By selectively engaging in the counter-terrorism discourse — criticizing India’s actions in Kashmir while downplaying Pakistani shortcomings — China subtly reveals its strategic bias.
The 22 April 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir—one of India’s key tourist destinations—has once again heightened regional tensions and renewed concerns over the deepening security crisis in the region. India directly blamed the Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) proxy, The Resistance Front, for orchestrating the attack. Although the group initially claimed responsibility, it later denied involvement.
China’s response, though publicly restrained, is influenced by its complex strategic calculus—balancing concerns over terrorism in restive Xinjiang, protecting its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Pakistan, and maintaining its long-standing alignment with Islamabad to counterbalance India’s rise. China views terrorism in South Asia through a multi-layered lens, simultaneously wary of threats to its interests in Pakistan while tacitly shielding Pakistan-sponsored groups targeting India as part of its broader geopolitical strategy.
On 23 April, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that China “strongly condemns” (强烈谴责) the Pahalgam terrorist attack. However, just four days later, during a phone call with Pakistani Foreign Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar on 27 April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s unwavering support for its “ironclad, all-weather friend.” He pledged three key assurances: China supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and national security, backs its counter-terrorism efforts, and calls for a prompt and impartial investigation into the incident.
Unsurprisingly, on the same day, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif proposed including China and Russia in an international investigation into the attack. Yet, the persistent “cognitive bias” (认知偏差) between India and Pakistan regarding the nature and definition of terrorism continues to hinder China’s potential role as a mediator. This challenge was highlighted in a recent study by Zhang Chaozhe, Associate Research Fellow at the School of International Relations, Sichuan University, and Dai Yonghong, Chair Professor at the Institute for Regional Studies and International Communication, Shenzhen University.
This stance is largely rooted in Pakistan’s strategic importance within China’s foreign policy framework and Beijing’s long-standing alignment with Islamabad as a counterweight to India’s rise. Chinese scholars have previously acknowledged this alignment, and their current analyses of the Pahalgam terror attack remain consistent with this perspective. Scholars such as Zhao Hong and Shi Xuewei have argued that “India’s broader geopolitical ambitions have, to some extent, been constrained by its rivalry with Pakistan and China.”
A review of Chinese media coverage of key events—including the Kargil conflict (1999), the Mumbai terror attacks (2008), and the Pulwama (2019)—along with China’s repeated “technical holds” on UN Security Council resolutions to blacklist Pakistan-based terror groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, clearly indicates that China’s position is neither one of “strategic ambiguity” nor of “neutrality.” Rather, it reflects a consistent pattern of support for its strategic pivot, Pakistan.
Yuan Jirong, former senior journalist for People’s Daily in India, observes that “India quickly identified Pakistan as the mastermind behind the [Pahalgam terror] attack and responded with tough retaliatory measures, yet has not provided compelling public evidence to support its claim.” Notably, Chinese discourse continues to downplay or question widely recognized terrorist incidents involving Pakistan-based groups—such as the hijacking of IC 814 by Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the involvement of Pakistani national Ajmal Kasab and others in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Yuan refers to the Pahalgam incident as a “shooting incident” (枪击事件) rather than a terrorist attack, framing it as a blow to the perceived “image of peace” in Kashmir since the abrogation of Article 370. According to him, the constitutional change has “triggered local discontent and a resurgence of armed resistance.” This scepticism aligns with China’s consistent reluctance to endorse India’s narrative on cross-border terrorism. Instead, Beijing tends to interpret New Delhi’s framing of such incidents as a strategic move to legitimize its hard-line policies in Kashmir and to delay or avoid meaningful dialogue with Pakistan.
The study by Zhang and Dai cited above argue that since 2019, India has shifted from a policy of active engagement to one of “confrontation and indifference” in its dealings with Pakistan. While China continues to downplay Pakistan’s role in sponsoring cross-border terrorism against India, it remains fully aware of the escalating internal security challenges that Pakistan itself faces due to terrorism.
