Both the Indian government and Indian businesses will gladly give Trump
small-big wins that he can sell to his support base. However, India will not be a walkover.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, for a meeting with President Donald Trump is significant as it marks a reset in India-US engagement under a more transactional and disruptive, yet less interfering, US administration.
TRUMP 2.0
Trump 2.0 has been highly disruptive from day one—withdrawing from multilateral agencies and commitments, cracking down on the misuse of funds by USAID, imposing tariffs, and even signalling territorial ambitions over the Panama Canal, Canada, Greenland, and the Gaza strip.
In India’s context, while Trump personally invited President Xi Jinping to his inauguration, no such public invitation was extended to Prime Minister Modi. However, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, attending as PM’s special envoy, was given a highly prominent seat at the event. Trump 2.0’s first multilateral engagement was with Quad representatives, and his Secretary of State’s first bilateral meeting was with Dr Jaishankar.
Despite Trump repeatedly labelling India as a tariff king and a significant trade abuser, the initial tariff pressure has been directed at China, Canada, and Mexico—not India. However, just days before Modi’s scheduled White House visit, US authorities deported 104 Indians who were in the US illegally, and circulated images of them in shackles. Among them were 33 Gujaratis—directly impacting Modi’s image in his home state. Trump also signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum intensifying pressure on Iran, including modifying or rescinding sanctions waivers related to the Chabahar port project, a strategically important venture where India has made significant investments.
While the consequences of disruptions in US foreign policy and agencies will take time to unfold, PM Modi’s February visit could mark a positive turn in Indo-US ties. Relations had soured over the US weaponising its Justice Department against India and Indian business, to the point that the BJP publicly accused the US State Department’s USAID and other deep-state elements of attempting to destabilise India.
In that regard, Trump 2.0 has already benefited India by cracking down on USAID and exposing its nefarious activities in various countries, including India. The administration has also halted funding to all nations except Israel and Egypt, thereby stopping the money flow used to foment protests. Justin Trudeau and Hindenburg Research—two other irritants to India—have folded.
It is almost certain that the Trump administration will minimise ideological interventionism in India. It is also expected to target those within the US establishment who have weaponised the judiciary, given Trump sees himself as a victim of such tactics. His commitment to freeing the US from the deep state’s grip—including operators like George Soros, whom he despises—would indirectly benefit India. While India must remain cautious of China filling the covert space in its neighbourhood, Trump 2.0’s actions eliminates a key irritant—US-backed activism and regime-change efforts—that had strained bilateral ties.
Trump harbours a dislike for Muhammad Yunus, who heads the caretaker government of Bangladesh. During the campaigning, Trump condemned attacks on minorities in Bangladesh. The involvement of Soros and China in Bangladesh, as well as the free run given to Islamist extremists, is not in US interest. Therefore, the Trump administration is likely to exert pressure on Bangladesh to hold free and fair elections and reduce its alignment with Islamist extremist groups.
During his first term, Trump was willing to take action on behalf of India in the event of a terrorist attack on the latter. Given this stance, along with his resolve to dismantle the deep state and his projection as a “law and order” President, he is unlikely to allow pro-Khalistan extremists to operate freely on American soil. He has also pledged to protect the interests of Hindu Americans against the anti-religion agenda of the radical left. Key figures in his administration are either pro-India or have ties to India. Overall, this would enhance the safety of the Indian diaspora, as well as the security of Indian diplomatic missions.
Freedom from US interference in India and its neighbourhood is of immense value for India’s internal and external security, as is the safety of Indian missions and the Indian community in the US. If securing that requires offering Trump a few symbolic victories for his domestic narrative, a Gujarati mind would see that as an easy trade-off.
MODI 3.0
Narendra Modi is serving his third term as Prime Minister of the world’s largest democracy and fastest-growing economy—one that is courted by many nations and increasingly seen as the voice of the Global South. The Indian diaspora in the US is economically powerful, and overwhelmingly supports Modi. While President Trump does resort to bluster, he is smart to know where to draw the line. So, he will extend respect to PM Modi, even as he pushes hard on trade negotiations.
