Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and China’s Special Representative on the Boundary Question with India, visited New Delhi from August 18 to 20 at the invitation of the Indian side to attend the 24th meeting of the China-India Special Representatives on the Boundary Question. During his three-day visit he met India’s Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s National Security Advisor and Special Representative, Ajit Doval, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The visit has been seen as a path breaking for resetting the frayed India-China relations.
The thaw cannot be considered sudden, for since the Galwan clashes in 2020, India and China have held 21 rounds of talks at the corps commander level, 17 rounds of meetings under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), as well as several rounds of discussions between the foreign ministers and national security advisors of both countries, before the “patrolling arrangement” was agreed upon and announced by Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October 2024. In total, the two countries have held 24 rounds of Special Representatives’ talks and 34 rounds of WMCC meetings. Ajit Doval, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have all visited China within a span of eight months. Therefore, Wang Yi’s visit could be regarded as a continuation of this momentum, albeit under a very different international environment.
Second, India’s sensitivities on the border are evident, as “de-escalation” has remained a recurring theme in bilateral talks, whereas China has emphasised placing the border issue in the “proper position” within overall bilateral relations. This contrast is also reflected in the MEA statement, which, unlike the Chinese statement, focuses more on the “setting up of an Expert Group under the WMCC to explore early harvest measures in boundary delimitation in the India-China border areas; the establishment of a Working Group under the WMCC to advance effective border management; and, in order to maintain peace and tranquillity along the India-China border areas, the creation of General-Level Mechanisms in the Eastern and Middle Sectors, in addition to the existing General-Level Mechanism in the Western Sector.”
No wonder Wang Yi, during this visit, reiterated the need to “establish the right strategic perception” (树立正确战略认知) of bilateral relations and to “view each other as partners and opportunities rather than as rivals or threats, and devote their valuable resources to national development and rejuvenation.” He further emphasized that China is ready to uphold the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, inclusiveness, and a shared future, and to work together with neighbouring countries, including India, to jointly build the “five homes” (五大家园) of peace, tranquillity, prosperity, beauty, and friendship.
However, the element of “mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual sensitivity,” which the Indian Prime Minister advocated in Kazan as the foundation of bilateral relations, is conspicuously absent. But then, this has been China’s stated foreign policy approach toward the Belt and Road countries and the Global South in general.
Third, in the Chinese statement, Wang Yi summarized the outcomes of his meeting with Prime Minister Modi as reaching a “new consensus” in two areas. On bilateral relations, both sides agreed to restart dialogue mechanisms in various fields, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, uphold multilateralism, jointly respond to global challenges, and oppose unilateral bullying. On the boundary question, he told Prime Minister Modi that both sides agreed to carry out normalized management and control, maintain peace and tranquillity in border areas, properly handle sensitive points, and, where conditions permit, initiate boundary delimitation talks. The statement also says that India accepts Taiwan as part of China, forcing the government to clarify its “One China Policy”.
Here again, however, the notion of “early harvest measures in boundary delimitation” runs counter to the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. Nonetheless, the new mechanisms on the border, resumption of border trade at Nathu La, Lipulekh, and Shipki La, and resumption of flights at the earliest are some of the concrete measures. Hope the stalled projects such as the mutual translation are also resumed at the earliest.
Fourth, there has been bilateral coordination within multilateral mechanisms, including India reaffirming its full support for China as the SCO chair and China supporting India’s hosting of the BRICS Summit in 2026. From the Chinese perspective, these mechanisms represent efforts by the Global South to build a more just and equitable international order within the framework of the United Nations. Further coordination between the two sides, according to Qian Feng, a researcher at the National Strategy Institute of Tsinghua University, will have a positive impact on strengthening unity among Global South countries and on promoting the building of a new type of international relations.
While the SCO has disrupted terrorist plots and reduced cross-border extremist activity in Central Asia, it has not fully contained the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, China’s perspective on cross-border terrorism in India diverges significantly, as reflected in Chinese discourse following the Pahalgam terror attack and in Ambassador Xu Feihong’s recent remarks in Delhi that “Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism”.
Five, with regard to US tariffs, China and India do share some common ground. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States earlier this year, despite his overtures to Trump, Washington’s stance toward India remained largely unchanged. On the contrary, India was hit with an additional 25% tariff over the existing 25% for purchasing Russian oil. During his recent visit to Russia, India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar expressed that he was “perplexed” by this logic, noting that India is not the largest purchaser of Russian oil, that is China; nor is it the largest purchaser of LNG, that is the European Union.
Therefore, it could be argued that any new signs of India-China bonhomie at this point in time are driven largely by tactical rather than strategic factors. They amount to geopolitical signalling, as both countries are feeling the impact of Trump’s tariffs, particularly India, which has been unsettled by Trump undoing the hard-won warmth between the historically estranged democracies. China, for its part, has sought to prevent India from moving too close to Washington, while India has consistently aspired to preserve its strategic autonomy and maintain room for diplomatic manoeuvrings among the major powers.
Certainly, closer India-China ties could complicate US efforts to isolate China, but only up to a point, as Chinese economy remain intertwined with the global economy. For India too, given the structure of its trade with China, economic pragmatism has tended to prevail over political mistrust, with India relying on critical imports and China valuing access to India’s vast market.
Six, a stronger Beijing-Delhi line could, in theory, spur Asia-led trade blocs less reliant on Washington, but structural frictions limit the prospect. China drives initiatives like RCEP, while India withdrew over trade imbalance concerns and remains wary of Beijing’s dominance. Though better ties might symbolically bolster regional frameworks, India’s pursuit of deals with the EU, UK, Australia, and the Quad economies makes its commitment to any “China-led” order unlikely.
Seven, there are also speculations that what would happen to India’s Indo-Pacific outlook. The warmer India-China ties are unlikely to dismantle the Quad, but could subtly shift its role. The Quad’s cohesion rests not only on balancing China but also on shared goals such as resilient supply chains, emerging technologies, climate cooperation, and maritime security. A friendlier Beijing-Delhi line might temper India’s appetite for overtly anti-China positioning within the grouping, nudging the Quad toward a broader agenda of providing public goods in the Indo-Pacific rather than functioning as a blunt counter-China bloc, an approach that India has always taken, regardless of how China perceives it. Warmer ties could soften the Quad’s edge, but they would not diminish its strategic relevance.
Finally, the talks of India moving away from the Washington orbit, and the revival of Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral mechanism, India’s Indo-Pacific outlook and China’s close military ties with Pakistan, as demonstrated during “Operation Sindoor” in May make it unlikely that India would swing decisively toward China. Thus, while temporary bonhomie may complicate US efforts by signalling that India is not fully in Washington’s camp, deep-rooted mistrust ensures that India-China convergence in global institutions will remain limited and issue-based rather than strategic.
B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
