Over six decades of friction, Indian Army has remained a professional, disciplined, and constitutionally accountable force, whereas the PLA functions primarily as the armed wing of the CCP
Galwan Valley clash of 2020 highlighted the professionalism of the Indian Army versus the CCP-controlled PLA’s aggressive tactics along the LAC (Photo: Pinterest)
NEW DELHI: On 15 June 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a violent face off in Galwan Valley across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Indian Army sources confirmed that 20 Indian soldiers were killed, the deadliest clash between the two nations in over four decades. The confrontation occurred during a de-escalation process following a standoff across several points in eastern Ladakh that began in May 2020.
While there was no exchange of gunfire, the combat involved hand-to-hand fighting and the use of improvised melee weapons such as stones, clubs, and nail-studded rods. Independent assessments, including US intelligence reports, suggested that China suffered around 35-45 casualties, although Beijing officially acknowledged only four deaths.
A key question after the clash was why firearms were not used. Agreements between India and China prohibit the use of firearms within two kilometres of the LAC as a confidence-building measure (CBM). India has historically adhered to this rule. However, during the Galwan Valley clash and subsequent standoffs, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) exploited this restraint by using non-firearm weapons and simultaneously expanding its military infrastructure, eroding mutual trust.
India-China Border Agreements Since 1962. Over the decades, India and China have signed a series of CBMs designed to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) was the first major post-war accord, committing both sides to resolve the boundary question peacefully and refrain from use or threat of force. The 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) prohibited the use of firearms and explosives within two kilometres of the LAC and required restraint during confrontations through measured engagement. The 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question established the framework for a final settlement, calling for non-use of force, respect for settled populations, and consideration of historical, geographical, and security factors. The 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) aimed at preventing border incidents through enhanced communication, flag meetings, and hotlines. Earlier understandings such as the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement failed to prevent the 1962 war, yet successive Indian governments continued to pursue dialogue in the hope of stabilising relations.
For decades, Indian troops upheld these CBMs, resolving face-to-face encounters with restraint during confrontations. The PLA's conduct in Galwan (2020), however using spiked clubs and stones violated the spirit of the 1996 and 2013 accords. By doing so, the PLA weaponised India's restraint, exploiting the no firearms clause to gain tactical advantage.
Despite continued diplomatic talks, China has not reduced its forward deployments along the LAC. The US Department of Defense's 2024 "Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC" report noted that China has expanded its permanent infrastructure across Aksai Chin and the Western Theatre Command to sustain multiple brigade-level deployments since 2020. New roads, bridges such as the Pangong Lake bridge, airfields, and hardened shelters have transformed the frontier.
On 9 December 2022, PLA troops attempted to transgress the LAC in the Yangtse area of the Tawang sector (Arunachal Pradesh) but were repelled by Indian soldiers in a firm and resolute response.
Following the 2020 Galwan clash, India revised its rules of engagement, empowering commanders to use firearms in self-defence if threatened. The Army also procured non-lethal weapons and developed indigenous deterrence tools to counter PLA tactics.
On 21 October 2024, India and China reached a limited disengagement arrangement in the Depsang and Demchok sectors, completing verification patrols by early November 2024. Experts caution that while this represents a step forward, buffer zones remain, and the broader border dispute is far from resolved.
Over six decades of friction, the Indian Army has remained a professional, disciplined, and constitutionally accountable force, whereas the PLA functions primarily as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a distinction that defines their contrasting reputations.
Indian Army: The Indian Army is apolitical and constitutionally bound, serving under civilian authority through the President of India and Parliament. It is the world's largest all-volunteer army, drawing soldiers from diverse regions and communities under the motto "Service Before Self." Operating under the Army Act, 1950, it upholds strict accountability, professionalism, and humanitarian conduct, both in combat and in peacekeeping missions.
People's Liberation Army: The PLA answers directly to the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping, embodying Mao Zedong's dictum that "the Party commands the gun." It functions as a party militia rather than a national army, tasked with safeguarding CCP rule and suppressing internal dissent. The PLA has been deployed to enforce control during the 1959 Tibetan uprising, the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and continuing security operations in Xinjiang and Tibet. Abroad, its behaviour has been marked by assertiveness in the South China Sea and along the LAC, reflecting political rather than professional military imperatives.
The Galwan clash exposed the fragility of long-standing CBMs when one side weaponises restraint. India's adherence to agreements has reflected professionalism and accountability, whereas the PLA's repeated violations have exposed Beijing's willingness to exploit peace mechanisms for strategic gain. For the future, effective CBMs will require joint verification, transparency, and enforceable compliance not merely declarations of intent.
Ashish Singh is an award-winning senior journalist with over 18 years of experience in defence and strategic affairs.