India has already taken steps to counter trade related pressure from the US. The last budget announced a review of the customs duty structure to rationalise it, and the 2025-26 budget has brought down the peak rate from 150% to 70% that applied to only five items but created a perception of India as a high-tariff country. The Finance Secretary has clarified that duties on the top 30 items imported from the US fall within the 0-7.5% range. As Trump had specifically mentioned the duty on Harley Davidson bikes, that too has been reduced.
India is considering increasing imports from the US to appease Trump. In 2023, the United States surpassed the UAE to become the second-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas to India, with Qatar holding the top spot. As demand in India continues to soar, there is potential for more LNG imports from the US. However, the specifics of the sectors—be it LNG, defence or tech—are not the focus here.
The Modi government has also introduced major income tax relief that would increase disposable incomes, boost consumer spending, and strengthen domestic demand. This could serve as a strategic buffer, mitigating potential economic fallout from Trump’s tariff wars and broader trade policies.
It is quite clear that the most effective way to deal with Trump is through trade incentives and occasional flattery. In November 2024, Gautam Adani, in a congratulatory post on X, announced plans to invest $10 billion in US energy security and resilient infrastructure projects, aiming to create up to 15,000 jobs. In the same month, Reliance Industries made headlines by acquiring a 21% stake in US-based Wavetech Helium for $12 million. The Ambanis also attended Trump’s pre-inauguration celebration event.
Both the Indian government and Indian businesses will gladly give Trump small-big wins that he can sell to his support base. However, India will not be a walkover. It is worth remembering here that during the Lok Sabha elections, Narendra Modi had warned against foreign interference and stated that those elements would witness the power of India, its democracy and its voters. In December 2024, the BJP publicly accused the US elements of destabilising India. It was convenient timing given Trump’s commitment to dismantle the deep state, but even then, it was an unexpected and bold move that clearly signalled the end of tolerance towards US interference.
The difference in the Indian and American readouts of the Modi-Trump phone call in January is telling. The US highlighted “friendship and strategic ties” and mentioned Quad. In contrast, India emphasised a “mutually beneficial and trusted partnership” but avoided the word “friendship.” India, which is set to host Quad leaders this year, excluded any mention of it, even though it was Trump 2.0’s first multilateral engagement. The American readout referred to Modi’s upcoming White House visit, whereas India merely mentioned a meeting “at a mutually convenient date.” While Modi’s post on X about the said call was friendly, the official Indian readout lacked warmth, and by omitting Quad, subtly signalled India’s indispensability in the Indo-Pacific.
A WIN-WIN
PM Modi and President Trump share a strong personal rapport and are known for their “common sense” approaches. Both leaders project a strongman image, prioritise national interests and self-reliance, and position themselves as champions of the common people. Modi has upheld India First despite immense pressure over Russia ties, while Trump pursues America First, even at the cost of old alliances. Trump is a businessman and a deal maker. Modi is a Gujarati who instinctively understands business and deal making. Trump is highly transactional; NaMo is at ease with his number two, who is quite transactional. Both leaders will deal with each other quite well, striking balances that allow both to claim wins and save face.
Beyond this give-and-take, however, New Delhi must reinforce its strategic red lines with the US—something Trump will likely accept, as he neither sees India as a threat nor appears interested in regime change operations in its neighbourhood or in undermining India’s interests.
Under Modi, India has mastered the art of maintaining strong ties with rival powers. Trump, meanwhile, is alienating even long-standing allies. Modi, from experience, knows that fighting battles on all fronts is exhausting. He would readily offer concessions or take a hit if it meant eliminating US interference, capitalising on US isolationism to expand India’s global footprint, and advancing the multipolar world India seeks.
Trump will soon realise—if he has not already—that he needs allies. India is hardly a problem for the US and could be a valuable partner in mutually beneficial areas. Contrary to what many believe, Trump’s upfront honesty about his objectives and his commitment to purge US deep state elements (“swacchh” America) could drive the Indo-US relationship forward more effectively than the American empty rhetoric of “natural allies” while undercutting Indian interests.
* Semu Bhatt is a strategic adviser, author, and founder of FuturisIndia.