NEW DELHI: Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Washington, DC has taken a visibly harder line on India, introducing trade penalties, renewing overtures to Pakistan, and signalling its unhappiness with New Delhi’s independent strategic posture. While there has been no formal declaration of a shift in alliance, the moves collectively reflect a recalibrated U.S. approach that prioritizes short-term leverage over long-term partnership, officials following the development said. Last week Trump imposed a 25% tariff on Indian imports, citing India’s high trade barriers—which he described as “obnoxious”— limited market access, and continued energy purchases from Russia. Trump accused India of unfair practices, clubbing it with Russia and China.
The tariff, along with an additional undefined “penalty,” signalled a transactional turn in ties, diverging from the broader Indo-Pacific cooperation frameworks of previous administrations even as a team of U.S. officials are slated to meet Indian officials on 25 August for the sixth round of talks. India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian oil despite repeated U.S. appeals has remained a persistent irritant, official sources told The Sunday Guardian. Even after the introduction of a new legislation in the U.S. Senate proposing secondary sanctions and up to 500% tariffs on countries importing Russian energy, India maintained its buying levels, citing economic necessity and national interest.
Officials in New Delhi stated that India cannot compromise its energy security and will continue to take independent decisions on foreign policy. This refusal to yield under pressure has fuelled frustration in Washington, particularly within the Trump camp, which views such defiance as undermining American authority. What has raised more questions is that while tensions with India rose, the Trump administration renewed engagement with Pakistan. In May, just days after India stopped Opera tion Sindoor, Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir was invited to the White House for a private meeting with President Trump, an unusual move that was not mirrored with Indian officials during the same period.
U.S. officials have since announced exploratory energy cooperation with Pakistan and revived discussions around security coordination in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. These gestures have raised concerns in Indian security circles about Washington’s shifting calculus in South Asia. India’s military response to the 22 April Pahalgam terrorist attack further strained ties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week told Parliament that he missed multiple calls from U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance on 9 May as India prepared its response under Operation Sindoor. Modi said he returned the call later and conveyed that India would retaliate decisively if attacked again. While no official criticism came from the U.S. side, American selfinvited mediation efforts in the aftermath were seen in New Delhi as undermining India’s deterrence posture.
The re-emergence of a purely transactional U.S. foreign policy has sharpened the divide. Unlike earlier strategic dialogues that framed India as a long-term partner in balancing China, the Trump administration appears more focused on compliance and quick returns, officials indicated. India’s unwillingness to align on sanctions, defence access, and trade liberalization has placed it in Washington’s crosshairs. The imposition of tariffs, simultaneous reengagement with Pakistan, and legislative threats of secondary sanctions indicate that Washington is willing to penalize India if it refuses to adjust, something that Government of India is not “too concerned” about, given the diversification of trade ties that India has done in the last decade.
While acknowledging the importance of the bilateral relationship, officials have privately acknowledged growing unpredictability in U.S. behaviour. During the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, the contrast between China’s active support for Pakistan and the United States’ restrained response toward India was striking—both in material terms and strategic signalling.
While China provided Pakistan with tactical support, including real-time intelligence, surveillance data, and technical inputs on Indian positions, the United States did not provide any comparable military assistance to India. This difference has been noted by Indian military officials, analysts, and diplomats as evidence of an evolving asymmetry in crisis-time partnerships. Indian Army Deputy Chief Lt Gen Rahul Singh publicly stated that China helped Pakistan with “live inputs” during the engagement, allowing the Pakistan military to respond to Indian missile and troop deployments with precision.
These inputs are believed to have included satellite imagery, ELINT support, and radar coordination, enhancing Pakistan’s situational awareness on the battlefield. Chinese diplomatic rhetoric during the same period also reaffirmed its strategic alignment with Pakistan, calling it an “ironclad friend” and pledging to defend its “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” By contrast, the United States provided no operational or intelligence support to India. Even more notably, the U.S. response was marked by neutrality, with Trump administration officials urging both sides to “exercise restraint.”
This stance disappointed many in New Delhi, particularly as China was seen taking a partisan position in favour of Pakistan, not only diplomatically but also operationally. Despite over two decades of India-U.S. defence dialogue, and India being designated a “Major Defence Partner” in 2016, the U.S. opted for conflict containment over ally support. In essence, India acted alone, both in terms of strategic planning and battlefield execution.
