Defining victory: The power of narratives

The ongoing RussiaUkraine conflict, the recent India-Pakistan flare-up, and the Israel-Iran war have created different narratives about their outcomes. When all sides claim victory, perceptions significantly influence the outcome. Much of the focus is on the losses inflicted on the enemy and the damage caused by enemy actions, to judge the war’s results. Such analysis often overlooks the primary objectives of the war, which may vary among different participants.

The Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022 and remains ongoing, has had different objectives for the two sides. For Russia, it was to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. An additional aim was to secure a land corridor to Crimea by annexing the Donbas region. For Ukraine, it was about resisting Russian aggression. The conflict appears to be deadlocked, with both sides suffering significant losses in personnel and matériel. Russia has, however, gained control of most of the Donbas region, capturing the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, thus establishing a land link to Crimea.

Since Ukraine is unlikely to be admitted to NATO, Russia can claim victory if the war ends today and the current situation remains. Ukraine, on the other hand, can also claim victory, having resisted aggression and, despite losing territory, maintaining a sense of nationhood and unity. The power of narratives will probably influence individual perceptions of who the victor is. The Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza is highly complex. After the heinous attack on 7 October 2023, in which Hamas terrorists killed over a thousand civilians and took many hostages, including women and children, Israel destroyed most of Gaza. Israel’s war aims were to deter further assaults and disarm Hamas.

While the Israeli Defence Forces have achieved significant success, these goals have only been partially realised. Hamas remains largely intact and difficult to disarm. To maintain control of Gaza, Israel will need substantial resources, which it would struggle to sustain without a truce over an extended period. Hamas, meanwhile, aims to destroy the state of Israel, although this objective is unlikely to be achieved. There are no victors here, although both sides might claim a form of victory. The 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, which started on 13 June with Israeli strikes on key Iranian military and nuclear sites amid the Gaza war, concluded on 24 June when a ceasefire was announced between the two sides. Israeli military objectives centred on destroying Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. They received assistance from the US on 22 June, when the United States Air Force and Navy, in Operation “Midnight Hammer,” targeted three Iranian nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

Iran acknowledged the attacks but stated that their facilities remained intact. The US and Israel claimed that substantial damage had been inflicted on Iran’s nuclear installations. However, Iran, while admitting that their sites had been hit, asserted that the damage was not extensive. Iran’s retaliation against Israel included missile strikes on military and other targets. Iran claimed that 90% of its missiles successfully struck their targets and that significant damage was caused, including the destruction of Israeli fighter aircraft and damage to the Nevatim air base. These claims have been challenged by Israel, which argued that its air defence system intercepted most Iranian missiles. Both Iran and Israel require compelling narratives to portray themselves as victorious.

These narratives influence how other nations view them. Internally, for their publics, Israel can claim victory in averting an existential threat by degrading Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities. The Iranians can claim victory in the damage they caused to Israel, which is likely to discourage further attacks on Iran. The brief four-day conflict between India and Pakistan from 6-10 June 2025 again had limited aims. For India, it was to deter Pakistan from using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy. India launched Operation Sindoor on the night of 6-7 June 2025 in response to the horrific terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 people were killed. It provided the Indian establishment with the rationale to establish a new doctrine for dealing with cross-border terrorism, employing both kinetic and non-kinetic methods.

Suspending the Indus Waters Treaty was part of the non-kinetic response, which will have long-term consequences for Pakistan. India also declared that it would no longer be subject to nuclear blackmail. Crucially, as part of the new doctrine, India stated that moving forward, it would not differentiate between terrorists and those who support them, implying that in future, supporters would also face Indian reprisal attacks. The brief conflict garnered widespread global media coverage. Ideological beliefs and the persuasive strength of narratives influenced opinions on the outcome. India dismissed Pakistani claims of downing some Indian fighter jets, but understandably, this narrative gained broad acceptance in Pakistan, China, and some Islamic countries aligned ideologically with Pakistan.

President Trump’s claims of mediating a ceasefire between the two countries provided Pakistan a face-saver for asking for a halt to hostilities, as their Chinese-supplied air defence systems had been significantly compromised, airfields made unserviceable, and several fighter aircraft destroyed. As part of the Indian narrative on Operation Sindoor, two issues are a cause for concern. The first is the stance of the opposition, which sought to hold the government accountable for India’s perceived losses of fighter aircraft, based on Pakistani claims. The Indian government has provided no official comment. However, Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, in response to a question during a combined defence briefing, regarding whether India had lost any platforms, including Rafales, during Operation Sindoor, stated: «We are in a combat scenario and losses are a part of it.» He further mentioned that all our pilots are safely back home and that the objective of destroying the terrorist camps had been fully achieved. Despite this statement, some opposition leaders continued to rake up the issue.

No country speaks of losses suffered during combat, and raising such issues reflects great immaturity and a lack of understanding on the part of these opposition leaders. Such queries inevitably play into the enemy’s hands. The second issue concerned India’s decision to accept a ceasefire, when the Pakistani DGMO pleaded with India’s DGMO for the same. Many analysts believe that India should not have accepted the ceasefire, as India held a decisive military advantage. However, this view overlooks the objective of Operation Sindoor, which was to target terrorist bases and respond decisively to any retaliation by the Pakistani military. Escalation was carefully managed within India’s response strategy, as it was not in India’s interest to escalate the conflict into a fullscale war.

However, there is significant potential for India to improve the management of narratives during conflicts. While military victories depend on hard power, shaping perceptions among domestic audiences and friendly, neutral, and hostile nations is also vital. This is also a key element of the modern battlefield and must be considered in any future conflict in which the nation engages. * Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch is an Army veteran. He is currently the Director, India Foundation.