President Donald Trump’s war against Iran did not achieve his stated goals. When he announced his ceasefire, Iran’s nuclear material remained unaccounted for, the country’s ballistic missile arsenal remained potent, raining destruction on at least ten different countries, and the regime remained firmly entrenched.
Perhaps Trump’s chief achievement was demonstrating just how fragile global energy trade has become.
Approximately 20-25% of the world’s maritime oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily. The majority of its oil flows eastward towards India and China. While the market is fungible, supply is not. U.S. domestic production and now Venezuelan oil inure the United States to supply shortfalls.
India is not so lucky. Indians are furious because a decision made at the White House 12,000 kilometres away from Prime Minister Narendra Modi had profound negative effect on India. Almost overnight, India’s energy profile transformed from perceived security to scarcity.
That Iran continues to demand payment for passage through the Strait of Hormuz should not surprise. For more than a year, the Houthis in Yemen have operated an invisible toll between Socotra and the Bab El-Mandeb. Any ship that passes it without first paying for protection risks attack should they proceed into the Red Sea. For this reason, Greek, Cypriot, and Indian ships pay nearly four times the usual insurance rate of 0.3% the value of cargo; Chinese and Russian ships do not. There has not been such a threat to freedom of navigation since German U-boats preyed upon civilian shipping during World War II.
Blaming Trump for accelerating Iranian extortion may be politically satisfying, but it neither recognizes the perpetrator nor offers a solution. For India, that solution lies in Africa.
In 2021, insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State overran northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where TotalEnergies held a $20 billion gas concession. The French company declared force majeure on its contract but resumed operations earlier this year after Rwandan forces helped secure the province. The British multinational Shell is exploring two fields offshore Tanzania. Kenya and even Somalia also possess tens of billions of barrels per oil. Somaliland, a former British protectorate that is Western oriented and democratic, but which India ignores, also likely sits on or astride significant oil and gas resources. Rwanda, meanwhile, is tapping into vast methane reserves under Lake Kivu along its border with the Democratic Republic of Congo.
India is late to the game. ONGC Videsh, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL), and Oil India Ltd now invest in natural gas projects in Mozambique, while other companies work in power transmission in Kenya or contribute to infrastructure in Tanzania. Still, neglecting east Africa as a solution for India’s energy needs reflects a decades-long short-sightedness if not negligence that spans administrations. Persian Gulf oil might have been easier to extract, but the warning signs of conflict loomed. India and Iran might have civilizational ties but Tehran’s threats to the Strait of Hormuz were frequent, and its cooperation in Chabahar less than satisfactory. A nuclear Iran would have likely found itself so overconfident that an attempted closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have been inevitable.
Today, there can be no doubt that India needs a strategy in which no country or terrorist group can extort it or hold its economy hostage nor, for that matter, an erratic U.S. President. India should double down on Mozambique and seek out blocs off the Tanzanian and Kenyan coasts. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has long been overly cautious and conventional, but it must stop sacrificing India’s energy security to an outdated position on Somaliland. To suggest Somaliland does not deserve freedom from Islamist, pro-Beijing Somalia is akin to saying Bangladesh must revert to become East Pakistan. That Somaliland would welcome Indian trade simply makes India’s self-destructive policy even more astounding.
India might also cooperate with Rwanda, whose armed forces have brought security to Mozambique and the Central African Republic, and whose tech sector now makes capital Kigali a second Bangalore. Transparency International gives Rwanda a better score on countering corruption than India; Indians would find Rwanda an easy business hub. The tiny country also deals with the same U.S. hypocrisy as does India: U.S. envoys finger-wag about purchasing arms from Russia while without any sense of irony refuse to sell the weaponry needed to counter cross-border security threats.
For too long, when Indians view the Indian Ocean basin, they have looked only eastward. India’s energy security, however, lies to the west, where a little investment could mean energy flows absent maritime chokepoints. Indians may blame Trump for upsetting the status quo, but its foundation was already termite-ridden. India aspires to be a global economic if not military power, but it will achieve neither if it does not shed its self-imposed blinders and recognize it will not succeed absent Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, and Somaliland.
- Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC.
