The report by an independent Swiss military history and strategic studies institution, says that Indian operations significantly reduced the quality and extent of Pakistani airspace awareness.
OP Sindoor Achieved Escalation Dominance, Says Swiss Report (Image :X)
India retained escalation dominance and protected its most critical air-defence assets during the 7–10 May 2025 air conflict with Pakistan, named Operation Sindoor, according to a detailed European military analysis, which concludes that New Delhi controlled both the tempo and the ceiling of the confrontation while preventing Pakistani forces from achieving any decisive operational effect.
The report, titled “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan Air War (7–10 May 2025)”, is authored by Adrien Fontanellaz and published last week by the Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (CHPM), an independent Swiss military history and strategic studies institution based in Pully, Switzerland. Founded in 1969, CHPM is not affiliated with any government and positions itself as a neutral forum for professional military research, force-preparation studies, and lessons-learned analysis. The publication carries institutional oversight, with a review committee including Joseph Henrotin, a Paris-based strategic analyst associated with European defence think tanks; Claude Meier, a retired Swiss Air Force Major General and former Chief of Staff; and Arthur Lüsenti, a specialist in nuclear doctrine and arms control with experience at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
According to the report, India’s response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack marked a deliberate shift from earlier crisis-management precedents. Political leadership led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi authorised strikes against Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba infrastructure deep inside Pakistani territory, while granting the armed forces freedom to manage escalation. Long-range precision weapons were employed, while most Indian aircraft remained within national airspace, signalling intent while limiting exposure. The study notes that Indian preparations for large-scale drone and missile attacks pre-dated the opening strikes, with counter-unmanned aerial system defence exercises conducted in late April 2025—a factor directly linked to the effectiveness of India’s response once Pakistani drone waves began.
Pakistan retaliated with multiple waves of drones, artillery rockets, missiles, and limited air operations aimed primarily at Indian air bases and air-defence systems. However, the report finds that these attacks failed to degrade India’s layered air-defence architecture. Indian surface-to-air missile batteries operated with mobility and strict emission control, repeatedly relocating and denying Pakistani forces accurate targeting data. Most incoming munitions were intercepted, disrupted, or neutralised. Crucially, the report states that there is no verified evidence that any Indian S-400 battery was destroyed or rendered inoperative during the conflict. While Pakistan claimed that a JF-17 fighter struck an S-400 system at Adampur using CM-400AKG missiles, the analysis notes that no independent satellite imagery or open-source material corroborates the claim. The S-400 systems continued to constrain Pakistani air operations and forced enemy aircraft to operate at extended distances throughout the conflict.
The analysis further concludes that Indian operations significantly reduced the quality and extent of Pakistani airspace awareness. Indian strikes and electronic effects forced several Pakistani radars to shut down or limit emissions to avoid detection, while Pakistan’s reliance on airborne early-warning platforms and networked targeting failed to translate into sustained operational advantage. As the conflict progressed, Pakistan’s ability to coordinate air and drone operations deteriorated.
The decisive phase occurred on 10 May, when India launched coordinated long-range missile strikes using BrahMos, SCALP-EG, and Rampage missiles against multiple Pakistani air bases up to 200 kilometres inside Pakistani territory. Targets included command-and-control facilities, drone infrastructure, hangars, and runways. These strikes were launched from within Indian airspace and sharply constrained Pakistan’s capacity to continue air and drone operations at scale. Some Indian strikes were conducted close to strategically sensitive facilities, demonstrating India’s ability to operate near higher escalation thresholds. At the same time, India deliberately limited the scope of its actions, signalling restraint alongside capability. This combination of reach and control is assessed as a stabilising factor rather than a weakness.
According to the study, de-escalation followed these Indian deep strikes. Pakistan did not mount a response of comparable scale or depth, and the escalation cycle ended without external mediation. The report concludes that India achieved escalation dominance by demonstrating both the capability and the willingness to impose higher costs while retaining control over further escalation. The report also highlights that both sides exaggerated aircraft losses, a recurring feature of modern air warfare dominated by long-range engagements, electronic warfare, and incomplete battle-damage assessment. After adjusting for overclaiming, Indian operations are found to have imposed greater and more durable operational constraints on Pakistan than vice versa.
Overall, the CHPM assessment characterises Operation Sindoor as the first high-intensity, network-centric air conflict between two nuclear-armed states and concludes that India emerged with a clear operational advantage, having protected critical assets, degraded adversary capabilities, dictated escalation dynamics, and demonstrated credible deep-strike capability without crossing nuclear thresholds.
