The October 2025 summit in Busan between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump, their first in six years, took place against a backdrop of renewed tensions and escalating tariff disputes. From the perspective of Chinese analysts and state-affiliated commentators, the encounter represented more than a transitory easing of bilateral frictions; it signified a structural recognition of China’s emergence as a global power on par with the United States, despite US Treasury Secretary Bessent’s characterization of China as an “unreliable partner” in remarks delivered shortly after the Trump-Xi meeting.
MEETING OF THE EQUALS
Official media and policy journals such as Qiushi and the People’s Daily framed the Busan meeting as an encounter between two major powers jointly steering the global order toward stability. They stressed a dual posture—“Fight if necessary—China will stand firm (打, 奉陪到底); talk if possible—the door is always open (谈, 大门敞开)”—and reaffirmed that China “has the confidence and the capability (有信心也有能力) to meet all kinds of risks and challenges (应对各种风险挑战).” Xi’s remarks that “China and the United States should be partners, not rivals” and that “dialogue is better than confrontation” were widely cited across state and semi-official outlets, including the Observer Network.
Trump’s own rhetoric, most notably his widely-discussed tweet before departure characterizing the summit as a “G2 meeting”, was interpreted by Chinese commentators as a symbolic acknowledgment of parity between China and the United States. As Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University observed, “In a sense, Trump has acknowledged that China and the United States are great powers of equal standing.” Nevertheless, Beijing has consistently rejected the “G2” formulation, maintaining instead that US efforts to contain China are bound to fail and that global stability depends on constructive coordination between the two powers.
As Professor Zhu Zhiqun, noted, “Whether or not the label ‘G2’ becomes more widely accepted, there is no doubt that China and the United States are competitors of equal standing. Although the United States remains generally more powerful, it no longer dominates the bilateral relationship—China can retaliate forcefully and inflict serious damage on American interests.” Huang Jing, Distinguished Professor at Shanghai International Studies University, put it more bluntly: “Suddenly the US realized what it feels like to be sanctioned.” Likewise, Professor Jin Canrong’s view that Xi Jinping “set the tone for China-US relations” in Busan was widely cited in Chinese media. Collectively, these perspectives highlight that Beijing viewed the Busan summit not as a concessionary negotiation, but as a symbolic rebalancing in which China stood on equal footing with the United States.
CHINA’S NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE
Chinese commentaries after the summit emphasized that the United States had softened its tone on several key issues, especially tariffs, export controls, and high-technology restrictions—largely because China possessed tangible leverage. Chinese analysts highlighted four pillars of this leverage: rare-earth dominance, diversified markets and agricultural imports, manufacturing scale, and technological leadership.
First, rare-earth elements emerged as a central theme in Chinese analyses. Following Beijing’s 2024 introduction of new export-licensing requirements for rare-earth minerals vital to advanced chips and defence technologies, China agreed at Busan to suspend these restrictions for one year. This was framed not as a concession but as a strategic pause, a gesture of goodwill that preserved China’s leverage. As Professor Jin Canrong explained, the period from December 2017 to the September 3 military parade (2025) marked a phase of strategic defence (战略防御), characterized by “the US attacking and China defending” (美攻我守). The current phase, he argued, is one of strategic stalemate (战略相持), in which “both sides alternate between offense and defence” (互有攻守). The ongoing tariff war exemplifies this dynamic. The analogy could be explained by drawing on Zhuge Liang’s “stratagem to win a respite” (缓兵之计).
Second, China’s success in diversifying its exports and soybean imports was frequently cited as evidence that Washington’s leverage had diminished. China had expanded sourcing from Brazil, Argentina, and parts of Central Asia, reducing its dependence on US suppliers. As the People’s Daily observed, “Diversification of supply chains means that cooperation is a choice, not a necessity,” implying that future US tariff escalations would carry less coercive weight.
Third, Chinese analysts underscored the country’s vast industrial capacity, which accounts for about one-third of global manufacturing output. The People’s Daily quoted Xi Jinping as saying that “China’s economy is large, resilient, and full of potential,” a phrase widely echoed across state media. By contrast, Professor Huang Jing argued that “the US industrial base has collapsed to such an extent that it’s hard to find joint-venture partners. Manufacturing once made up 11.8% of US GDP, but has now fallen below 9.6%,” adding that the US “lacks a manufacturing ecosystem, technical talent, and tax and distribution systems that support industry.” During the Busan meeting, Xi highlighted China’s 5.2% economic growth and a 4% increase in global goods trade, with Chinese analysts arguing that this industrial depth enables Beijing to better withstand tariff and export-control pressures.
