The Beijing summit between China and the US produced more terminology than outcomes.
The final outcome from the several hours of recent interactions in Beijing between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping will become more fully known in the weeks ahead. Prima facie, the symbolism displayed at the summit was notably stronger than the ground-level understandings reached. A degree of interpersonal thawing in their personal interactions on the second and final day may bode well for measurable results in future meetings.
The pace of progress in the all-around strengthening of the Sino-US bilateral relations would also depend on how both sides interpret the host of new diplomatic terms that were so freely deployed, particularly by Xi, during this first US presidential visit to China in eight years. While it cannot be ruled out that the usefulness of the summit could get “lost in translation” as Trump comes up against strong political opposition at home, it is equally possible that he himself decides upon reflection after the import of all the new terms is laid before him, that the concessions Beijing expects are simply beyond what can be offered.
In the context of the ongoing war in the Gulf, President Xi is credited with having used before the visit the maxim attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte when his enemies were abandoning high ground at Austerlitz: “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” Reportedly, he began the summit by cautioning his American guest not to continue supporting the independence of Taiwan, which was “as clear as fire and water” an integral part of China. Besides demanding the de facto recognition of that position in no uncertain manner, he had warned that any misstep by the USA could cause a serious confrontation between them.
Having delivered such a pre-planned opening discourse, the confident Chinese President had gone on to expound his newly evolved reasoning for how the two most powerful nations should, henceforth, work together and cooperate on a wide range of subjects. He had even alluded that the burden of “great power responsibility” now rested upon the two of them. Seemingly, he had already come to the conclusion that “global diplomacy now really boils down to the dealings between the US and China.”
While communicating the new twists in China’s national foreign policy based on such premises, Xi reached for the language of history and classical books on international relations and diplomacy. Walking Trump through the Imperial Garden of Zhongnanhai, where the Communist Party of China is housed, he pointed toward a 400-year-old tree and exclaimed with open arms: “Look at the vitality and history on display.”
Thereafter, he worked on convincing President Trump, more accustomed to striking hard-nosed business transactions, about the need for a new framework of China-US ties aimed at “a constructive and strategically stable relationship”. On both days of their discussions, the Chinese host had talked of strategic stability, maintaining peace, and allowing manageable competition which does not turn into conflict, as the goals of such a new relationship.
In fact, at the Temple of Heaven, where he had taken Trump on the very first day, he expressed a hope that the two powers could sidestep the 5th century enunciated Thucydides Trap, the ancient Greek historian’s warning that conflict between an emerging power and an established one is rarely avoidable.
Xi’s intent of moving into a higher gear of international polity was evident through the summit. Whether it was in his nine hours of bilateral discussions with President Trump, his outdoor walks, the official Chinese press note at the conclusion of the first day’s deliberations, or in the post-summit press interaction, the host leader let it be known that theirs is now a country of consequence, and they would like to be treated as such by all others, especially the US. Equality and partnership, rather than dominance of one over the other was his new goal.
The message conveyed by the Chinese President was loud and clear: the pursuit of President Trump’s global designs was not their cup of tea. Instead, the two should jointly work out the contours of a new global order and closely coordinate their efforts and resources in turning these into reality. The underlying unstated basis was that the rest of the comity of nations including Russia, was to be the “taker” and not the decider.
China’s rapidly escalating confidence and communication tactics were also demonstrated in how Xi controlled the summit’s structure and sequence of discussion. The absence of a joint communiqué was telling: both sides issued separate readouts on the first day, and once the gaps in their respective accounts became apparent, neither attempted a shared statement communique summing up the two-day deliberations or the agreements, if any, reached.
Obviously, the Chinese mandarins had little desire to tell their own citizens, as well as the world at large, that they had been unable to prevail in bringing its guest around to accepting China’s core aspirations: recognition as a superpower, treatment as an equal along with the respect and protocol that follow such a hike in global status.
NO HURRY TO MAKE FULLER SENSE OF THE NEW JARGON
The phrase “strategic stability,” invoked frequently by President Xi, is an illustration of why the newly evolved Chinese objectives are not likely to materialize any time soon. Much patience on both sides is needed before the full import of the new terminology becomes clear.
Historically, the term had originated as a Cold War concept in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the US and Russia kept each other in check through the threat of mutually assured nuclear destruction. In the post-Cold War version, strategic stability is now meant to be constructive, not destructive. The Chinese side calls for cooperation as its mainstay while permitting competition within bounds. As an accompanying essential ingredient, the Chinese leadership also wants the US to see their country not as a junior partner, but as a peer competitor on par with it.
For China, which at the summit had openly raised questions about Washington’s commitment to Taiwan and not shied away from threatening a conflict, the notion of strategic stability includes the demand that the US move away from its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by its own Congress. The statute commits it to enabling the island to defend itself against attacks. Revisiting it and any further delay in approving the proposed $14 billion package of arms sales to Taiwan, is not likely to raise heckles of not merely Taiwan, but also Japan and South Korea. They too have been advanced similar US assurances, though not necessarily by explicit laws.
For these countries as well as several in South East Asia and Middle East, peace and stability have a different connotation. They would not appreciate the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China being conceded by the US, lest in near future they too get used as similar pawns in the China proposed global leadership of only two.
President Trump’s near-obsession with treating bigger business related pledges as a sign of peace and strategic stability is not a calculus that holds true for several countries around the globe. History is replete with instances where even worthwhile commercial relationships between nations proved transitory in nature or of limited value. Durable foreign relations demand more especially a cooperative conduct displayed over long stretches of time. Also, pacts signed unilaterally by authoritarian regime heads seldom last for long. They lack the domestic legitimacy that invariably comes from visible public benefit and the transparency that parliamentary endorsement provides.
A country’s record of honouring existing foreign commitments influences the readiness of others to enter into new pacts with such a partner. Unfortunately, the US under Trump in his second term has not acquitted itself creditably on this score. Not only has it exited bilateral deals with individual nations or regions, but also reneged on multilateral commitments. These spread across disarmament, climate change, free trade, health, and international aid.
Such proclivity, and the hesitation of President Trump to use UN bodies and other multilateral fora, could further lessen Chinese enthusiasm to sign up for new and significant pacts with it in haste.
Through a variety of not-so-well-conceived actions and comments in recent months, the US has left its long-term allies and partners questioning its reliability, whether in Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, or its own neighbourhood. Already, that has cost the US its global leadership, assiduously built ever since the end of the Second World War 80 years ago.
Moreover, several “middle power nations” such as Canada, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Indonesia, along with European nations like Germany and France, might not like being compelled to making a binary choice between the USA and China, especially if it could gradually or otherwise reduce them to the status of tributary powers. Instead many of them might prefer to become closer in a variety of relevant fields or even consider the creation of formal structures to effect concerted actions more meaningfully.
China, which in recent times has favoured a multipolar world, might find such powerful coalitions difficult to ignore. Such eventualities must weigh on China’s moves to sign up with only the US to hurriedly claim its share of global hegemony.
Ajay Dua, an ex-Union Secretary, Commerce & Industry, is a development economist by training.
