Under Western influence, the World Bank had brokered a pro-Pakistan pact.
The dastardly, Pakistan state-sponsored terrorist attack on April 22, which killed 26 innocent tourists holidaying in the lush meadows at Baisaran, near Pahalgam in J&K, has once again brought international focus to the tenuous relationship between the two neighbours. In retaliation to the gruesome sectarian murders of Hindus, India promptly initiated measures impacting bilateral trade, movement of Pakistani citizens, downsizing its high commission in New Delhi, and putting the operation of the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance.
Denying involvement in the horrific act—despite low-cost terrorism being its preferred mode of strategic warfare for the past 35 years—the Pakistan government launched its countermeasures. These echoed the Indian actions and included the suspension of Indian civilian aircraft from its airspace (India reciprocated with a similar move a week later). Specifically, in response to India’s action on the Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan indicated its intention to rescind or suspend existing bilateral pacts, including the Simla Agreement. Following the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Indira Gandhi–Zulfiqar Bhutto pact had turned the 740 km long 1948 ceasefire line in Jammu & Kashmir into the actual Line of Control. Soon thereafter, three senior Pakistani ministers belligerently termed any interruption of water flow from India as an act of war warranting military reprisals. Another minister threatened that Pakistan’s arsenal of 130 tactical nuclear missiles was now pointed at India.
Such belligerent statements, aimed at promoting jingoism and a false sense of security among its citizens, have caused Indo–Pak relations to hit a new low. Even in the best of times, the relationship was marred by deep mistrust and suspicion. The two nations have fought three full-fledged wars, and the 3,323 km-long border has been heavily guarded for the past 78 years. The bugbear of reclaiming Kashmir through military actions has kept the Pakistani Army in virtual command of the affairs of the beleaguered nation.
The Pakistan Army maintains firm control over the country’s defence and foreign policies and only tolerates civilian governments that acknowledge their subservience. As perceptive security expert and former DGP, Anju Gupta, says, “The Pakistan army deliberately follows policies to harm neighbours and bring defensive retaliation upon itself. Then it publicly plays up the possibility of retaliation or threat thereof in order to support its narrative that only the army, not the corrupt polity, can hold Pakistan together. This vicious cycle has continued for decades.” In the days immediately preceding the Pahalgam shootings, Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir echoed this stance while addressing a group of overseas Pakistanis. He referred to Kashmir as Islamabad’s “jugular vein” and assured Kashmiris they had not been forgotten.
India’s more effective checking of terrorism since 2019, when J&K was placed under direct Union Government rule, seems to have provoked renewed calls for terrorism from Pakistan’s political and military leadership. The recent rise in domestic bombings in crowded markets, passenger trains, and military establishments by Baluchi and other armed terrorist groups has added to Pakistan’s woes and frustration. Despite former PM Imran Khan being incarcerated, a pliable civilian government in place, and a visibly submissive judiciary, reining in the army does not, however, appear on the horizon.
Though its generals are conscious of the Indian military’s larger size and superior capabilities in many respects, reckless responses by Pakistan cannot be ruled out. Its tactical nuclear weapons and air force are capable of inflicting significant damage. With a price to pay, the key question is whether a response stronger than the 2019 Balakot strike is warranted. Defence and foreign policy commentators suggest that to effectively disable the majority of terrorist camps across the LOC, “precise, swift, and deliberate action” should be undertaken. Alongside such ‘kinetic action’, they recommend targeting the infrastructure enabling cross-border infiltration and the handlers behind the Pahalgam incident.
While the logic and patriotic fervour behind these suggestions must be appreciated, the potential for Pakistani retaliation must also be reckoned with. Without ever ruling out military action, lasting impact on Pakistan’s economy, military, and polity can be achieved through the already-initiated non-military measures—such as revisiting the Indus Water Treaty to significantly reduce its water- entitlement. The 135.6 million acre-feet(MAF) of water from the perennial western rivers allocated to Pakistan sustain 80% of the country’s irrigated lands and contribute 25% to its GDP. If reducing Pakistan’s share of Indus waters ever seems infeasible, and the likely cost upon the country of military action is deemed affordable, India can always exercise that option.
Historical Background of the Indus Water Treaty
The Indus River and its two western tributaries—Jhelum and Chenab—and the three eastern ones—Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—have long supported civilization, prosperity, and occasional deluge in the Indian subcontinent. When the British partitioned the subcontinent based on religion, they were mindful of the region’s geography and history. All these rivers originate in the Himalayas and flow through India before entering Pakistan. Punjab and Sindh, the granaries of undivided India due to the elaborate British-constructed canal systems, were allocated to Pakistan. Eastern Punjab (later reorganized into Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh) and Rajasthan, with no significant irrigation systems, came to India courtesy of the hurried recommendations of the Radcliffe Border Commission set up by the outgoing British colonizers.
That the English rulers recognized the strategic importance of these rivers is pretty obvious. Ferozepur district, eligible to join India on the grounds of the religion of its residents was almost allocated to Pakistan by the Commission because headworks controlling three major canals—including the Ganga Canal of Bikaner—were located there. Only the vigilance and prompt action of three water engineers—A.N. Khosla and Sarup Singh of East Punjab and Kanwar Sen of Bikaner—prevented this. They alerted Maharaja Sadhul Singh through K.M. Pannikar, his Prime Minister. The Bikaner royal’s personal rapport with Lord Mountbatten, and his reported threat to merge Bikaner with Pakistan, had prompted Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon to rush to the Viceroy and ensure that the headworks and three tehsils—Ferozepur, Fazilka, and Zira—were included in India.