According to Li Wei, Director of the Counter-Terrorism Research Centre at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Pakistan experienced a sharp escalation in terrorist activity between 2021 and 2024. The number of attacks rose from 207 to 521, while the death toll climbed from 335 to 852. Over 90% of these incidents were concentrated in two provinces—Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. High-value targets, including Chinese nationals and strategic infrastructure projects, came under increasing threat, with at least 10 Chinese citizens killed during this period. The majority of these attacks were carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), asserts Li. Interestingly, Li acknowledged the fact that there are “religious extremist organizations against India” in Pakistan.
Against this backdrop, China has called on Islamabad to strengthen security cooperation and has taken a more active role in Pakistan’s internal counterterrorism efforts, including intelligence sharing and the protection of critical infrastructure. However, despite its growing concerns, China does not share India’s perception of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Instead, Chinese scholars often cite claims such as Sarfraz Bungulzai’s 2023 revelations regarding alleged Indian financing of insurgents in Balochistan, using such narratives to challenge India’s global image as a victim of terrorism and instead portray it as a destabilizing force in the region.
China’s reluctance to condemn Pakistan-based terror groups targeting India must be understood within the context of its broader regional strategy. Beijing sees Pakistan as a pivotal strategic counterbalance to India in South Asia—a role that has gained increased significance as India expands its global footprint. This includes New Delhi’s active participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), deepening strategic ties with the United States, accelerated military and infrastructure development along the China-India border, and efforts to reshape global supply chains to reduce dependency on China.
The Kashmir issue holds particular strategic importance for China due to its geographic overlap with Chinese interests in Ladakh. Chinese scholars Zhang and Dai have described this region in metaphoric terms: Ladakh as the “throat” connecting South Asia, Central Asia, and East Asia; the north-western part of Kashmir bordering Xinjiang as the “neck” of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); and the remainder of Kashmir as we know has been spelled by Pakistan as its “jugular vein.”
This strategic framework highlights the region’s vital importance to both Chinese and Pakistani interests. By fostering robust military, economic, and diplomatic ties with Pakistan, China aims to limit India’s regional influence and, as noted by Chinese analysts, prevent India from “dominating South Asia.” Not surprisingly, between 1993 and 2018, Pakistan’s military expenditure as a percentage of total government spending ranged from a low of 15.84% to a high of 27.4%, with an average of 21.12%. According to a study by Hu Penggang of Kunming City University and Lu Lingyu of Yunnan University, this expenditure accounted for 81% of Pakistan’s total defence imports, as reported by SIPRI. Therefore, in an event of conflict, it would be Chinese weapon system versus the Indian and Western platforms.
Zhang and Dai also argue that “Pakistan hopes China will become more deeply involved in the India-Pakistan dispute.” Yuan, meanwhile, suggests that India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty sends “dangerous geopolitical signals” (危险地缘信号), highlighting India’s efforts to control South Asia’s water resources. According to Yuan, this move could compel Pakistan to accelerate its collaboration with China on dam construction in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). China and Pakistan are already working together on major dam projects, including the Diamer-Basha Dam, the Dassu Dam, and the Mong Hydropower Project. In light of India’s recent actions, these projects may receive increased attention and urgency.
Yuan argues that India’s recent actions have set a troubling precedent that could heighten tensions in countries like Bangladesh and Nepal, which already face water resource challenges with India. This, he warns, may destabilize the region. He further emphasizes that China must closely monitor India’s “water diplomacy,” as India has long accused China of restricting water flow in the Yarlung Zangbo River (Brahmaputra River). Moreover, India’s recent “pre-emptive water restrictions” against Pakistan offer crucial insights into India’s approach to managing water resources. These developments, Yuan suggests, require careful analysis by China, particularly given its position upstream.
China’s response to the Pahalgam attack should not be seen through the lens of simple condemnation or support, but rather as a complex web of strategic interests—geopolitical manoeuvring, infrastructural security, and regional influence. Though publicly neutral, China’s realpolitik clearly favours Pakistan as a counterweight to India’s rise. By selectively engaging in the counter-terrorism discourse—criticizing India’s actions in Kashmir while downplaying Pakistani shortcomings—China subtly reveals its strategic bias, wrapped in diplomatic ambiguity. In the long run, this approach maintains the regional stalemate and hampers any genuine progress toward peace in South Asia.