The fundamental tactic of global jihad has shifted from terror through mass violence to institutional capture and subversion from within.
NEW DELHI: For many in the West, and the East, the image of Islamist threat remains seared by the horrific spectacles of 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings, the 26/11 mass killings in Mumbai, the Bataclan massacre, or the chillingly frequent car rammings and lone-wolf knife attacks that punctuated the last two decades.
These acts, largely perpetrated by individuals inspired or directed by Salafi-jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, aimed to terrorise, provoke overreaction, and cleave societies along religious lines. Yet, as Western counterterrorism efforts have become more sophisticated and the caliphal ambitions of ISIS have crumbled in the Levant, a more subtle, arguably more patient, and potentially more transformative set of strategies appears to be gaining prominence among various Islamist actors, including those aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.
This evolution marks a shift from a primary reliance on kinetic attacks to a multipronged approach emphasising demographic growth and the systematic engagement, and some would argue infiltration, of Western democratic institutions. This is not to declare an end to violent jihadism; the threat of sporadic attacks by radicalised individuals remains, and global jihadi hotspots continue to inspire. However, the grand, centrally-planned spectaculars have become rarer in the West.
Instead, we are observing a strategic pivot, a realisation among certain Islamist ideologues that the “long war” might be more effectively waged through demographic presence and the methodical leveraging of the West’s own open systems. The evolution of Islamist movements over recent decades reveals a strategic pivot from overt violence to subtler forms of influence in Western societies.
While jihadist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda once dominated headlines with bombings and lone-wolf attacks in European cities, organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood have increasingly pursued institutional power through demographic shifts, political participation, and ideological permeation. This shift reflects both the success of counterterrorism measures and a calculated long-game approach to reshaping Western societies from within.
The Salafi-jihadist strategy, epitomised by Al-Qaeda and later ISIS, was predicated on several assumptions. Firstly, that spectacular violence would intimidate Western populations and force their governments to withdraw from Muslim lands. Secondly, that such attacks would expose the perceived hypocrisy and fragility of Western societies, thereby attracting recruits to a global jihad. Thirdly, that these actions would spark a global conflagration between Islam and the “Crusader-Zionist alliance,” ultimately leading to the re-establishment of a global Caliphate.
While these groups achieved tactical successes in sowing fear and causing immense human suffering, their strategic aims largely failed. Western nations, despite initial shock, did not fundamentally alter their foreign policies in the desired direction. Instead, counter-terrorism apparatuses were massively expanded, international cooperation was enhanced, and direct military pressure degraded these groups’ core operational capabilities.
Furthermore, the brutality of groups like ISIS alienated vast swathes of the global Muslim population, undermining their claims to represent authentic Islam. The “far enemy” strategy proved costly and, in many respects, counterproductive to the overarching Islamist project of societal transformation. It is crucial to differentiate the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from Salafi-jihadist groups, though their ultimate eschatological visions of an Islamic state may share commonalities.
Founded by Hassan alBanna in Egypt in 1928, the Brotherhood traditionally espoused a gradualist approach—tarbiyah (education/nurturing) and da’wah (proselytization)—aimed at Islamising society from the grassroots up. While the MB has had factions that engaged in violence at various points in its history, its mainstream methodology, particularly in the West, has focused on building social institutions, community networks, and engaging in political activism where permissible.
Sayyid Qutb, a highly influential Brotherhood ideologue, provided a radical intellectual framework that influenced both the Brotherhood and later, more extreme jihadist movements. His concept of jahiliyyah (a state of pre-Islamic ignorance) applied to modern societies, including Muslim ones deemed insufficiently Islamic, implicitly called for a revolutionary vanguard. While jihadists interpreted this as a call to immediate, violent action, many within the Brotherhood sphere saw it as a mandate for long-term societal transformation, creating a robust Islamic counter-culture within existing states, with political participation as a key tool.
The period between 1979 and 2024 saw 66,872 Islamist attacks worldwide, with Europe experiencing 209 incidents and 802 deaths. France alone endured 85 attacks claiming 334 lives. Yet since 2020, overt terrorism in Western cities has declined markedly—not due to ideological moderation, but strategic adaptation. The Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution exemplifies this shift. Early Brotherhood rhetoric under Hassan al-Banna (1928–1949) glorified armed struggle against colonial powers. While the group officially renounced violence in the 1970s, its offshoots— including Hamas—continued attacks, with Brotherhood-linked European groups fundraising for militant campaigns. The 2023 Hamas-led October 7 massacres (1,195 killed) demonstrated enduring ideological ties to violence. But a much wider trend of aiming for institutional transformation and capture is more powerfully underway. Post-9/11 counterterrorism pressures forced a tactical recalibration. The Brotherhood’s European affiliates adopted a dual strategy.
Establishing groups like the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (renamed Council of European Muslims in 2020) to project moderation. Building parallel societies through mosques, schools, and cultural centres. In Austria, Brotherhood-linked groups are said to control around 60 per cent of Islamic institutions while promoting narratives of Muslim victimhood. Fielding candidates under moderate banners while maintaining ties to hardline ideologies.
