The protests initiated by the CJP, which culminated in the resignation of Union Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, should not be viewed as the conclusion of the crisis but as the beginning of a potentially wider phase of political mobilisation, according to intelligence and strategic affairs experts, including several who have held senior positions in the country’s security establishment. According to officials, the developments of the past few days have fundamentally altered the calculations of various pressure groups and protest organisations. They believe the resignation has created a perception that sustained street mobilisation can compel political concessions, a lesson that could encourage other organisations with pending demands to adopt similar strategies in pursuit of their own objectives.
The officials caution that the government should not assume public anger has dissipated merely because the immediate political demand has been met. Instead, they describe the present situation as a temporary lull that could be followed by renewed mobilisation, either by the same organisations or by allied groups seeking to broaden the agitation and sustain public pressure. “The mistake would be to believe that the issue is over. Such movements rarely end immediately after achieving one objective. Once a movement discovers that sustained mobilisation can produce tangible political outcomes, there is every incentive to regroup, reorganise and return with additional demands,” a former senior intelligence officer said. According to the experts, the government’s priority should now shift from responding to demonstrations after they erupt to preventing conditions that allow them to gather momentum. That, they say, requires a detailed assessment of the grievances driving the movement, the organisational structure behind the protests, the networks mobilising participants and the trajectory of future demands.
They argue that major protest movements generally follow identifiable stages. Initial mobilisation is often centred on a specific grievance, but if the response is delayed or perceived as inadequate, additional organisations join the campaign, broader political narratives emerge and the movement acquires greater legitimacy. Preventing such escalation, they say, requires intervention during the early stages rather than after large crowds have already assembled. Officials believe the government should undertake a comprehensive review of the weaknesses exposed during the recent protests. This should include identifying intelligence gaps, examining how mobilisation took place on the ground, assessing coordination among protest organisers, monitoring the digital channels used to mobilise participants and anticipating the next set of demands likely to emerge. Such an exercise, they argue, would enable authorities to adopt pre-emptive measures instead of relying primarily on crowd-control mechanisms after demonstrations have already begun.
A significant concern raised by the experts relates to the role of the Intelligence Bureau. According to them, the agency’s responsibility extends beyond collecting information to providing advance assessments that enable policymakers to anticipate developments before they unfold. Several former officials believe that objective was not effectively achieved during the recent protests. “The Intelligence Bureau exists to provide strategic warning. Intelligence is valuable only when it allows the political leadership to act before a crisis develops. If the government is compelled to respond after events have overtaken it, then the purpose of advance intelligence has not been fully achieved,” another former senior official said. The experts argue that available indicators, including public messaging, organisational coordination and local mobilisation efforts, should have enabled authorities to assess the scale of the agitation well before it reached its peak. They also point to shortcomings in coordination between intelligence agencies and local law enforcement. According to them, intelligence collection alone is insufficient unless it is translated into operational planning by police authorities. They believe both the Intelligence Bureau and the police should have anticipated the possibility of large-scale mobilisation and developed contingency plans before the situation escalated. According to the experts, once the protests reached a certain scale, the government’s room for manoeuvre narrowed considerably. With large numbers of protesters already on the streets, every available option carried significant political and administrative costs, leaving the government to respond under mounting pressure rather than shape events proactively. “The leadership was effectively placed on the back foot. Once protests achieve sufficient scale, governments often lose the initiative and become reactive. At that stage, every decision carries consequences, whether the administration chooses confrontation, negotiation or concession,” one expert observed. Former officials also warn of what they describe as a possible demonstration effect arising from the minister’s resignation.
They believe organisations with unresolved demands may conclude that sustained agitation is an effective means of securing political concessions and could seek to replicate similar methods by building public campaigns and maintaining prolonged pressure on the government. For that reason, the experts argue, the government’s focus should now be on preparing for possible future mobilisation through continuous intelligence monitoring, early identification of emerging flashpoints, engagement with stakeholders before grievances escalate, closer coordination between intelligence agencies and state police forces, and preventive strategies tailored to anticipated protest scenarios.
