Operation Desert Storm in 1991 saw the US and its coalition allies launch massive land, air, and sea power. The “shock and awe” marked a change from the US grinding and unsuccessful war in Vietnam. The speedy victory even led to talk of a new era of warfare—a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. In theory, the adversary would be defeated through speed and manoeuvre, with realtime intelligence provided by smart sensors guiding immediate attacks using precision weapons.
However, the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed came to be labelled “forever wars” and saw the same coalition being bogged down. The military campaign in Afghanistan was the longest in US history, and in the end, despite being pushed out at the start of the US invasion, the Taliban eventually returned in 2021.
Russia too has felt the pain of a protracted conflict. Ukraine was supposed to fall in a matter of days, but over four years later the conflict persists, dominated by grinding, attritional fighting rather than bold offensives as witnessed on the same terrain in World War II.
Similarly, when Israel launched its invasion of Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’s 07 October 2023 assault, then US President Joe Biden urged that the Israeli operation should be “swift, decisive, and overwhelming.” Instead, it has continued for years, expanding to other fronts in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Though a fragile cease-fire was reached in January 2025, Gaza has been flattened and humanitarian losses have been immense.
The initiation of the Iran war was probably shaped by thinking regarding the advantages of short wars, in which major outcomes were to be decided in the first days of combat. In this case, the first strike aimed at the elimination of Ayatollah Khamenei was supposed to pave the way for the collapse of the regime. But instead it galvanized the Iranians.
By now, it is obvious that the war is of a qualitatively different nature than most other US wars; the tone of the narrative is no longer optimistic and pain is being felt across the globe.
In the summer of 1914, European military leaders were confident that the war could be “over by Christmas”; instead, the fighting—characterised by devastating trench warfare along almost static frontlines—lasted until November 1918.
In 1940, Germany overran much of Western Europe in a matter of weeks by means of blitzkrieg, bringing together armour and airpower. But it failed to bring victory and, after initial rapid advances against the Soviet Union in 1941, it was drawn into a brutal war that ended only in 1945 with Germany’s defeat.
In both world wars, the key to victory lay in stamina and the ability to sustain conflict. The Korean War lasted over three years, and US troops remained in Vietnam for over a decade. This is not to say that modern armed conflicts never end in quick victories. In June 1967, it took Israel less than a week to decisively defeat a coalition of Arab states in the Six-Day War. The 1971 War that resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh took just 13 days. Operation Sindoor took 88 hours.
For a country initiating conflict, the advantages of short wars point towards immediate success at a bearable cost. By contrast, even admitting the possibility of a protracted war may appear to betray doubts about military capability.
The idea of short, swift wars producing decisive victories may be embedded in military thinking. But time and again, forces undertaking them have shown how difficult it is to bring war to an early conclusion.
There is a tendency, as seen in Iran, for countries with overwhelming power to assume that military superiority will quickly overwhelm opponents. This overconfidence leads to misjudgement of the enemy’s political and military resilience.
A major problem is that immediate battlefield success is often prioritized over longterm outcomes such as political stability and governance, as witnessed in Iraq.
The US has historically underestimated nationalism as a motivating force, assuming that technological superiority would suffice. This miscalculation contributed to prolonged conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The strategy for short war emphasizes speed, surprise, and overwhelming force. Artificial intelligence (AI) is intended to compress decision cycles, enabling rapid identification and execution of battlefield options.
Short wars rely on existing resources; long wars require sustained adaptation. The Ukraine conflict illustrates continuous innovation, particularly in drone warfare.
Short wars may cause limited economic disruption; long wars require sustained public support, economic resilience, and logistical depth. Gaza illustrates this challenge. Despite prolonged operations, Israel has not achieved its stated objective of eliminating Hamas.
Even great powers risk failure if they are unprepared for prolonged conflict.
In Iran, recent events show an adversary capable of absorbing and responding to military pressure. Reports indicate strikes on US bases, energy infrastructure, and advanced systems, highlighting vulnerabilities in modern warfare. Militarily, Iran has survived and responded; economically, it has contributed to energy disruptions, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global oil flows.
The key question is how realistic it is to plan for wars without a clear end state. Sustaining prolonged conflict requires immense resources and political will. Preparing for long wars does not mean indefinite conflict but developing realistic doctrines of victory. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence prevented escalation into prolonged war.
For any country, prolonged conflict carries significant economic and political costs. Military objectives must be realistic and aligned with available resources. The allure of quick victory often proves misleading.
In the current Iran war, there appears to be a misalignment in planning, with assumptions of a short war proving flawed. Initial battle plans rarely unfold as expected. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder famously observed: “No plan survives contact with the enemy.”
- Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM, retired from the Indian Army.