Soon after the emergence of the conflict over Kashmir in 1948, Pakistan woke up to its vulnerability due to the Indian control of these headworks. Its Premier, Liaquat Ali Khan, flew to New Delhi to urge Pandit Nehru to refrain from using the facility and negotiate a formal water-sharing agreement. After years of negotiations and under the influence of American World Bank President Eugene Black, the Indus Water Treaty was signed in Karachi in 1960, by Premier Nehru and President Ayub Khan. Thereafter the Indian leader was feted in Lahore , Rawalpindi, Murree and Nathlagali and the two leaders loftly envisaged the eradication of poverty from the subcontinent .
There was much rejoicing in Pakistan since the treaty was unique and unprecedented. The lower riparian state, Pakistan, was granted exclusive consumptive rights to 135.6 million acre-feet(MAF) of water from the three perennial western river while India was permitted to build a storage capacity of 3.64 MAF on them but only for non consumptive usage like hydro power generation. In the three eastern rivers coming to its fold, the maximum consumptive usage possible was 33.8 MAF. Globally, the norm was the opposite: the upper riparian nations would retain most of the water, leaving less for lower-lying countries e.g. the water -sharing between the US and Mexico. The navigation rights were similarly shared as in the Nile river between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, the Mekong river amongst the Southeast Asian nations and the Danube flowing through several European countries. Nearer home, India finds China unilaterally checking and controlling the waters and its flow from the rivers originating in Tibet and other regions of China, without seeking consent, consulting or informing any lower nation.
With this treaty, Pakistan formally also secured the rights to be informed and consulted about water availability and its flow to Pakistan from all six rivers. All project designs—whether storage-based or run-of-river—on western rivers, even for non-consumptive uses, must be shared with the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistan’s review. The World Bank was given a pivotal role in implementing and interpreting the Treaty’s provisions. Disputes are settled solely through the Bank, via either a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration. Neither party can approach other nations or any international institution for dispute resolution. No unilateral modifications in the Treaty are allowed, even if delays and constraints persist for decades as experienced by India from time to time.
The treaty’s one-sidedness and rigidity were forcefully brought to light when the signed treaty came to the Indian Parliament for ratification. Congress MPs Iqbal Singh from Punjab and H.C.Mathur from Rajasthan, along with Swatantra Party’s Asoke Mehta, had urged its non -endorsement , citing harm to Indian interests and it having been signed for appeasing Pakistan . Explicit allegations were made that Americans had favoured Pakistan at India’s cost. India’s non-aligned stance and growing ties with the Soviet Union had irked Western nations. At the time, India was facing famine-like conditions and was dependent on PL-480 wheat and corn imports from the USA. Such compulsions would have likely led Pandit Nehru to persuade party members to ratify the treaty , but there was little justification for him to allege ‘narrow mindedness’ on the part of those who had opposed it and drawn attention to its numerous infirmities.
Hamstrung in its quest to expand hydroelectric generation in northern India by the treaty’s rigidity and pro-Pakistan provisions, India had formally notified Pakistan and the World Bank in January 2023 of its intent to modify the treaty. This was reiterated in August 2024. As expected, no response has come from Pakistan or World Bank officials. It is worth recalling that over the decades, Pakistan has objected to India setting up almost all the hydroelectric projects (HEP) .
The first such project was the 690 MW Salal HEP on the Chenab at Reasi . Despite the project – design having been shared in 1968, it took 10 years to get Pakistani concurrence and get completed in 1987 after its capacity had been reduced by 57 %. The mandatory notice for the 900 MW Baglihar HEP on the Chenab was served in 1992. It took 28 years to formally resolve the disputes and get the project commissioned soon thereafter in 2012. The 330 MW Kishanganga and the 850 MW Ratle HEPs due to Pakistan’s dilatory tactics remain stuck since 2010 and 2013 respectively before the World Bank ‘s Neutral Expert. In 2006, India had to abandon the barrage at Tulbul under construction since 1984, because Pakistan considered it a storage project and not a permissible navigation project near the mouth of Wullar Lake on the Jhelum . Persistent and calculated tantrums by Pakistan have ensured India so far uses barely 0.6 MAF of its meagre allocation of 3.6 MW and generate a meagre quantum of the feasible 30,000 MW
India’s recent action of holding the treaty in abeyance may have to be carefully explained to the World Bank and its prominent member- nations. Fortunately, President Trump has endorsed India’s position. Since the treaty’s signing 65 years ago, the two nations have fought bloody wars, and Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism has severely damaged bilateral ties. Such developments undermine the treaty’s foundation. Lasting peace between signatories was a prerequisite. Under such fundamental changes , the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permits even the rescinding of international pacts. Nevertheless, one should expect Pakistan to now oppose this move with all means at its disposal.
Dr. Dua is a former Union Secretary of Commerce & Industry, and the former Chairman & Managing Director of National Hydro Power Corporation.
A second article will address the impact of the extant treaty on India and the consequences for it and Pakistan of any revisions.