NEW DELHI: The multi-decade grooming gang scandal, one of the biggest assaults on women in British history, has exposed a critical issue that very few people like to talk about—the deadly effect of the community called Mirpuris. A majority of the deadliest assailants who operated as gangs and “chains” abducting and sexual abusing women for years, in many cases, were Pakistani Mirpuris. So named because they originate from a town called Mirpur in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (PoK), in the 1950s such was the volume of migration from Mirpur to the UK that even today the region is known as “Little England”, and the pound sterling is the other currency accepted widely here apart from the Pakistani rupee.
The Mirpuri forms a significant portion of the British Pakistani population, with estimates suggesting 60-80% of British Pakistanis in England have Mirpuri roots. The community’s mass migration to the UK was catalysed by the construction of the Mangla Dam in the 1960s, which displaced over 100,000 people from a rural, underdeveloped region. This foundational experience of forced displacement shaped the community’s settlement patterns in concentrated enclaves within Britain’s industrial towns and the formation of tight-knit social structures, such as the biraderi kinship system.
This context is useful in understanding the community’s origins in Britain. They arrived not as educated, urban professionals, but as a displaced rural population with little or no experience of urban living in Pakistan. Their collective identity was forged by the shared trauma of displacement and a sense of abandonment by the Pakistani state, creating a strong, cohesive group whose initial socio-economic conditions would profoundly shape their future in Britain.
Additionally, it cannot be denied that especially after the early years, Pakistani intelligence agencies encouraged more and more Mirpuris to settle in the UK to create a pressure group in that country against India. Upon arrival in the UK, Mirpuri migrants established highly concentrated settlement patterns, clustering in the industrial towns and cities of the Midlands and Northern England where there were labour shortages. Cities like Bradford, Birmingham, Luton, Leeds, and Manchester became major centres for the community.
This clustering was not random but was driven by a process of “chain migration”, where the initial wave of migrants sponsored and provided support for relatives and fellow villagers from back home. This process led to the direct transplantation of village-based social structures from Kashmir to the streets of Britain, with families from specific areas in Mirpur often living in close proximity in their new host country. A central organising principle of this social structure is the biraderi system a powerful network of kinship and clan loyalty that influences everything from social life and business arrangements to marriage patterns. This structure is heavily reinforced by a high rate of endogamy, particularly first-cousin marriages.
This practice is seen as a way to preserve patrilineal identity, maintain family honour, and consolidate property and social ties within the clan. Subsequent migration waves from the 1970s through the 1990s, focused on family reunification and “marriage migration”, further solidified these insular structures. Many British-born Mirpuris married spouses from their ancestral villages in PoK, who then moved to the UK. This constant circulation of people reinforced cultural and linguistic ties to a specific rural part of Pakistan, with many households having one parent who was a nonEnglish-speaking recent arrival. These strong, insular community structures proved to be a doubleedged sword. Initially, they were an invaluable form of social capital, a successful survival strategy that provided housing, employment opportunities (often in factories or family businesses), and a crucial support system in what was often a new and hostile environment.
However, the very mechanisms that ensured the community’s establishment also created long-term barriers to wider social and economic integration. The continued emphasis on insular networks, particularly through transnational marriages, slowed linguistic and cultural assimilation for subsequent generations. This has contributed to the community’s concentration in some of the UK’s most deprived areas and, trapping many in the lowest tier of jobs and housing. The short-term survival strategy thus had the unintended long-term consequence of reinforcing social and economic isolation. The emergence of the “Kashmiri cause” in the late 20th century had a strong impact on Mirpuri identity in the UK, leading to increased activism and involvement in Kashmiri separatist and anti-India movements.
In the 1970s, Mirpuris in Britain were instrumental in forming organizations such as the United Kashmir Liberation Front (UKLF) and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which advocated for Kashmir’s independence from India and Pakistan. These organizations spread their influence globally and played a key role in funding and supporting the armed revolt in the Kashmir Valley. A key element of the Mirpuris political strategy has been the conscious cultivation of a “Kashmiri” identity, distinct from a Pakistani one. While a majority of all British Pakistanis trace their origins to the Mirpur region of Pakistan-administered Kashmir (AJK), many actively identify as Kashmiri. This identification is a deliberate political act. Ethnolinguistically, the term Kashmiri typically refers to natives of the Kashmir Valley, but it has been widely adopted by the diaspora from Mirpur and surrounding districts.