According to Professor Jin Canrong, when Trump launched the trade war in 2017, Chinese negotiators repeatedly travelled to Washington, offering concessions and pledging to buy soybeans, corn, and Boeing aircraft. Now, he noted, the stance has shifted: “if you want to fight, we’ll fight you back.” “Before, we kept a low profile; now we show our muscles every day (天天给你秀肌肉), and if you don’t take notice, we’ll put them right under your nose (伸到你鼻子底下).” He added that China’s diplomacy now “places neighbouring countries on the same level as great-power diplomacy.” Washington’s move to cut average tariffs from about 57% to 47% and resume select high-tech exports in Busan was seen as tacit recognition of China’s resilience and countermeasures.
Finally, technological leadership in emerging fields, including AI, new energy vehicles, and renewable-energy storage has been portrayed as evidence that the US must engage China to sustain global innovation. Professor Jin goes a little further when he says, “China has made major breakthroughs in technology and industry. He recalls that in March 2018, “China’s domestic firms’ chip self-sufficiency was only about 5%; now it should be close to 45% and will soon exceed 50%. He adds, China holds strong cards: from rare earths and pharmaceutical raw materials to its dominance in synthetic diamonds and vast import markets for food and oil. In short, China can’t be choked; it can strike back with leverage of its own.
In an interview with Yao Yang, Dean of the Advanced Institute of Finance at Dishui Lake, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Professor Huang Jing, argued that Trump has realised the failure of Wilsonian liberalism to contain China’s rise, and has thus reverted to great-power competition through a Jacksonian approach. Nevertheless, Huang contended that “Trump is actually quite weak—he has no real cards left to play” and “no long-term strategy.”
AGENDA CONTROL
An equally significant aspect of the Busan summit, from the perspective of Chinese observers, was what remained off the agenda. Sensitive topics such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet, and alleged industrial overcapacity were notably absent. Chinese commentators viewed this omission as evidence that Washington had acknowledged the futility of challenging Beijing on issues central to its sovereignty and development model. Dun Zhigang, a research fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University, argued that this reflected “respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns,” while Global Times commentator Bei Pingfeng described it as “a thunder heard in silence.”
Xi’s call for China and the United States to “stay the right course” and “ensure the steady sailing of the giant ship of China-US relations” was seen by Bei as a “key prerequisite” for Washington’s proper understanding of the Taiwan issue. He argued that China’s reunification is integral to national rejuvenation and not incompatible with the goal of “Making America Great Again.”
A STRATEGIC INTERMISSION
Official Chinese coverage framed the Busan outcome as “win-win cooperation” (共赢合作) rather than a concessionary compromise. Nevertheless, several Chinese scholars cautioned against overstating China’s advantage. Professor Zhu observed that “the competition between a rising power and a dominant power is structural. The road ahead for the US-China relationship will be rocky. China’s continued growth will inevitably provoke fear in the United States, whose instinctive response has been to counter China’s development by all possible means.”
From this perspective, while Beijing’s industrial and resource advantages provided short-term bargaining power, structural vulnerabilities remain—such as reliance on imported high-end lithography equipment, exposure to financial sanctions, and continued Western supply-chain diversification. Thus, the Busan summit signified a tactical truce rather than a structural reconciliation. Professor Jin Canrong captured this dynamic aptly: “The more likely path is this—talk a bit, delay a bit; talk again, delay again. So, don’t expect some ‘grand bargain’… In terms of military development, we must ‘engage in struggle, prepare for war, and build up simultaneously.’”
With regard to lessons for India, I believe Xi’s remarks at APEC are telling: “We must focus our energy on running our own affairs well, becoming a better version of ourselves, and sharing development opportunities with all countries.” As the People’s Daily observed, China’s engagement with APEC over the past three decades has helped “break the old mind-set of bloc confrontation and zero-sum rivalry,” fostering deeper regional economic cooperation and integration. Trump’s early departure from the APEC meeting, in turn, allowed Xi to present himself and China as a more stable and predictable partner than the United States.
