India’s northern border and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have become prone to stand-offs that have an immediate effect on the national discourse and inspire wide ranging commentary. Responding to such national-security incidents, the military and the media work on differences compounded by the very different expected work speeds and cultures within the professions. Evidently, there are procedural voids in information dissemination, voids that are filled by loose interpretations, and heightened anxieties. The apparent chasm between incident-triggered information dissemination between the military and the media is characterised by four basic factors:
* The audio-visual medium, signified by 24×7 news cycles, have a mantra: “Get it first”, though the correct one should have been, “Get it first, but first get it right.” Getting it right is immaterial if it is, “breaking first on this channel.” For very understandable reasons for news organizations, negativity is much more impactful than positivity. Deeply ingrained in journalistic norms is the TV trope, “if it bleeds, it leads.”
* Social media has its own life, its own mantra: “spread bad news pronto, impede spread of rebuttals and clarifications.” On social media, negativity is a massive scale contagion, it sucks up negative news hungrily.
* The military has many mantras. The basic one is, “Never believe a first report, get details, details and more details.” Then commence with the “ensure the lid is tight for secrecy,” “inform the hierarchical bosses and staff (who will have a steady stream of more and more details and some nasty accusations and insinuations),” and “make the story right and palatable, to inform the government.” Someone (unfortunately) will have to clear dissemination, method, language, but will procrastinate till cleared by the next higher one, or when social and audio-visual media have gone berserk, and keeping quiet is not an option.
* The government has its own slow but steady systemic to absorb negative-news and response mechanism, but that is out of the purview of this discussion.
This is not to debate on 24×7 audio-visual media or the power of social media. For those are already unleashed and uncontrollable. Social media players are seemingly limitless, their capabilities are vast and their speed is in nano-seconds and less. In short, anyone can say or broadcast anything to anyone at any time, in real-time. Now this concept of social media is in stark contrast to the culture of a structured and disciplined military. Independent thought in units and up-the-chain-headquarters in the military is accepted and encouraged, but subordinates are generally required to be respectful and finally obey the superiors and execute, regardless of personal feelings and opinions. Social media is great; though often it not only enables but promotes exactly the opposite—disrespect and disobedience.
The relationship between the audio-visual medium and the military is not always an easy one. Military professionals abide by principles of honour, integrity, and loyalty. The historical distrust (“media-management” formulation of the military irks media professionals) has been combined with the realities of the 24/7 news cycle, that pushes the channels and journalists. The military is irritated at unfavourable coverage, seen as airing their dirty laundry. In fact, the reality is that the media considers military favourably, especially the vagaries of service and hence the relationship is largely on a solid footing. Obviously, there would be some exceptions.
The fact of the matter is that over the last decade, the audio-visual medium and its intersection with social media have transformed the nature of military information-dissemination. It has become a new battlespace. In the last five years, social media has dynamically changed the modern military incident experience not only for the military personnel, but also for their families and even the nation at large. Soldiers are themselves complex mechanisms; and now “remaining connected” with loved ones, friends, and even simply the world at large has become an imperative, thanks to hand-held smart devices. There is no divide anymore in space or time between the soldier and the world at large. This ability to connect comes with its apparent downsides.
As a live example, the conflict in Ukraine is truly the “first social media war,” as it is the first time that nearly everyone on the ground can serve as a de facto war correspondent, and share their experiences from the frontlines. One of the lessons from the war in Ukraine about social media is that there is no control on information. Russia tried that and failed. The adversaries’ inimical media dissemination outlets, like the ISPR and Global Times, are ever-ready too state versions that signify propaganda value. On the Balakot strike, the ISPR was first off the mark. With social media, everyone on the ground is now also a battlefield reporter, with a smartphone.
That brings us closer home. People in the nation watch feeds (some even live) of videos and photos of combat zones on social media, even before it is reported on news channels, and even before submitted as first information hierarchically up the military-chain. It is contended that the military has yet to accept that social media and 24×7 news cycle have overtaken the routine methodology of information dissemination. Since May 2020, transgressions in Eastern Ladakh, the expansionism and belligerence on the LAC are hot news. A case in point is that the first evacuation of casualties at Yangtse on 9 December 2022, the information that an altercation had happened was available, though may not have gone viral. Even before there was official acknowledgement and acceptance on 12 December, there was a social media glut, and the 24×7 news cycles had dissected the altercation seemingly threadbare with the large posse of “experts”. Differing versions of PLA troops from 300 to 600 and casualties evacuated to Military Hospital Guwahati from 6 to 35 were debated. The visuals of altercation shown had all the humour—Pangong Tso at Yangtse, with “FILE” mentioned in unreadable small print in one corner. The official statement, when it finally comes, does not help for its nature of brevity and obscurity, and hence also has some disbelief.
To state the obvious, the genie is uncaged, and is unchallengeable. Attempts to close ranks, apply guillotine, enforce Officials Secrets Act or such measures, in an era of information, will not succeed. The social media and the 24×7 news cycle have placed themselves as primary information disseminators; the relevance of official information dissemination is lost. The official media is taken as secondary in all military incident reportage, for obvious reasons. Media well understands the likely locations where stand-offs can take place, and a simple retainer to a local person can well provide the primary “Breaking News”.
The incidents on the LAC (and maybe even LOC) are bound to increase and increase their geographical spread. Within hours of any military related incident, the news will invariably be on social-media, and maybe soon thereafter on 24×7 news cycle. Three pathways can be considered for implementation, to adjust to the inevitability of this transformation that has occurred, and to bring credibility to the official channels:
* The military information disseminators must refashion policies positively and forcefully to retain their status of first, truthful, precise and continuous reporting. An ecosystem needs to be created from formation level and up the chain, with due exploitation of social media, with timelines, methodology, and content details that can be released. There is need for training, and delegation of responsibilities. There can be an odd misreporting or a mistake that should be acceptable as part of the information cycle, and can be corrected.
* India has a status in the comity of nations and exercising military power is inherent. A permanent military information (or press briefing) room is necessary at Commands and in Delhi where daily/regular press-briefings should be conducted. Accredited defence journalists are an important medium of the military-information system, and a commensurate establishment is certainly warranted.
* This is the information era and times of specialisation on all facets of strategic communication. There is a need of a specialist cadre of information managers who cater for this, are inducted as such, trained and deployed accordingly. The information era demands it. Short term postings based on English/Hindi language prowess do injustice to the very large and continuous ambit of information dominance. Because social media is based on information sharing, a potential exists for careless posting of information that could result in security risks, or go against policy.
In sum, the military has to confront this information chaos that routinely happens in the procrastination of official military channels’ response. The signposts for the chaos are apparent and the information vacuum is leading to commentators with incredible and implausible ideas and scenarios. The official channels must regain ground and superiority by refashioning policies.
Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma (Retd) is a military veteran.