This self-identification serves a strategic purpose. It continues Pakistan’s claim on the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and the entire Kashmir region. It also keeps alive Mirpuri and Pakistan grievance on this issue, and keeps it burning in British political consciousness. By framing their identity in this way, the Mirpuris position themselves as a key stakeholder—this was manifest in campaigns to have “Kashmiri” included as a separate ethnic category in the UK census, an effort to gain official recognition of this distinct identity. This identity is intensely transnational. Even after decades in Britain, many in the community are only concerned about Kashmir, maintaining deep connections to their homeland through a constant circulation of people, remittances, and political ideas. This framing allows them to advocate for “selfdetermination”, a concept more palatable to Western political sensibilities than a purely pro-Pakistan stance, even if the practical effect of their activism is to exert pressure on India.
This self-identification as a distinct, aggrieved national group provides the moral and political foundation for all subsequent lobbying efforts. A turning point came in the early 1980s. The kidnapping and murder of Indian diplomat Ravindra Mhatre in Birmingham in 1984 was carried out by members of the Kashmir Liberation Army, a group formed by Mirpuri-origin activists in the UK. This act was intended to pressure India to release Maqbool Bhat, a prominent Kashmiri separatist leader, and marked a direct act of violence against Indian interests on British soil. From that time, Mirpuris in the UK became increasingly involved in jihadi activities targeting India. Many travelled to Pakistan to receive training in camps run by groups such as Lashkare-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ulMujahideen (HuM), Jaishe-Mohammad (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), with the knowledge and, at times, tacit approval of British intelligence, as these activities were perceived as targeting India rather than the UK.
Financial and logistical support for militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir was often organised within Mirpuri networks in the UK, including fundraising and recruitment for jihadi groups fighting Indian forces. Notorious Mirpuri-origin individuals involved in anti-India militancy include Rashid Rauf, implicated in the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot and linked to Jaish-e-Mohammad, and others who participated in or facilitated terrorist activities against India. In addition to violent activities, the Mirpuri community in the UK has been active in organising political protests and lobbying against Indian policies in Kashmir, especially after the revocation of Article 370 in 2019. These protests, while generally peaceful, have maintained a consistent anti-India stance and have sought to influence British and international opinion against Indian actions in Kashmir.
The overlap between Kashmiri jihad and global jihadist movements has been evident, with figures like Ilyas Kashmiri, a Bhimber-born operative, inspiring Mirpuris in the UK to participate in militancy against India. The British government has historically overlooked the activities of Mirpuriorigin militants targeting India, only reassessing the threat after some individuals turned their attention to targets in the UK itself (for example, involvement in the 2005 London bombings). Many Mirpuris in the UK have played a documented role in supporting or participating in activities aimed at harming Indian interests, both through militancy and political agitation. The British Mirpuri community has effectively converted its demographic weight into tangible political power. Due to their high concentration in constituencies across cities like Birmingham, Bradford, and Luton, they hold significant electoral influence. It is estimated that there are 70-80 MPs in the House of Commons who represent constituencies with large Mirpuri populations.
This has led to the election of numerous MPs and local councillors of Mirpuri origin, who provide a direct voice for the community’s concerns within the British political system. This political capital is deployed to lobby elected officials and influence the policies of major political parties. A notable success was the campaign that led to a change in the Labour Party’s policy on Kashmir, resulting in the issue being debated on the main conference floor for the first time in British history. A primary vehicle for this influence is the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Kashmir. APPGs are informal, crossparty groups of MPs and Lords, and the Kashmir APPG’s stated purpose is “to support the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people” and “to highlight the abuses of human rights in Kashmir”. Its membership includes numerous MPs from both major parties who represent constituencies with large British Kashmiri populations. Beyond parliamentary lobbying, the diaspora engages in direct action and public activism.
This includes organising protests outside the Indian High Commission in London on dates such as India’s Republic Day and holding commemorative rallies for militant figures like Burhan Wani and Maqbool Bhat, founder of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKNLF). These activities ensure that the Kashmir issue remains visible and contentious in the public sphere. It is important to note that of course the Mirpuris never talk about any issue in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Their only focus is the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Also, through the decades, with the influence of the Pakistani intelligence agencies, the Mirpuris in the UK have developed deep, nefarious networks with Khalistanis, Islamists and anyone who could potentially harm India.
The Mirpuri-Khalistani combination has been responsible for attacks on the Indian embassy in London in recent years. Identifying the Mirpuris in the UK, in public discourse, as a partisan community in which many, if not a majority, are relentless working against India is critical for the future of India’s security and indeed in the interest of the UK and British society. * Hindol Sengupta is Professor of International Relations at the O.P. Jindal Global University.
