 294 Assembly seats fall in districts where Muslims constitute more than 25% of the population; areas where the BJP has historically struggled and where the Trinamool Congress remains dominant.
An analysis of Census 2011 district-level data shows that nine of West Bengal’s 23 districts have a Muslim population share exceeding 25%, highlighting a clear demographic concentration across parts of central, northern and border Bengal. The districts crossing the 25% threshold are Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur, North 24 Parganas, South 24 Parganas, Birbhum, Nadia, Howrah and Cooch Behar.
According to the 2011 Census, the Muslim population share in these nine districts stands at: Murshidabad (66.27%), Malda (51.27%), Uttar Dinajpur (49.92%), South 24 Parganas (35.57%), Birbhum (37.06%), Cooch Behar (around 25.5–26.5%), Nadia (26.76%), Howrah (26.20%) and North 24 Parganas (25.82%). These figures underline both the magnitude and the geographical clustering of Muslim-populated districts in the state.
As per officials, these numbers are expected to have increased significantly in the past one decade, the clarity on which will emerge after the findings of the 2027 census are made public. Statewide, West Bengal had approximately 2.46 crore Muslims in 2011, a total of 27% of its population, making it the Indian state with the second-largest Muslim population after Uttar Pradesh. This sizable statewide presence provides the demographic backdrop against which the political behaviour of Muslim-concentrated districts acquires its electoral significance.
Notably, six of the nine districts with over 25% Muslim population lie along the Bangladesh border. These include Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur, North 24 Parganas, Nadia and Cooch Behar, placing a significant portion of the state’s Muslim-heavy administrative units in its international border belt. The remaining three districts, South 24 Parganas, Birbhum and Howrah, also have Muslim population shares above 25% but do not share a direct international boundary.
Together, these nine districts account for 160 Assembly constituencies in the 294-member West Bengal Legislative Assembly. However, it is important to mention that this does not mean that all 160 Assembly seats have more than 25% Muslim population. Many seats within these districts may have markedly lower (or higher) Muslim shares depending on block composition and delimitation boundaries.
In the 2021 West Bengal Assembly election, the Trinamool Congress won 123 of these 160 seats. The TMC’s sweep across most of these districts, particularly South 24 Parganas, North 24 Parganas, Murshidabad and Birbhum, contributed significantly to its statewide victory in 2021. A closer breakdown of the six border-belt districts shows that the Trinamool Congress won 67 of the 102 Assembly seats located in Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur, North 24 Parganas, Nadia and Cooch Behar.
The BJP’s best performances in this belt came from Cooch Behar, parts of Uttar Dinajpur and pockets of North 24 Parganas, while the TMC dominated Murshidabad, most of Malda and large sections of Nadia and North 24 Parganas. The distribution underscores that while the border belt is politically competitive in stretches, the TMC retains a clear overall advantage across these demographically significant districts.
Significantly, a comparison with the 2001 Census shows that this pattern of demographic clustering is not new. Two decades ago, seven districts: Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur, South 24 Parganas, Birbhum, Nadia and North 24 Parganas already had Muslim population shares above 25%. The picture expanded to nine by 2011, with Cooch Behar and Howrah joining the list after both crossed the 25% threshold during the intercensal period.
The shift underscores that while some border and central districts have seen incremental increases, the broader geography of Muslim-concentrated districts in West Bengal has remained largely stable since at least 2001. Similarly, a review of the 2001 Census shows that West Bengal’s Muslim-concentrated belt along the Bangladesh border was already well defined two decades ago. Five border districts: Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur, Nadia and North 24 Parganas, each recorded Muslim population shares above 25% in 2001, with South 24 Parganas also above the threshold despite having only a riverine international boundary.
Cooch Behar, by contrast, stood just below the cutoff at around 24%. When read alongside the 2011 Census, the data makes clear that the geography of Muslim-heavy districts in the border zone has remained largely stable. The same five districts stayed above the 25% mark, and only Cooch Behar tipped over the threshold during the decade.
