India’s push to ban TRF underscores the futility of UN action against Pakistan-backed terror groups.
NEW DELHI: One of the key components of the Indian government’s multi-level diplomatic approach against Pakistan-based terror groups is its ongoing effort to seek a United Nations ban on The Resistance Front (TRF). The activities of this organisation, first reported by this newspaper in April 2020 in the article “Kashmir’s Resistance Front in Lashkar”, are directed by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) commanders.
It is pertinent to note that Lashkar-e-Taiba was designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council under Resolution 1267 on May 2, 2008. Following increased global scrutiny and intense lobbying from India, the group rebranded itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) for public consumption. However, this organisation was also designated a terrorist group by the UN Security Council under the same resolution on December 10, 2008.
Despite these designations, the actions taken by the UN and its affiliated agencies have produced no tangible results on the ground. Since being banned, Lashkar has continued to carry out major terror attacks against India, including the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and the September 2013 twin attacks in Jammu.
Similarly, since its designation as a terrorist organisation by the UN Security Council in October 2001 and its subsequent ban in Pakistan in January 2002, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has been responsible for at least five major terrorist attacks on India up to August 2019. These include the January 2016 Pathankot airbase attack, which killed seven security personnel; the January 2016 attack on the Indian Consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, which killed at least one civilian; the September 2016 Uri attack, which claimed the lives of 19 Indian soldiers; the November 2016 Nagrota attack, which killed seven soldiers; the
February 2019 Pulwama attack, where a suicide bombing killed 40 CRPF personnel.
All these attacks, primarily targeting Indian security forces and diplomatic interests, underscore LeT’s and JeM’s sustained operational capabilities despite international sanctions. These groups often use cross-border infiltration and proxies to escalate tensions in the region.
This also exposes how ineffective the UN’s actions—achieved after prolonged lobbying—are in truly disabling these terror groups. Despite India’s success in getting these groups designated as terrorist organisations after years of intelligence sharing, diplomatic pressure, and persistent lobbying, it is left with little to show for it. After Lashkar was banned, JuD emerged; when JuD was banned, TRF was born.
The pattern is predictable—one group is banned, only to re-emerge under a new name with a fresh coat of legitimacy. India’s current efforts to get TRF officially designated as a terror outfit follow the same exhausting path it took with LeT and JuD. Experts suggest that any meaningful international action could take four to five years—if it happens at all.
Officials argue that the core issue isn’t just the rebirth of terror outfits under different aliases. It’s the inherent weakness of the international enforcement regime—and, more importantly, its bias against the suffering nation.
Victim countries like India must invest years into compiling dossiers, navigating complex diplomatic channels, and sustaining public campaigns.
“Frankly, it’s a useless exercise. The burden to get them banned is entirely on the victim nation, while the perpetrator nation goes scot-free—even as it continues to receive financial assistance from Western countries,” said a former Indian diplomat familiar with multilateral counter-terror negotiations.
“You get them banned, and then they return in a new avatar. What have we achieved?”
This, officials say, is something that terror leaders have also come to understand.
At most, international designations bring symbolic pressure, impose travel restrictions, temporarily limit recruitment capabilities, and impact funding—but only for a limited period. Without strong enforcement by the host country, they amount to little more than diplomatic formalities. This is likely to be the case again, and even if TRF is banned, it will likely reappear under a new name in the future.
Officials argue that the most effective way to counter Pakistan-based terror groups is to strengthen covert domestic capabilities for targeted operations against terrorist leaders across the border—carried out without attribution to state or state-supported entities—given the persistent limitations of international sanctions.