New Delhi: India gained independence on August 15, 1947, becoming free from British rule. China’s independence, or rather the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is marked by October 1, 1949, when Mao Zedong declared the formation of the PRC after the Chinese Civil War.
The initial period of India-China relations was marked by optimism and the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1950. In fact, following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, India was the first non-communist country to recognise the new government. India formalised these relations by establishing an embassy in China and appointing K M Panikker as its first ambassador in 1950.
India further sought to strengthen the ties with the PRC by signing of the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 for peaceful coexistence. The Panchsheel Agreement was aimed at promoting a spirit of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between India and China. It sought to establish a foundation for bilateral relations based on mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
The agreement was a foundation of Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and was meant to foster peaceful relations between the two countries. Its core principles included:
Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty: Each nation will recognize and respect the other’s borders and independent status.
Mutual non-aggression: Both sides committed to refraining from any military aggression or conflict.
Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs: Neither country would interfere with the other’s domestic policies or political systems.
Equality and mutual benefit: Relations would be based on equality and aim for mutual benefit for both nations.
Peaceful coexistence: The two countries would live side-by-side in peace.
The Panchsheel Agreement was signed on April 29, 1954, in Beijing by the Indian Ambassador to China, N Raghavan, and the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai. The agreement initially pertained to trade between the Tibet region of China and India, but it soon became a broader framework for bilateral relations. The Panchsheel Agreement marked the beginning of a new era in Sino-Indian relations.
It was seen as a progressive step towards building a peaceful and cooperative relationship between the two largest countries in Asia. The Panchsheel principles later evolved and were incorporated into a statement of ten principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which was pivotal in shaping the idea of post-colonial nations’ unique role in world affairs. These principles gained universal relevance when they were adopted into a UN General Assembly resolution in 1957.
However, this cordial phase quickly soured after the Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950. India’s decision to provide asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959, following anti-China riots in Tibet, was perceived by China as an act of subversion of its sovereignty over Tibet. Further, from 1958 onwards, Chinese territorial claims became more assertive as it refused to accept the McMahon Line.
Established in 1914, McMohan line served as the boundary in the eastern sector between British India and Tibet. China never accepted this line, considering it a product of British aggression against Tibet. In the western sector, India claimed Aksai Chin as part of its Ladakh region, while China considered it part of its Xinjiang province. China had secretly built a road through Aksai Chin by 1957, further complicating the issue.
Also, India’s decision to deploy troops and establish outposts in the disputed areas, a move called the Forward Policy, was seen by China as an aggressive and provocative act.
These tensions led to PLA launching simultaneous offensives on October 20, 1962, in both Aksai Chin and North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal), also called NEFA. The Chinese troops, better-equipped and prepared for high-altitude warfare, quickly overwhelmed the Indian forces. culminated in a brief border war in 1962, fought over disputed territories like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, marking a severe setback and the beginning of a long period of hostility in bilateral ties.
To make matters worse, India’s Army was caught between its political leadership’s idealistic principles and the army’s acute lack of military preparedness during the 1962 war against China. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon pursued a diplomatic and ideological path, while ignoring warnings of a potential Chinese attack, leaving the Indian Army unprepared and outmatched.
After a month of fighting, and having achieved its territorial objectives, China declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew its troops from NEFA. However, it retained control of Aksai Chin. The initiation of the 1962 War was indeed a violation of the principles of peaceful co-existence as envisaged under the Panchsheel Agreement.
In the month-long 1962 Sino-Indian War, India suffered approximately 1,383 killed and 3,968 captured, with some estimates of 3,250 deaths, while China’s reported casualties were around 722 killed and about 1,700 wounded. This war shattered the idealistic notion of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) and exposed the fragility of the agreement in the face of deep-seated territorial disputes.
India lost approximately 38,000 square kilometre (sqkm) of land in the Aksai Chin region, which remains under Chinese control today. While the People’s Liberation Army captured Aksai Chin, it also advanced into Arunachal Pradesh in the east but later withdrew behind the McMahon Line. Aksai Chin remains a point of contention, with China asserting control over it as a part of its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet.
The PRC killed the very pact it once showcased. Pandit Nehru felt betrayed and died heart-broken soon after, while Menon was sacked as Defence Minister following the debacle. The clashes on the Himalayas with the PLA even after the 1962 war shows that India can’t afford to lose sight on its eastern borders.
(Aritra Banerjee is a Defence, Foreign Affairs & Aerospace Journalist and co-author of The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. Having spent his formative years in the United States before returning to India, he combines a global outlook with on-the-ground insight in his reporting. He holds a Master’s in International Relations, Security & Strategy from O.P. Jindal Global University, a Bachelor’s in Mass Media from the University of Mumbai, and Professional Education in Strategic Communications from King’s College London (War Studies). With experience across television, print, and digital media.)
