Contemporary Chinese digital discourse increasingly constructs India as China’s civilizational opposite: poor versus prosperous, chaotic versus orderly, unhygienic versus clean, irrational versus modern.
The rapid expansion of people-to-people exchanges between China and India since the normalization of bilateral ties after the 2020 border crisis has generated an unexpected phenomenon in China’s digital public sphere: the emergence of a strong current of anti-Indian sentiment, popularly described by Chinese commentators as “恐印” (fear of India) or “Indo-phobia.” While anti-Indian stereotypes have existed in Chinese popular discourse for decades, the dramatic increase in visas issued to Indian citizens after 2023 and the restoration of direct flights have transformed these prejudices into an intense online campaign portraying India as a source of immigration, social disorder, and cultural incompatibility. This discourse illustrates how digital nationalism, racial stereotyping, and geopolitical rivalry reinforce one another in contemporary China.
The immediate trigger was the Chinese embassy in India’s announcement in June 2026 celebrating the issuance of the year’s 100,000th visa to an Indian applicant. Rather than being welcomed as evidence of improving bilateral relations, the announcement generated widespread criticism on Chinese social media. Netizens questioned whether visa screening had become lax, whether visa fees had been waived, and why visa application processing had been outsourced to VFS Global, mistakenly assuming that visa approval itself had been delegated to an Indian company. Although the embassy clarified that only administrative processing had been outsourced while visa decisions remained entirely with Chinese consular officers, public anxiety continued unabated.
The controversy reflected broader concerns arising from the sharp increase in Indian travel to China. According to figures widely circulated in Chinese media, visas issued to Indian citizens increased from approximately 180,000 in 2023 to 280,000 in 2024 and exceeded 400,000 in 2025. More than 80% of Chinese visas issued to Indian nationals were business visas, while tourist visas constituted only a relatively small proportion, argues The Paper. Simultaneously, bilateral trade reached a historic high of approximately US$155 billion, making China India’s largest trading partner. These statistics, however, failed to reassure large sections of Chinese public opinion, which increasingly interpreted greater mobility through the lens of immigration anxiety rather than economic cooperation.
Chinese social media platforms rapidly became saturated with sensational stories alleging widespread “uncivilized behaviour” among Indians in China. Huanqiu Travel Daily, cited “old incidents”, including Holi celebrations organized by Indian restaurants, reports of an Indian national allegedly defecating in public in Guangzhou, accusations of sexual harassment involving Indian students, and videos showing littering or inappropriate public behaviour, were repeatedly recycled and amplified. In many instances, isolated events were generalized into sweeping conclusions regarding the alleged “national character” of Indians. Such discourse frequently extended beyond criticism of individual behaviour to explicit racial and cultural stereotyping, invoking India’s caste system, sanitation challenges, and gender inequalities as evidence of an inherently “backward” civilization.
This pattern closely resembles what Edward Said described in his Orientalism (1978) as “othering,” whereby societies construct an inferior “Other” in order to reinforce their own sense of superiority. Although Said developed Orientalism primarily to analyse Western representations of Asia, the conceptual framework is equally useful for understanding intra-Asian hierarchies. Contemporary Chinese digital discourse increasingly constructs India as China’s civilizational opposite: poor versus prosperous, chaotic versus orderly, unhygienic versus clean, irrational versus modern. Such representations strengthen domestic confidence in China’s developmental achievements while simultaneously reinforcing nationalist identity.
Importantly, these narratives are not universally accepted within China. Several influential scholars and media personalities have attempted to introduce greater nuance into the discussion. Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, candidly acknowledged that “most Chinese people do not have a particularly favourable view of India.” Nevertheless, he argued that China should “maintain a balanced and objective understanding of India, avoid allowing society as a whole to develop intense hostility or rejection toward Indians, and support the development of positive and healthy China-India relations.” Hu further emphasized that India is a rising major power whose continued economic growth makes stable bilateral relations an important strategic necessity.
Similarly, Jin Canrong, Professor of International Relations at Renmin University, recognized that concerns regarding Indian “immigration” were being amplified by deteriorating Sino-Indian relations following the border confrontation. While controversially attributing some negative perceptions to India’s domestic social problems, including sanitation and caste, Jin nevertheless criticized the Chinese Embassy in India’s communication strategy. According to him, official responses should be based on transparent disclosure of visa statistics, immigration data, and law enforcement measures rather than defensive media commentary. His intervention illustrates an important distinction between acknowledging public concerns and encouraging xenophobic mobilization.
The debate also exposes the tension between China’s geopolitical objectives and rising popular nationalism. From Beijing’s perspective, facilitating greater interaction with India serves multiple strategic purposes. Expanded business travel supports rapidly growing bilateral trade, while increasing the number of Indian students studying in China potentially strengthens China’s long-term influence among future Indian elites. Some Chinese commentators explicitly compare this strategy with the United States’ Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Programme, arguing that educational exchanges can cultivate future intellectual and commercial influence. Ironically, however, this very strategy has generated domestic anxieties regarding immigration, employment, and cultural integration.
Several online commentaries have further intensified these fears through highly questionable causal arguments. For example, one article in Huanqiu Travel Daily attributed the increase in Indian tourism primarily to India’s heat waves and low air-conditioner ownership, arguing that Indians were travelling to China in search of air-conditioned hotels. The article claimed that Chinese guests avoided hotels frequented by Indians because of hygiene concerns and asserted that Indian visitors commonly engaged in behaviour such as bathing in scenic pools, littering, eating curry with their hands on public transport, and scattering gulal during festivals. While presented as factual analysis, many of these claims relied on anecdotal evidence, selective reporting, and cultural stereotypes rather than systematic empirical research.
The mechanisms underlying such discourse closely resemble earlier anti-Chinese narratives in the United States. During both the late 19th century and the post-1980 era, Chinese immigrants and students were portrayed as economic threats, carriers of undesirable cultural practices, and agents of foreign influence. The “Yellow Peril” discourse similarly generalized isolated incidents into collective racial characteristics. Ironically, several Chinese commentators themselves have noted this historical parallel, warning that China risks reproducing the very forms of racial prejudice once directed against Chinese communities abroad.
The current wave of anti-Indian sentiment must therefore be understood within the broader context of mutual distrust between the two Asian powers. The unresolved boundary dispute, intensified geopolitical competition, growing nationalism, and limited societal interaction have created fertile conditions for stereotypes to flourish. Digital platforms, driven by algorithms that reward emotionally charged content, further amplify sensational narratives while marginalizing moderate voices.
This does not imply that instances of inappropriate behaviour by individual Indian visitors should be ignored. Any visitor to China or indeed to any country, is expected to respect local laws, customs, and public norms. Incidents involving littering, public nuisance, or criminal behaviour deserve legal sanction irrespective of nationality. However, the transformation of isolated cases into blanket judgments about an entire people represents a classic manifestation of xenophobia rather than legitimate public concern.
Ultimately, the phenomenon reveals less about India than about the dynamics of digital nationalism in contemporary China. The construction of India as an inferior “Other” serves important psychological and political functions by reinforcing domestic identity and developmental confidence. Yet it also risks undermining the very strategic objectives that Chinese policymakers seek to advance through greater economic and educational engagement. As Asia’s two largest civilizations and emerging global powers, India and China will remain indispensable neighbours whose relationship will profoundly shape the future Asian and global order. Overcoming mutual stereotypes, therefore, is not merely a matter of social civility but a strategic imperative for regional stability.
* B.R. Deepak is Professor, Centre for Chinese Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