The comparison underlines that West Bengal’s demographic clustering along its international border is not a recent development but a long-standing feature that has persisted with only marginal shifts between 2001 and 2011. TMC’s dominance in these districts is not the result of any recent demographic shift.
The number and distribution of Muslim voters in West Bengal have remained broadly stable since at least 2001, with the same districts retaining their demographic profile across two Census cycles. What has changed is the politics: the TMC has successfully consolidated this pre-existing electorate, converting Muslim-heavy districts into reliable strongholds through organisational networks, welfare mobilisation, identity reassurance and a consistent anti-BJP posture.
This is why the party’s strongest performances continue to come from Murshidabad, Malda, North 24 Parganas, Nadia, South 24 Parganas and Birbhum, districts that had significant Muslim voter heft long before Mamata Banerjee emerged as the state’s principal political force. This electoral pattern is also consistent with broader trends. Muslim voters have not supported the BJP in any substantial measure in West Bengal across successive elections, and available evidence suggests that this behaviour is unlikely to change in 2026.
Even in Bihar’s recent election, Muslim voting patterns remained overwhelmingly anti-NDA. The BJP, therefore, enters the West Bengal contest with virtually no realistic prospect of attracting Muslim votes, making its pathway to a majority dependent almost entirely on non-Muslim consolidation and performance in Hindu-majority regions.
State BJP leaders too are aware of this ‘significant’ handicap that they are facing in the Eastern state. “Nobody is under any illusion. We know the Muslim community is not voting for us. However, we are working to gain their support despite past electoral results, as you would have seen from recent statements by our leaders. But appeasement is something we cannot do, and we are very clear about that,” a senior central functionary assigned to work in Bengal said.
Comparisons with Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP has repeatedly won sweeping victories despite the state having India’s largest Muslim population, are misleading. In UP, Muslims are far more dispersed across constituencies and rarely form decisive blocks in more than a limited number of seats, allowing the BJP to win large majorities through consolidated Hindu support alone.
West Bengal’s arithmetic is fundamentally different. Around 160 of its 294 seats fall in districts with over 25% Muslim population, with many constituencies having far higher shares. This concentrated distribution means that a unified Muslim vote can decisively lock up dozens of seats for the TMC, leaving the BJP with far fewer winnable constituencies even if it achieves substantial Hindu consolidation.
If Muslim voters continue to remain firmly with the TMC, the BJP enters the next Assembly election with a structural disadvantage that sheer expansion in Hindu-majority areas cannot overcome. The party needs at least 148 seats for a majority but already faces deficits in roughly 160 seats located in Muslim-heavy districts, territory where it has historically struggled to make inroads, barring pockets in Cooch Behar and parts of Nadia and Uttar Dinajpur.
This leaves the BJP with only three realistic expansion zones: the Jungle Mahal region, where it performed well in 2019 and 2021 but where the TMC has since rebuilt its organisation; the non-Muslim parts of North Bengal, which together offer barely 20 to 25 seats; and the greater Kolkata industrial belt, where the BJP made gains in 2021 but still confronts the TMC’s entrenched machinery.
Even sweeping these regions would take the BJP only to around 100 to 110 seats, still short of a majority if Muslim-influenced seats remain effectively sealed off. For the BJP, the only viable opening lies in forcing cross-voting in mixed constituencies by splitting Hindu support within TMC strongholds, leveraging local anti-incumbency and channelling anger over corruption, Sandeshkhali-type incidents and welfare delivery, though this still requires chipping away at the TMC’s non-Muslim base.
The deeper implication is that the BJP’s challenge is now mathematical rather than ideological. The demographic map simply does not offer enough Hindu-majority seats for the party to form a government without breakthroughs in areas where the TMC’s Muslim support is decisive. Put simply, unless the TMC faces an internal collapse, a consolidated Muslim vote ensures that even a strong anti-incumbency wave may not carry the BJP to power in 2026.
If the ongoing electoral-roll cleaning exercise leads to even modest deletions of illegal or non-existent voters in border districts such as Murshidabad, Malda, Uttar Dinajpur or North 24 Parganas, as is being expected, several previously safe TMC seats could become more competitive, giving the BJP a mathematical opening it otherwise lacks.
