When Taiwan heads to the polls this November, the contest will not be confined to Taipei’s streets or the island’s airwaves. China is already manoeuvring to tilt the playing field—most visibly by channelling covert support towards the Kuomintang (KMT). This interference is not an aberration but part of a long-term strategy: weaken the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), elevate Beijing’s preferred interlocutors, and erode confidence in Taiwan’s democratic resilience.
China’s interference is multifaceted. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has documented foreign influence in KMT leadership races, including coordinated disinformation campaigns on TikTok and YouTube. These operations are designed to appear organic, masking their origin while amplifying narratives favourable to Beijing.
Financial channels are harder to trace but equally potent. Beijing deploys front companies, cultural associations, and business intermediaries to funnel resources into Taiwan’s political ecosystem. These funds often arrive disguised as “cross-strait exchanges” or “economic cooperation projects,” but their political intent is unmistakable: to strengthen the KMT’s organizational capacity and campaign reach.
The logic is straightforward. A KMT victory would give Beijing greater leverage in cross-strait negotiations, potentially slowing or reversing Taiwan’s moves toward deeper international alignment. By presenting the KMT as the “responsible” choice for stability, Beijing seeks to frame the election as a referendum on peace versus provocation.
Equally important is the psychological dimension. Demonstrating that Taiwan’s democracy is porous to external manipulation reinforces Beijing’s claim that unification is inevitable, and that Taiwan’s institutions cannot withstand sustained pressure.
The United States cannot dictate Taiwan’s electoral outcomes, nor should it. But it can help ensure that voters make their choice with full knowledge of the forces at play. Three steps are critical: i) Expose funding channels: Washington can share expertise in forensic accounting and campaign finance oversight, helping Taiwan trace illicit flows. US agencies have decades of experience closing loopholes exploited by foreign actors; adapting these frameworks to Taiwan would strengthen transparency. ii) Support legal reform: Taiwan’s campaign finance laws need updating to address indirect funding and digital influence operations. US legal experts and NGOs can provide technical assistance, ensuring reforms are both effective and politically viable. iii) Diplomatic backing: Just as the US has supported Taiwan’s diplomatic resilience through legislation like the Taiwan Allies Fund Act, it should extend this support to election integrity. Publicly exposing Beijing’s interference would not only protect Taiwan but also signal to other democracies that covert funding will be met with coordinated resistance.
Beijing will deny involvement, framing US exposure efforts as “foreign interference.” Domestically, highlighting KMT’s ties to Beijing risks deepening Taiwan’s internal divisions—precisely the fissures China exploits. Yet silence is more dangerous. Allowing covert funding to shape Taiwan’s elections unchallenged would normalize Beijing’s interference and weaken democratic legitimacy.
Taiwan’s November elections are not merely a domestic contest; they are a test of whether democracies can withstand authoritarian influence. Beijing’s covert funding of the KMT is part of a broader strategy to erode Taiwan’s sovereignty from within. The United States, by helping expose and publicize these hidden channels, can ensure that Taiwan’s voters confront Beijing’s hidden hand in the open light of day.
- Khedroob Thondup, a geopolitical analyst, is the nephew of the Dalai Lama.
