India must tread carefully. Coercion alone is unlikely to produce enduring influence. Bangladesh is vital to India’s own developmental and security goals.
Bangladesh has been in news for being gripped by a political and governance crisis. The interim administration led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus is facing headwinds on multiple fronts: internal civil unrest, institutional rifts with the military, a spiralling energy crisis, and increasingly hostile rhetoric towards India. For New Delhi, these developments in the neighbourhood spell strategic trouble, especially in the wake of Operation Sindoor.
Yunus had emerged as a consensus figure following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government and initially inspired cautious optimism. But that optimism has since eroded. His proposal for a “humanitarian corridor” for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to Myanmar’s Rakhine State—a plan derided by critics as the “bloody corridor”—has deepened tensions with the Bangladesh Army. Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman has publicly raised concerns about national security and sovereignty. The appointment of Khalilur Rahman as National Security Advisor without military consultation has only widened the civil-military gulf.
Domestically, the interim government faces mounting protests from civil servants, teachers, and political parties. The government’s recent ordinances allowing summary dismissal of public employees have stirred widespread resentment. The economic situation is no better.
Industrialists warn of an impending famine-like scenario. Power shortages have triggered massive protests in key industrial zones like Savar, Ashulia, and Gazipur in the last one year. Over a hundred garment factories were shut down last September due to unrest—many of which remain non-operational despite security interventions.
Yunus, meanwhile, has accused India of orchestrating a conspiracy to destabilize Bangladesh—an allegation devoid of evidence but deeply damaging to bilateral ties. His regime has embraced a foreign policy tilt towards China and Pakistan, rekindling fears in New Delhi of a strategic squeeze in the eastern flank.
For India, the stakes are particularly high. The Siliguri Corridor—or “Chicken’s Neck”—a narrow 22-kilometre-wide strip of land connecting mainland India to its northeast, lies precariously close to Bangladesh. Any disruption here could sever India’s access to eight northeastern states. China’s growing infrastructure footprint in the region, including plans to develop the Lalmonirhat airport in northern Bangladesh, exacerbates this vulnerability.
Earlier this year, Yunus’ cryptic comments in Beijing alluding to India’s “fragile geography” sparked concerns about Dhaka’s geopolitical intentions. India’s sensitivity to such rhetoric is understandable. The 2017 Doklam standoff already underscored the vulnerability of the corridor. With only a single railway line serving as a vital military and commercial artery, any hint of obstruction—whether diplomatic or physical—is cause for alarm.
New Delhi has not taken these developments lightly. During the Rising North East Investor Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted Northeast’s role as India’s “gateway to ASEAN.” Backing this vision, Indian conglomerates like Adani, Reliance, and Vedanta have pledged over $25 billion in new investments across Assam and the Northeast.
Meanwhile, India has rolled back the transshipment facilities it once extended to Bangladesh. This has severely impacted Dhaka’s ready-made garment (RMG) sector, which exported over 35,000 tonnes of garments to 36 countries last year, many routed via India. These economic measures are signs of a rapidly fraying bilateral relationship. Yunus’ administration has also deepened ties with Pakistan—resuming flights, easing visa restrictions, and initiating low-level military cooperation. This trilateral drift towards a China-Pakistan axis poses a challenge to India’s strategic depth in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal.
Yet, India must tread carefully. Coercion alone is unlikely to produce enduring influence. Bangladesh is vital to India’s own developmental and security goals. A stable, cooperative Dhaka helps check China’s maritime ambitions in the Bay of Bengal, secures India’s Northeast, and bolsters New Delhi’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific outreach. New Delhi should therefore institutionalize dialogue with a wide range of Bangladeshi political actors—not just ruling elites. Regular exchanges between parliamentarians, military officials, and civil servants can create a buffer against political volatility. India should continue to invest in areas such as energy, food security, and infrastructure, along with enhancing joint border patrols, anti-drug operations, and intelligence sharing. India should also foster state-level engagements. Given the importance of Indian states like West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura in cross-border relations, New Delhi should establish a formal mechanism to include state governments in its Bangladesh policy formulation.
South Asia continues to remain the world’s least integrated region. The intra-regional trade languishes at 5%. The fraying of India-Bangladesh ties, and instability in Bangladesh, particularly of a religious or militant nature, will impact the entire region. India can help Dhaka by engagement not by being reactive or partisan. A rules-based, strategic, and empathetic relationship—anchored in mutual respect—is the only viable path forward. The time to reset and renew this vital partnership is now.
* Dr Shreya Upadhyay is Assistant Professor, Christ University, Bangalore.