The Brotherhood’s 2012 electoral victory in Egypt, though short-lived, proved the viability of ballot-box Islamism. For decades, MB-affiliated organisations in the West have focused on establishing mosques, Islamic schools, charitable organisations, and student groups. Their aim has been to cater to the religious and social needs of Muslim communities, foster a strong Islamic identity, and advocate for Muslim interests within the broader political system.
This approach was often viewed as distinct from, and sometimes even in tension with, the overt violence of jihadists. The perceived shift we are witnessing today is not necessarily a wholesale abandonment of one set of actors for another, but rather an evolution and, in some ways, a convergence of strategic thinking, influenced by the perceived failures of violent jihad in the West and the slow, steady work of groups pursuing a more gradualist path. Several factors contribute to this. Western Europe, in particular, has experienced significant demographic shifts over the past half-century due to postcolonial migration, asylum seekers, and differing birth rates.
While “demographic change” itself is a neutral phenomenon, it is viewed by some Islamist thinkers as a strategic opportunity. Larger, more concentrated Muslim communities, often situated in urban centres, can provide a fertile ground for religious and political mobilisation. The argument, sometimes explicitly stated by figures like the late Youssef al-Qaradawi (a spiritual leader for many aligned with the MB), is that Islam’s eventual “conquest” of Europe could be achieved through da’wah and demographics, making violent confrontation unnecessary or even counterproductive in this context. This isn’t necessarily a centrally coordinated “tactic” in the way a bombing is planned, but rather an observed reality that Islamist groups aim to harness by ensuring these growing communities adhere to their particular interpretation of Islam and its socio-political implications. Western liberal democracies, with their emphasis on freedom of speech, religion, and association, offer avenues for influence that are absent in many autocratic Muslim-majority nations.
The strategy here involves forming or supporting political parties, or encouraging members to join mainstream parties to influence policy from within. We see this in local council elections in various European cities (consider the emergence of the “Muslim vote” pressure group in the UK, for instance, and debates on introducing sharia law through the backdoor), and even attempts to gain representation at national parliamentary levels. The focus is often on issues like religious accommodation, challenging counter-terrorism legislation perceived as discriminatory, and advocating for foreign policies aligned with certain Islamist viewpoints.
Establishing influential NGOs, think tanks, and advocacy groups that can shape public discourse, lobby policymakers, and secure public funding. These organisations often present themselves as representatives of the broader Muslim community, even if their ideological underpinnings are rooted in specific Islamist thought. Control over educational content and the shaping of identity are seen as critical for longterm influence. Engaging in interfaith initiatives can serve to normalise Islamist perspectives, build alliances (sometimes tactically), and counter accusations of extremism by presenting a moderate facade. India often faces the brunt of this with Islamist and Khalistani groups coordinating attacks on the country. Using Western legal systems to challenge laws or policies deemed “Islamophobic” or restrictive of religious practice, and to silence critics through defamation lawsuits or accusations of hate speech.
In Germany, for instance, the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG), a Brotherhood affiliate, controls 300 mosques and 70 per cent of Islamic religious instruction in public schools. Through its political wing, the Alliance of German Democrats (ADDE), it secured four state legislature seats in 2023 elections. ADDE representatives routinely block counterextremism measures while pushing for sharia-compliant finance laws. The underlying strategic logic from an Islamist perspective is one of incrementalism—slowly shifting the cultural and political landscape to be more amenable to Islamist norms and governance, achieving through patient societal work what bombs failed to deliver. For those Islamist actors who always preferred a non-violent, gradualist path (like many traditional MB affiliates), the failures of violent jihadism simply reaffirm their chosen methodology. For those who might have been sympathetic to or involved in violent action, the “successes” of counter-terrorism and the evident public backlash may have prompted a strategic recalculation: perhaps the Western system is more effectively challenged from within its own structures.
This evolving strategic landscape poses complex challenges for Western democracies. How to, for instance, distinguish legitimate representation from subversion? Muslim citizens have every right to participate in the political process and advocate for their interests. The challenge lies in distinguishing between legitimate democratic engagement and efforts by organised Islamist movements to incrementally impose ideologies that may be incompatible with liberal democratic norms (e.g., regarding freedom of speech, gender equality, religious freedom for others). Unlike a bombing, demographic shifts and gradual institutional influence are harder to identify as direct threats and more difficult to counter without infringing on fundamental freedoms.
The tactics of some Islamist actors are indeed evolving. The dream of a society governed by their interpretation of Islamic law has not faded, but the preferred methods for achieving it in the West appear to be shifting from the immediate shock of violence to the long game of demographic weight and institutional influence. Recognizing this shift is not alarmism; it is a prerequisite for developing informed, nuanced, and effective strategies to safeguard the pluralistic, democratic, and secular fabric of Western societies while respecting the rights and freedoms of all their citizens. The challenge is complex, demanding vigilance, wisdom, and an unwavering commitment to democratic foundational principles.
Hindol Sengupta is professor of international relations at the O. P. Jindal Global University